The Face of Truth: Potential Understandings Between Riyadh and Washington Regarding the War in Sudan?
Ibrahim Shglawi
As the Sudanese scene grows increasingly complex with intersecting regional and international interests, a central question arises: Do Riyadh and Washington genuinely share a will to reach a settlement that delivers justice to the Sudanese people, or does the Jeddah platform remain a mere formal framework to freeze the crisis rather than resolve it? Tracking political signals and leaders’ speeches—especially what was stated by the Saudi Crown Prince during the Gulf-American Summit—offers insight into the nature of ongoing understandings and whether they reflect a shift in vision or a mere reproduction of old containment tools. In this article, we attempt to read the scene in light of these indicators.
It is evident that Washington has recently adopted a policy of delegation in dealing with complex regional files, including the Sudanese file, which has become part of a larger game of power balances in the Red Sea and East Africa. Here, Saudi Arabia emerges, through the “Jeddah Platform,” as a key player in trying to manage this file—confirmed by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman during the Gulf-American Summit in Riyadh, when he emphasized the Kingdom’s commitment to achieving a comprehensive ceasefire in Sudan in cooperation with Washington. The word “comprehensive,” in my view, is new and warrants closer attention.
But what do these statements mean in such a fluid regional moment? What is unfolding is not a traditional mediation effort, but rather a re-engineering of a new regional order that starts from the Red Sea and does not end in Khartoum.
The Crown Prince’s statements are not only a reaffirmation of continued support for the Jeddah Platform, but an implicit declaration that Sudan is no longer a marginal issue in regional security calculations. On the contrary, Khartoum today represents a point of intersection for the interests of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and even the United States—given the spread of militias, threats to navigation routes, and the growing influence of non-traditional actors in the Sudanese landscape.
On the American side, there are clear signs of a shift in strategic doctrine. Washington is no longer obsessed with direct control over files but prefers asymmetric partnerships—delegating and coordinating with strong regional allies. The frequent meetings between Riyadh and Washington regarding Sudan are one of the signs of this transformation. The emerging understandings reflect Washington’s desire to contain the Sudanese conflict without direct involvement, through empowering the Jeddah Platform to exert pressure—something many observers have emphasized—or perhaps aligning with the version of settlement favored by local and regional militia supporters.
However, this path is not without contradictions—especially considering the controversial role played by actors like the UAE in allegedly supporting the Rapid Support Forces, according to international reports. This places additional pressure on Riyadh to reconfigure regional alignments in a way that secures a balance that does not conflict with its interests in the Red Sea, nor threatens its security in Yemen or its broader regional influence, especially as it becomes the closest partner to Washington through its investment in peace and security, in line with the new U.S. policies in the region.
At the heart of this scene, Sudan’s war has become a battlefield for competing regional wills—and perhaps a stage for settling strategic scores. The use of drones in eastern Sudan, alongside Egyptian, Saudi, and Qatari movements, are all signs that Sudan has become a red line in the equation of Arab security.
Clearly, and based on these facts, Riyadh considers the destabilization of Sudan a direct threat to Red Sea security and regional balances. Cairo, for its part, views the collapse of the Sudanese state as an existential threat to its national security. Meanwhile, Doha operates in the background as a peace broker, drawing on its experience in Darfur peace negotiations through the Doha Platform, which culminated in the signing of the Doha Document on July 14, 2011—making it an acceptable mediator to various parties.
Elsewhere, recent regional developments point to shifts in traditional alliances. The visit of former U.S. President Donald Trump to the region, and his then-new approach to Middle East issues, reflect an attempt to reshape the regional order in a way that aligns with American interests in the current phase.
In this context, coordination between Arab states—such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt—gains importance in formulating a unified stance on the Sudanese crisis. These countries understand that Sudan’s stability is an integral part of the region’s security. Sudan is no longer a mere detail in an interwoven regional landscape; it has become the centerpiece of a new balance. Either it is reclaimed through a comprehensive settlement—similar to the understandings reached in Syria—that guarantees its sovereignty and territorial integrity, or it heads toward alternative options with other partners who can ensure its national security and sovereignty.
Accordingly, the understandings between Riyadh and Washington regarding Sudan cannot be separated from the broader struggle for influence, nor from the reconfiguration of collective Arab security. And as the war nears its end, a critical question draws closer: Who will be Sudan’s partner after the war? And who will be excluded from the equation? The regional scene shows that Sudan is no longer just an internal battleground but has become an active factor in reshaping regional and international power balances.
Wishing you well and good health.
Thursday, May 15, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com