The Face of Truth: They Await the Wrong Chess Move
Ibrahim Shglawi
In a political and social climate overshadowed by anxiety and burdened by the consequences of war, the growing debate surrounding the anticipated government of Dr. Kamal Idris reflects a microcosm of the broader struggle between aspirations for good governance and the entrenched legacy of political patronage and empowerment. While the Prime Minister, at least in his official discourse, aims to establish a new path based on competence and professionalism, away from power-sharing quotas, the political and media scene remains clouded by persistent rumors and misinformation—rumors that the Prime Minister’s Office continues to refute and clarify.
The statement issued by the Prime Minister’s Office, which firmly denied circulating claims on some media platforms about paid electronic applications for ministerial positions, reflects a legitimate concern over attempts to manipulate public opinion or tarnish the image of the government before its formation. However, despite the statement’s clarity, it left open the broader question: What, in principle, prevents the selection of ministers through a transparent, competitive, and professionally supervised electronic mechanism? And if such a system does not yet exist, why not create it?
The circulating proposal of an academic committee from the University of Khartoum tasked with reviewing ministerial applications—if proven true—marks a qualitative shift in the transitional government’s approach. On the surface, it aligns with Kamal Idris’s rhetoric on competence, transparency, and good governance. Yet, the government’s denial of such a move sends a mixed message: on the one hand, denying the existence of an electronic pathway; on the other, promising a cabinet free from partisan quotas and based solely on merit. In this ambiguity, the public remains torn between belief and suspicion, particularly given a long history of promises that have often turned into backroom deals.
The most striking reality in this scene is that traditional power centers—political or military—will not stand idly by in the face of a project that seeks to redistribute influence based on competence rather than loyalty. Early signs of such confrontation have already emerged through the alignments and counter-statements issued by armed groups such as “Ghadiboon” (The Angry), “Sudan Shield,” and “Al-Bara ibn Malik Brigade,” among others—forces that played decisive roles in battles against the Rapid Support Forces. These groups view their participation in the war as a source of political legitimacy, and any exclusion from the political process may be seen as betrayal or denial.
Conversely, should Dr. Kamal Idris’s government succumb to this symbolic blackmail or be pressured into awarding “compensatory seats” to armed factions based on their military roles, it would be repeating the same formulas that led to the Juba Agreement and its subsequent failures. Under such conditions, it would be difficult to speak of competence, fairness, or transparency in the distribution of power.
Perhaps the gravest threat lies in the “small political chambers” that, according to multiple sources, have begun exerting unspoken pressure on the decision-making circle. These actors seek to promote specific individuals or blocs under appealing labels, while hiding behind narrow partisan, regional, or personal interests. This form of “covert politics” poses a real threat to any reform initiative—regardless of its intentions—because it rebrands failure in a new language.
Within this context came the recent address delivered by transitional Prime Minister Dr. Kamal Idris to the Sudanese people. In it, he outlined the features of the upcoming “Government of Hope,” diagnosing Sudan’s chronic crises—chiefly, poor resource management, weak leadership, injustice in wealth and power distribution, and rampant corruption. Idris declared that the new government would adopt a scientific and professional approach rooted in competence and integrity, free from partisan quotas, and focused on leading Sudan toward stability and sustainable development. He emphasized that this government would reflect the voice of the silent majority and rely on independent national experts to build a state governed by law and institutions.
It is now up to the Prime Minister to prove that his calls for transparency are not merely a moral outcry in a country where politics has descended below ethical standards—and that he possesses the will to resist the pressure of power centers, both within the state and its political-military ecosystem. Competence is not measured by slogans, but by the institutions that protect it, the procedures that guarantee it, and the political will that refuses to compromise it.
The opportunity before Dr. Kamal Idris, as we see it in The Face of Truth, may be a rare one that does not come again. He must shut the door firmly against those who seek to exploit his missteps or spread falsehoods. Governance in this context is much like a game of chess—reliant on the intelligence and skill of the players. And we are confident that Idris has the ability to manage this game with wisdom. In a country weighed down by war and conflict, the people watch with hopeful hearts for a new dawn. If his government can fulfill its promises, it may mark a real turning point—breaking with the legacy of patronage and old hegemonies, and laying the foundation for a new beginning. But if he surrenders to reproducing old mechanisms with new names, the project will collapse before it is born, and the hope it promised the Sudanese people will become just another disappointment in their modern history.
Stay well and safe,
Sunday 22.6.2025.
Shglawi55@gmail.com