The Truth’s Perspective: Hemedti… The Speech of the End
Ibrahim Shaglawi
In wars, speeches are not judged by their passionate rhetoric, but by what they reveal about shifts in the balance of power and the contradictions they expose between language and reality. Politics does not merely read words; it reads what lies behind them—the timing of the speech, its context, body language, the messages deliberately conveyed, and those that inadvertently escape between the lines. In this sense, the latest speech by the rebel commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti,” appeared less like a declaration and more like a political document reflecting the predicament of a project that has begun to fade after losing the initiative.
The speech came after significant military developments in North Kordofan, where the Sudanese Armed Forces regained control of Bara, Jabra Al-Sheikh, and Umm Sayala, while securing the export road linking Omdurman to El-Obeid. These developments suggest that the initiative has shifted to the army, carrying direct implications for the strategic depth of the RSF, its ability to maintain supply lines and maneuver, and ultimately its future position.
Against this backdrop, Hemedti’s repeated phrases such as “From today there is no sleep,” “Change the rules of the game,” and “To be or not to be” sounded more like mobilizing rhetoric aimed at restoring confidence within his forces than an announcement of a new offensive phase. Leaders who hold the initiative rarely need to address their followers through existential calls to mobilization, because realities on the ground are usually sufficient to generate confidence without invoking it through words.
He appeared pale and exhausted, his gaze shifting between distraction and hesitation, while his expressions suggested difficulty in delivering his message under the weight of mounting pressures. Although body language alone cannot determine conclusions, in politics it acquires significance when it intersects with other indicators, highlighting a contrast between a speech intended to project confidence and an appearance that suggested the strain of battlefield setbacks.
The speech gained additional significance through repeated references to a “fifth column,” warnings against filming military operations, and calls to “clean the ranks.” Such language often reflects growing concerns about organizational cohesion and fears of internal infiltration. Likewise, his statement that “the reins are in your hands” appeared to transfer part of the burden of managing the war to field commanders, potentially indicating reduced central control or increasing difficulty in maintaining command cohesion.
These indications become more pronounced when compared with reports circulating from the battlefield about shortages of fuel, ammunition, and supplies, declining trust among commanders, and tribal tensions. Although these reports remain difficult to verify independently, their coincidence with military setbacks and the tone of the speech gives them analytical significance and may point to a deeper structural crisis beyond battlefield losses.
The RSF itself occupies a unique position. It did not emerge as a conventional rebel movement; rather, it was a legally established force that later rebelled against the army amid ambitions to reshape the political order. As the war unfolded, the conflict moved beyond a struggle over power-sharing to become a struggle over the nature of the state, the monopoly of armed force, and who has the authority to redefine Sudan’s political system.
Thus, discussing the decline of the project does not necessarily imply the immediate end of the force itself, but rather the weakening of the idea upon which the war was built: imposing a new political reality through armed power outside state institutions. The assumption was that military control would produce political legitimacy, yet developments on the ground suggest that the project is now facing a crisis in imposing its conditions even before confronting a crisis of survival.
Notably, Hemedti attempted to combine the language of war with the language of peace. He spoke of protecting civilians, affirmed that he was not opposed to peace, yet simultaneously hinted at expanding the conflict. This contradiction reflects an attempt to preserve political space that could attract supporters while also boosting the morale of forces that have suffered major setbacks in recent weeks.
Meanwhile, the movements of the Sudanese Armed Forces carried political messages alongside military gains. The appearance of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, among troops in Kordofan projected confidence in the course of military operations, while RSF leadership appeared under growing pressure. In war, political symbolism often becomes a significant factor in sustaining morale.
These developments also coincide with renewed international political activity through the upcoming meetings of the Quint Mechanism in Addis Ababa, reflecting the close relationship between diplomacy and battlefield realities. Political settlements tend to reposition themselves whenever the balance of power shifts, as international actors understand that no solution can be detached from realities established on the ground.
Yet international engagement is clearly driven by interests and influence. The weakening of a project in which some regional actors had invested creates a new reality and forces them to reassess their strategies in search of influence within the next political process. Nevertheless, any future political settlement in Sudan will remain tied to the Sudanese demand that accountability and transitional justice serve as the foundation of any agreement.
Sudan’s experience, however, demonstrates that external calculations cannot create legitimacy. Projects aimed at reshaping the state without national consent inevitably collide with the reality that Sudan is not a territory for guardianship and that its people have repeatedly had the final say—from the October Revolution to the April Intifada and the December Revolution. External influence may alter the course of crises, but it cannot confer legitimacy where national acceptance is absent.
This may not be Hemedti’s final speech. Yet it may become the first speech that history remembers as the announcement of a project’s end—a conclusion written by the will of the Sudanese people.
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