Is there conducive environment for the deployment of UN forces in Sudan?

By: Al-Rekabi Hassan Yagoub

“At present, the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a United Nations force to protect civilians in Sudan.”
This is how UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in his speech before the Security Council session on Sudan.
The controversy that was recently raised by Sudanese civil society organizations and human rights organizations closely related to the Rapid Support Forces and the repeated calls from these parties and a number of Sudanese political forces, headed by the so-called Coordination-body of Civilian Democratic Forces (Fagadom) , which constitutes the civilian and political wing of the Rapid Support Forces, which has continued to issue calls for the necessity of deploying UN forces to protect civilians in war zones in Sudan.
The pace of these calls increased following the noticeable military progress of the Sudanese army and the joint forces on the ground, the successive defeats of the Rapid Support Forces and their loss of a number of their positions that they controlled, the killing of a large number of their military leaders, and the successive wave of defections of military and civilian leaders from them and their declaration of their support for the army.

This situation represented a real crisis that was directly reflected in the address of the olitical and media of the civilian wing of the Rapid Support Forces tended to search for diplomatic exits from this crisis through regional and international organizations through military intervention mechanisms under the banner of protecting civilians.
This was the last bet for these civilian forces to save their military wing from certain defeat on the ground.
It is widely believed in Sudan that the ongoing violations, atrocities and attacks on civilians committed by the Rapid Support Forces since October 21, which included 6 cities and 58 villages in the eastern part of Gezira State in central Sudan, which left more than three hundred dead, hundreds wounded and missing, and tens of thousands displaced, are widely believed to have been committed deliberately and intentionally with the aim of mobilizing local, regional and international public opinion towards responding to calls for the deployment of international forces in order to block the Sudanese army and prevent it from completing its rapid advance on the ground and stopping its victories over the Rapid Support Forces on the three axes (the capital – Al-Fasher – Gezira State).
Whatever the case may be about the validity of this belief, it is certain that it will be in the interest of the Rapid Support Forces and its civilian wing, as it will stop the army’s advance, and then lead to a political agreement that will grant the Rapid Support Forces and its civilian wing political gains on the political and military arena.

With the categorical statement of
Guterres affirmation that the conditions do not exist for the successful deployment of a United Nations force to protect civilians in Sudan, there is no way to deploy UN forces in the current circumstances..

For this reason, it is expected that events in Gezira State will dramatically escalate towards escalation by the Rapid Support Forces by committing more violations against civilians, using them as human shields in the face of the Sudanese army’s advance and encirclement of them day after day, especially in the Gezira State axis. It is also expected that the events of the coming days will witness waves of disengagement and surrender from within the Rapid Support Forces, with the army and its supporting forces tightening the noose around them.
Anyone looking at the reality of the confrontations and military operations taking place between the Rapid Support Forces on the one hand and the Sudanese army and its supporting forces on the other hand will find that what the Secretary-General of the United Nations said about deploying international forces to protect civilians is the truth, as the scene on the ground is extremely complex, making the deployment of international forces a mission that is almost impossible.
It will add fuel to the fire of the crisis if it is undertaken.
It is known that peacekeeping forces and the protection of civilians cannot operate successfully in light of the escalation of military operations between the parties to the conflict, as their intervention must be preceded by a political agreement first, and in turn this political agreement paves the way for a truce and Then it leads to a ceasefire. Unless that happens from the beginning, the deployment of international forces puts these forces under the fire of both sides and these forces become in need of someone to protect them, and thus this represents an additional complication to the crisis.
Also, the deployment of forces requires a favorable infrastructure, a safe atmosphere, and passable roads, which is not available due to the destruction of this infrastructure due to the war, as the pictures and videos published by the Rapid Support Forces through its combatants in the field and broadcasted on the media confirm that they worked to destroy and burn infrastructure facilities in the areas they entered and controlled, especially in Greater Khartoum.
Also, the deployment of international forces comes due to the collapse of the national army and thus the absence of organized government security forces capable of achieving security and stability and protecting civilians, and the absence of a government that carries out its work and imposes its authority over the territory of the state. This not available in the Sudanese case, as the Sudanese army has not collapsed and still maintains its structures, regular units, and leadership hierarchy, and no divisions have occurred within it, and there is also a government that exercises sovereignty in all its forms, esides
an executive authority that runs the affairs of the state normally in all regions that have not been affected by the war.

Moreover, the Sudanese government has shown remarkable cooperation with humanitarian organizations and opened the (Adre) crossing to ensure the flow of humanitarian aid to those in need. Port Sudan Airport and its seaport received shipments of humanitarian aid from various countries and regional and international organizations.
It has sponsored all popular initiatives that provide aid to those affected by the war, and this was praised by Guterres, who said: “I pay tribute to the heroism of the leaders of the many Sudanese-led initiatives providing vital and lifesaving assistance on the ground. Sudan’s over 700 Emergency Response Rooms are an inspiring example of grassroots humanitarian action. Through their work, they are showing us another side of Sudan — the best of humanity in a country enduring the worst of it. We can all draw inspiration from their example

Also, one of the requirements for deploying international forces is the approval of the host or receiving country for these forces, which the Sudanese government has repeatedly rejected through Burhan, his deputy, and members of the Sovereignty Council on numerous occasions.

Naturally, it is not possible to intervene against the state’s will or based on the approval of the Rapid Support Forces only.

The alternative to this is the formula of the international coalition, an example of which is the intervention that took place in Iraq led by the United States in 2003, which is a formula excluded in the Sudanese case due to the difference in many contexts in time and space.
There is no point in comparing or approximating the two cases.

In addition to those factors specific to the situation on the ground in Sudan, there are other factors specific to the United Nations and to mechanisms and procedural actions related to the deployment of forces that impose restrictions on their implementation easily and smoothly, the most important of which is the unanimous approval of the deployment by members of the Security Council, which does not seem possible in light of the map of international politics and the conflicts and intersections in it.

Another factor relates to the resources specific to the deployment and financing process, as there are difficulties in this regard, as some major countries are preoccupied with other files and may not care much about what is happening in Sudan.
A third factor relates to the size of the forces. The United Nations does not have its own military forces, but rather forces assembled from countries.
In many cases, these countries are slow to send their forces and may send unqualified and untrained forces, in addition to the dispersion and lack of unity of the military leadership of these forces and the failure of the leaders of the various forces to obey the central command and only obey the directives of their leaders in their countries.

Finally, the Sudanese situation is not like the rest of the cases that required the intervention of international forces. There are safe states to which civilians fleeing from areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces are displaced, and these safe states are under the control of the Sudanese army.

For all of this, there is no need for the intervention of international forces. Rather, what is required to resolve the Sudanese crisis is to implement the (Declaration of Commitment to Protect Civilians in Sudan) that was signed by the Sudanese army and the Rapid Support Forces on May 11, 2023 in the city of Jeddah, which obligated the Rapid Support Forces to leave civilian areas and citizens’ homes and assemble at specific points according to the agreement.

In my opinion, there is another way that is considered the shortest way to stop the war and protect civilians from the attacks and violations practiced by the Rapid Support Forces against civilians, which is pressure the parties supporting the Rapid Support Forces with money, weapons and shelter to stop their support.

This is the shortest way to protect civilians and stop the war once and for all.