OPINION

Face of Truth: Soft Hegemony and the Manufacturing of Dependency..!

Ibrahim Shaglawi

At a time when the world is moving beyond the discourse of traditional colonialism, new, more subtle forms have resurfaced—known as soft hegemony. It now appears cloaked in the guise of “international support,” using internal crises as a window for intervention and the reconfiguration of new balances at the expense of national sovereignty and will.

Sudan today stands at the heart of this challenge: the reproduction of a regional and international order that redefines the fragile state as a function, not an entity—subordinate and led, not sovereign and proactive. In this light, the role of the international Quartet—United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—cannot be read in isolation. It is not a “political mediation” but a strategic engineering tool for the country and the region. Through this, these countries recalibrate the balance of power in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea in alignment with their interests.

Since the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, Sudan entered a phase that could have been foundational for a democratic civilian state—had it been allowed to develop in its national context. But regional and international powers rushed to fill the vacuum, preempting any path that might slip out of their control or fail to guarantee their strategic interests.

Thus, the transitional process turned into a “monitoring process,” with roles divided between open political support and indirect military backing—such as the UAE’s support of the Rapid Support Forces militia—which ignited the war and derailed the entire political track.

Realist political analysis requires reading interests before slogans. Sudan, with its geographic location, vast resources, long borders, and control of vital water passages and international corridors, represents a cornerstone in the regional re-engineering project.

Therefore, the “stability” the Quartet seeks is not a national goal, but rather a functional stability that keeps the country within a sphere of control and dependency—preventing it from becoming a free political model capable of reviving discourses of national liberation or independent regional rapprochement.

“Soft hegemony,” as described by Antonio Gramsci, manifests when control is exercised not through force, but through consent—by turning local elites into tools for implementing foreign agendas under the pretext of “supporting the transition.” It is here that the “Forces of Freedom and Change” fell into the trap of dependency and subordination, as revealed by Al-Rashid Saeed in an interview with French television, when he declared that their project was liberal in opposition to Islamic forces.

The danger lies not only in funding, but in cultural hegemony—the redefinition of concepts themselves, such as democracy, sovereignty, and legitimacy, in alignment with the international order rather than the national will. Thus, democracy becomes a negotiation rather than a right, sovereignty becomes conditional rather than absolute, and popular consensus is replaced by “external agreement.”

Sudan, in this regard, is not much different from Algeria, which firmly rejected any international guardianship during its 2019 uprising, insisting that the solution be purely internal. This independence did not emerge from a vacuum but from a deep conviction that national decision-making is not bought with foreign support but is protected by conscious will—and it succeeded in doing so.

This is what Sudan lacks today: a unified political elite that understands that independence begins from within. The zero-sum conflicts between political and military powers, the contradictions and failures of the elites, have opened the door for external forces to become both mediators and decision-makers at once.

Although the severing of relations with the UAE and its designation as a hostile state in May 2025 reflects a beginning of reclaiming national decision-making, the road remains long toward building an assertive foreign policy. What’s required is not a rupture but negotiation from a position of national interest, and liberating state institutions from subordination to international will—starting with reducing the influence and unchecked movement of embassies inside the country.

Since the time of Locke, Rousseau, and Hegel, political philosophy has emphasized that the state is the embodiment of the will of the nation. If this will fails to express itself freely, the state becomes an empty shell filled by foreign powers with their agendas and content.

Exiting Sudan’s crisis does not begin in foreign capitals but in Sudanese cities themselves—Khartoum, Madani, Darfur, and Blue Nile—where genuine will is being shaped far from closed-door conferences. This moment is a historic test of the concept of sovereignty—not just as a capacity to endure, but as a capacity to build. For “sovereignty is not raised in speeches, but translated into a unifying national constitution, an independent decision, and a political contract forged internally through a purely Sudanese will.”

According to #Face_of_Truth, the Sudanese crisis today reveals that the danger no longer lies in explicit colonialism, but in soft hegemony and the manufacturing of dependency—where attempts are being made to reshape national decision-making to serve foreign interests. There is no exit from this except through a free and sincere national will that lays the foundation for a unifying national project and rejects all forms of disguised international guardianship.

Wishing you well and in good health.

Monday, October 20, 2025

Shglawi55@gmail.com