Face of Truth: Al-Baraa: From the Rifle to the Political Project

Ibrahim Shaglawi

It is well known that wars do not merely produce winners and losers; they also create space for the rise of new actors seeking to secure their positions in post-war equations. Accordingly, Al-Baraa bin Malik emerges as one of the entities whose presence extends beyond the battlefield into the realm of politics. In this article, we attempt to examine the future of this entity and its potential role in shaping the contours of Sudan to come.

Accordingly, the recent appearance of Misbah Abu Zaid in a Facebook live broadcast, amid the controversy surrounding rumors of his arrest in Rwanda, seemed to be more than a mere response to the incident, as many suggested. Rather, it appeared to be part of an evolving mental image gradually revealing the contours of a role for Al-Baraa bin Malik in the post-war phase.

This meaning is reinforced when linked to an earlier post in which he spoke about documenting events, writing his memoirs, and preserving testimonies for future generations “as they happened, not as others would like them to be told.” This is undoubtedly more than an ordinary documentation process; it reflects an awareness of the importance of narrative and memory in the post-war struggle. When these signals are read together, they reveal indications of a gradual transition of this entity from the battlefield to the sphere of politics, narrative-building, and perhaps even narrative management.

During his remarks, he also highlighted openness to dialogue and communication with both domestic and international audiences, alongside concern for displaced persons and refugee camps. These signals complement his discussion of documentation and memory-building, reflecting a conscious shift toward issues of public opinion, in light of the prominence this entity has achieved during the war.

These indicators lead us to an important conclusion: what is taking shape within this entity extends beyond the requirements of war itself. The struggle is no longer solely about defeating the militia and reclaiming territory, but also about securing a position in the future, where the ability to influence public opinion, shape national cohesion, and build a popular base becomes no less important than conventional power.

This conclusion may appear premature, yet it gains credibility when viewed in light of the transformations Al-Baraa has undergone in recent years. It is no longer merely a combat formation; it has become a phenomenon present in discussions among the public and political circles, accumulating considerable support among segments of Sudanese society who viewed its military role as a significant contribution to protecting the state from collapse.

However, the most important issue is not the size of this support, but its nature. Many members of Al-Baraa are not professional soldiers by origin; rather, they come from diverse professional and academic backgrounds. The conditions of war pushed them to bear arms and engage in combat, yet their primary professions have remained rooted in knowledge, expertise, and civilian work.

Herein lies one of the most significant strengths of this experience. States are not built by fighters alone, but by competent individuals capable of administering them. If the war has produced an aware youth bloc possessing organization, discipline, and field experience alongside scientific and professional qualifications, then discussion of a future political and social role becomes a logical proposition rather than a theoretical assumption.

It is true that success in war does not necessarily translate into success in politics, and that governing a state differs from managing battles. Nevertheless, possessing such human capital gives any political project a greater opportunity to transition successfully from the sphere of military activity to that of civilian engagement, compared to traditional military formations that often lack the professional and intellectual foundation required to deal with public affairs.

Conversely, the crisis facing Sudanese political parties cannot be ignored. The war exposed the fragility of party structures and the inability of many traditional forces to produce an inclusive national project. It also revealed the extent of zero-sum conflicts that have dominated political life in the country for decades, as elites remained preoccupied with mutual exclusion rather than state-building and program development.

Within this context, the generational factor emerges as one of the most important determinants of the future. The youth who experienced the revolution and then found themselves at the heart of war have reordered their priorities and questions. Therefore, the appeal of any political project to them will not be measured by its ideological slogans as much as by its ability to absorb this youthful energy and offer a practical vision for statehood, stability, development, and reconstruction.

From this perspective, both the opportunity and the challenge facing Al-Baraa become clear. The opportunity lies in its ability to engage segments of youth weary of polarization and searching for an inclusive national project, while the challenge lies in overcoming the legacy of political rivalries and classifications and moving from the rhetoric of war to the rhetoric of statehood and citizenship.

Nevertheless, the most important question is not whether Al-Baraa will establish a political party or not. That, in itself, is not the essence of the matter. The real question is: what will happen to all this energy after the war? It is difficult to imagine that thousands of young people who left their jobs, professions, and studies to participate in defending the country will simply return to their previous lives as though nothing had happened. Major wars do not end when fighters leave the battlefield; they end with their integration.

Therefore, the most likely scenario is not the return of these energies to the sidelines, but rather their pursuit of a new role in the political arena. If they contributed during the war to protecting the state from collapse, their greater challenge today may be contributing to protecting the country from polarization and political chaos.

Sudan after the war needs not only to rebuild its institutions, but also to rebuild its political parties on foundations that are more cohesive and more conscious of the country’s interests.

According to Face of Truth, the appearance of Misbah Abu Zaid, as we see it, was not merely a denial of a rumor; rather, it revealed signs of a transformation quietly taking place beneath the surface of events. Accordingly, the future of Al-Baraa will not be determined by what it achieved on the battlefield, but by its ability to move from the legitimacy of arms to the legitimacy of ideas and a national political project, and from a role imposed by war to one shaped by the requirements of state-building.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Saturday, June 20, 2026 Email: Shglawi55@gmail.com