Islamists… Rule by the Outside or Rule by the Ballot Box?

By: Dr. Ibrahim Shaglawi

At major turning points in the history of nations, ethical questions move ahead of tactical calculations, and the question of the homeland becomes the standard by which the credibility of any political project is measured.

In the Sudanese case, the debate over excluding the Islamists returns as a dual test: a test of respect for the popular will, and a test of the ability of internal and external actors to distinguish between the necessities of stability and the humiliation of tutelage. Sudanese are not an object for political re-engineering from abroad, but a people who possess their full right to decide who governs them, how they are governed, and with what program, and they have a deep-rooted history in that despite the challenges.

Since the fall of the former president Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, two opposing narratives have formed within the Sudanese scene. The first sees what happened as a moment of liberation that reopened the horizon of the civil state. The second — strongly present within the Islamist current — sees that the post-fall path was gradually designed to reduce their presence in political life through manufactured legal and political tools.

Between the two narratives, the truth remains more complex in light of regional and international transformations. However, the notable recent development is the emergence of more explicit external rhetoric and intervention in internal affairs, pushing toward excluding the Islamists from any political equation.

Here the position of the United Arab Emirates clearly emerges, as reflected in its declared positions, which its representative to the United Nations, Mohamed Abu Shihab, expressed yesterday in the Security Council when he called for a political process leading to an independent civilian government free from extremist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood.

Formally, the speech came within the context of condemning violations and calling for an end to the war — goals that enjoy wide consensus. Politically, however, this proposal raised questions within Sudanese circles about the limits of the external role and its legitimacy, given that Islamists in Sudan are not described as extremist and this has not been proven in their political practice during their experience.

What matters in this context is that this position does not necessarily represent the consensus of the Security Council as an international body, but rather reflects the vision of a specific state within the regional and international arrangements concerned with the Sudanese file. This distinction is not a procedural detail but a fundamental issue in reading the balances. When the position of a single state is presented in the guise of international consensus, the picture of the scene becomes blurred, and the internal feeling that there is an attempt to direct the Sudanese political path from outside its national will is strengthened.

Not far from this tense climate, Sudan took a notable step when the Security and Defense Council announced in May 2025 the classification of the United Arab Emirates as an aggressor state and severed diplomatic relations with it, in a political indicator reflecting the depth of the crisis and the divergence of visions regarding the course of the war and the limits of external intervention.

This step reveals that the gap of trust between the two sides is no longer merely a diplomatic dispute but has become an influential factor in the calculations of the transitional phase. This prompted Sudan to reject the Quartet’s efforts, which include the UAE, on the grounds that it seeks to approve a humanitarian truce leading to ending the war in a way that saves the Rapid Support Forces militia that it clearly supports — according to what international reports and news agencies such as Reuters have indicated — in addition to its efforts to impose its vision in shaping the Sudanese scene.

Internally, this external dimension overlapped with the accumulations after 2019, as the experience of the Empowerment Removal Committee, despite its declared objectives, contributed to deepening the feeling among sectors of Islamists that transitional justice had completely slipped toward the logic of political dominance. With the controversy surrounding the Bar Association’s constitution and then the Framework Agreement, the impression was entrenched among these sectors that the engineering of the transitional phase was not sufficiently inclusive, even if those initiatives — in the view of their supporters — were launched from an attempt to re-establish the state after the collapse of its center.

A statement by Dr. Amin Hassan Omar, a leader in the Islamic movement and one of its thinkers, adds an ethical and political dimension to this position. In a previous podcast appearance, he formulated the Islamic movement’s self-perception, saying: “The Islamists will not knock on the door until a generous host permits them entry or a vile one bars them from it… The Islamists are the owners of the house and among its people and were the most truthful and sacrificial among them… Whoever greets us, we return the greeting with better than it, and whoever challenges us knows the field.”

This statement does not only represent a defensive position but reflects a deep awareness of the social and historical roots of the Islamic movement and its vision of its place as an authentic component in the fabric of the Sudanese state and society. The historical background of the Islamic movement in Sudan — since its emergence in the 1940s, through its role in the 1989 coup, then the transformations after 2019 — confirms that it is a political and social component that cannot be ignored in the equation, but this does not mean granting it permanent immunity. Therefore, the only fair and safe standard for the country and the region, in a state aspiring to transition and stability with no return to conflict, is the ballot box.

Likewise, a statement by Sana Hamad, a leader in the Islamic movement, to Al Jazeera Mubasher last week adds a realistic dimension to the idea, as she expects the army to remain part of the governing equation in the foreseeable future due to the realities of the war and the balance of power.

This assessment reflects a good understanding of the nature of post-conflict states, which was also stated by the head of the Shura of the National Congress in Al-Muhaqqiq News, Dr. Othman Kibir. However, it gains its real weight from the movement’s position rejecting the formation of a legislative council without elections — a position that reaffirms the golden rule the Islamic movement has long defended — even if some disagree with it — namely: legitimacy is not granted by top-down decisions but derived from popular mandate.

The war of April 15, 2023, dramatically rearranged the scene and brought back to the forefront the discourse of “restoring the state.” Amid these developments, mutual accusations escalated regarding regional roles in supporting the parties to the conflict, and international reports and Western media coverage addressed these allegations with varying degrees of confirmation and reservation. Politically, however, what remains constant is that any external involvement — regardless of its source — remains an additional complicating factor in a Sudanese crisis that, in its essence, requires a comprehensive national path rather than proxy conflicts.

What can be said with a higher degree of certainty is that the war has once again reshaped the scene and pushed broad sectors of public opinion to reassess the priorities of the phase, as the narrative of “restoring the state” has advanced over many of the post-2019 slogans.

At this precise moment, the old debate returns in a new form: who has the right to determine who participates in Sudanese politics?

The most coherent ethical and political starting point remains clear: no permanent exclusion of any current as long as it adheres to peaceful and legal political work, and no political immunity for any actor outside the balance of popular mandate. True stability is not built on the exclusion of one side, nor on the unconditional return of another, but on a delicate equation based on free competition under the roof of law and constitution.

Sudan today stands before a difficult but possible opportunity: to transform the memory of conflict into the basis of a new political social contract. If the next phase is managed in the spirit of domination, the same cycle will renew itself with different names. But if it is managed with the mind of the state and the spirit of the ballot box, the country may emerge from the tunnel of disgraceful polarization.

Therefore, the decisive conclusion is that Sudan today stands before a delicate equation: the comprehensive exclusion of any political current carries the risk of detonating the opposing actor, while imposing political maps from abroad, under any title, undermines the foundation of national legitimacy and subjects the country to a new form of soft colonization. The least costly and most sustainable path remains clear: open political competition under the roof of law, and strict recourse to free and fair ballot boxes.

Sudan, with the long history of its state and the vitality of its society, does not need someone to choose the features of its future for it, but rather someone who respects the right of its people to draw that future.

The real question is no longer who wins the battle of narratives, but who has the courage to accept the rule of the ballot box. States are not built by domination, nor stabilized by imported prescriptions, but by a national contract that people trust. Sudan — wounded yet ancient in its political sense — does not need someone to choose its representatives for it, but someone to open the way for its people to say their full and undiminished word.

Only here does the dialectic of exclusion end, and the state of popular will begin.