Truth Be Told: Water Security and the Government of Hope
Ibrahim Shglawi
Following the announcement by transitional Prime Minister Dr. Kamal El-Tayeb Idris of the features of the civilian Government of Hope—accompanied by promises to reform governance on the basis of national merit rather than political quotas—a proposal emerged to merge the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation with the Ministry of Agriculture. This suggestion is part of a broader restructuring plan aimed at reducing administrative waste and enhancing institutional efficiency.
However, according to experts, this proposal touches on a deeply strategic matter that is directly tied to Sudan’s national security. It raises critical questions about the state’s understanding of resource management in a highly sensitive regional and international context.
In Sudan’s case, water is no longer just a technical matter to be managed under a sectoral ministry like agriculture; it has become an existential issue tied to the very survival of the state. As a key country in the Nile Basin, Sudan faces increasing geopolitical complexities—from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), to groundwater management, and the rising regional contest over transboundary rivers and aquifers. In this context, it is no longer politically or technically acceptable to manage water resources within a non-specialized body. What the moment demands is an independent and empowered Ministry of Water Resources—one that possesses technical sovereignty, institutional authority, and scientific expertise to lead this strategic portfolio.
It is time for irrigation to step aside from leading the water file. The often-overlooked fact is that irrigation deals primarily with consumption, while water resources concern the supply of this vital commodity. Between supply and consumption lies a comprehensive chain of processes: from electricity generation, water storage, and groundwater exploitation, to future applications such as green hydrogen production. These pathways require a unified and dominant institutional body capable of crafting a national water policy aligned with security priorities, not merely a facilitator for agricultural irrigation.
Historically, the Ministry of Water Resources has been absent from the frontlines of public financing, as state budgets have largely focused on irrigation projects. This gap is not only the result of a narrow sectoral vision, but also a broader failure to elevate water to the level of a sovereign resource that transcends daily production metrics. Further complicating matters is the lack of centralized governance over Sudan’s fragmented water infrastructure—ranging from dams and reservoirs to groundwater, seasonal streams, and the Nile. These components require a unified authority with clear decision-making powers.
Furthermore, the debate over merging the two ministries cannot be isolated from the deteriorating internal conditions within the Ministry of Irrigation itself, which reportedly lacks a long-term strategic plan, policies to regulate water use, and technical preparedness for emerging challenges—especially those related to GERD, whether in times of water abundance or in the event of a catastrophic failure. In this light, opposition to the merger—though justified—must be accompanied by comprehensive institutional reform, including strategic planning, governance, capacity building, negotiation readiness, and a robust technical vision to confront climate change, erratic rainfall, flooding, and groundwater exploitation already underway by neighboring countries.
It is also essential to learn from past failures. The previous merger of the agriculture and irrigation ministries led to a clear conflict of interest between water users and regulators, resulting in disjointed coordination, deterioration of irrigation infrastructure, water wastage, and a decline in Sudan’s representation at international water forums. Agriculture, while a major beneficiary of water, cannot and should not be its regulator. Such a setup compromises institutional neutrality and undermines balance among stakeholders.
In the absence of that neutrality, the establishment of a sovereign Water Resources Center becomes imperative—a central hub for water data, planning, and execution, empowered to allocate water volumes, timings, and quality based on national priorities, not pressure from end-users. Thus, the independence of the Ministry of Water Resources is not a bureaucratic demand, but the cornerstone of Sudan’s sovereign and developmental future.
The danger is even more pronounced considering that Sudan does not yet possess an integrated national water policy that links available resources to industrial development, climate planning, agriculture, energy, and urban expansion. An independent ministry is the only institutional vessel capable of crafting such a vision, building partnerships with academia and research centers, representing Sudan in global negotiations, and engaging international financial institutions from a position of strength—not dependency.
This critical file, with all its complexity, cannot be confined to limited technical discussions. It must be elevated to a national dialogue involving decision-makers, experts, and stakeholders through specialized workshops and forums that culminate in a comprehensive water strategy. This is especially urgent given Sudan’s fragile political and environmental reality, where domestic institutional weakness intersects with regional pressures and ecological threats.
Defending the independence of the Ministry of Water Resources, as we see it through this #Truth_Be_Told column, must go beyond administrative formality. It is rooted in the understanding that water is Sudan’s foremost sovereign resource, and the first line of defense in the nation’s struggle for survival. Any complacency in this matter is a direct compromise of Sudan’s future—especially in a world where power is increasingly determined not by who holds weapons, but by who controls water… and manages it wisely.
With best wishes,
Wednesday, June 25, 2025
📧 Shglawi55@gmail.com