Face of Truth: The International Quartet: A Battle of Interests Undermines Peace Prospects..!
Ibrahim Shglawi
At a moment when attention was focused on the upcoming meeting of the International Quartet in Washington—seen as an opportunity to break the deadlock in Sudan’s ongoing war—the sudden announcement of its cancellation revealed not only the complexity of the Sudanese file but also the fragility of the international initiative itself.
What was expected to be a culmination of coordinated international efforts toward peace instead turned into a scene of clashing agendas within the Quartet—comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. It became evident that a lack of shared vision had overshadowed any real possibility for consensus.
Diplomatic leaks indicated that the disagreements were not about the declared objective, but rather about the mechanisms and approaches—chief among them, the issue of expanding international participation to include actors such as the UK, Qatar, and the European Union. While the U.S. supported this expansion, others opposed it, fearing a loss of control over the collective decision-making process.
This division was not just procedural—it reflected fundamental differences in priorities: the U.S. views Sudan through a geopolitical lens, linked to competition with China and Russia; regional powers focus more on border stability and their immediate interests. Meanwhile, Sudan as a state and people remains absent from the equation of decision-making and resolution.
The exclusion of the Sudanese army and the official government from the meeting—despite the agenda covering security arrangements and humanitarian aid—raised serious doubts about the initiative’s sincerity. How can a ceasefire be negotiated in the absence of those with the power to enforce it on the ground? This absence is yet another indicator that what’s being shaped behind closed doors does not reflect the aspirations of Sudanese people, but rather repackages regional power dynamics under a political façade.
The situation became more complex when the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the “Ta’sis” coalition recently announced the formation of a parallel government in the city of Nyala, Darfur. Named the “Government of Peace and Unity,” it appointed Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemedti” as president, Abdel Aziz al-Hilu as deputy, and Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi as prime minister.
This move—accompanied by the reactivation of administrative structures in RSF-controlled areas—represents a de facto fragmentation of the state and a shift from a power struggle to a battle over geography and legitimacy. The Sudanese government and social media activists reacted strongly, rejecting the development as an attempt to dismantle the country.
Such a declaration undermines any peace process led from abroad without genuine engagement from ground actors. It reinforces the notion that international laxity and division within the Quartet are not opening a path to peace but instead laying the groundwork for undeclared partition. It also raises questions about the legitimacy of any initiative that lacks popular mandate or political backing from international institutions like the UN and the African Union.
The failure of the Washington meeting should not be seen as a mere diplomatic setback. It is further evidence of the absence of a unified international will and the lack of legal and representative foundations. Peace in Sudan cannot be built on top-down settlements or power-sharing arrangements—it must be grounded in a comprehensive political process that emerges from within, based on national legitimacy and without external guardianship.
In this context, the recent experiences of Libya and Yemen offer valuable lessons. In both cases, regional and international actors played dual roles—conflict participants and peace brokers—thereby stripping peace processes of credibility.
Instead of responding to the voice of victims, such mediations became tools for brokering influence and interests. The result: recurring wars and fragile agreements. If those actors failed to deliver peace in those contexts, what qualifies them to succeed in Sudan—especially when their approach is driven by dominance, not responsibility?
Tying Sudan’s future to foreign interests is a proven recipe for repeated failure—unless Sudanese themselves break this pattern through a courageous and fundamental review of political divisions and rally around a homegrown national project, backed by the state, the army, and political forces.
According to what we see in #Face_of_Truth, what’s happening in Sudan today is not just a power struggle or a quest for state resources—it is a struggle over the very definition of the state. The current format of the international Quartet lacks the ingredients for a solution and instead mirrors a shameful history that helped lead Sudan into this war, shaped by shifting balances and conflicting interests.
The truth that must be acknowledged is that any peace imposed without the will of Sudanese people will be stillborn. A truly inclusive national project will not emerge from an international decree or a political declaration issued in Nyala or Washington—but from an internal will that asserts itself and forces others to listen.
Wishing you well and in good health.
Thursday, July 31, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com