Face of the Truth: Sudan… and the Defensive Maritime Alliance

Ibrahim Shaglawi

On Thursday, Sudan participated, represented by Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Yasser Al-Atta, alongside 14 countries, in the founding meeting of the Multinational Defensive Maritime Alliance led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in a step that confirms the transition of regional security in the Red Sea to a phase of regional partnerships.

Throughout history, alliances have always been associated with major turning points in the balance of power. Pivotal security arrangements have never been merely responses to challenges; rather, they have served as gateways to launching new phases in the management of influence. In this context, the Multinational Defensive Maritime Alliance, established to protect the Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, signals the region’s transition to a new security equation, in which states seek to take control of their own security after decades of dependence on international security umbrellas.

The more significant development, however, is that the Red Sea is no longer merely a maritime corridor contested by major powers. It has become a center for reshaping the emerging regional order. The U.S.-Chinese rivalry, Russia’s growing presence, the changes imposed by the U.S.-Iran war, and the instability in the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have all led the countries of the region to recognize an important reality: the security of the Red Sea is no longer managed from the sea alone, but from the land as well. Consequently, the stability of the littoral states has become an integral part of the sea’s security, rather than a consequence of it.

Within this context, Sudan’s position is undergoing a fundamental transformation. Since the outbreak of the war, many assessments have viewed Sudan as a crisis hotspot requiring interventions and mediation. Today, however, the equation is beginning to reverse. Sudan has become one of the keys to the success of the new regional security project. This is not an optimistic interpretation, but rather a reality imposed by geography. A state with an 820-kilometer coastline, located at the intersection of the Horn of Africa and the Arab Mashreq, cannot be overlooked in the redesign of Red Sea security, even while it remains preoccupied with putting its internal affairs in order.

Here lies a political paradox worthy of reflection. The war being fought by the Sudanese state has made its stability more important to the region than ever before. Any security architecture built to protect the Red Sea will continue to suffer from structural imbalance so long as the largest coastline on its western shore remains hostage to conflict. Therefore, the question Sudan should pose to its partners is not the extent of the benefits it will gain from participating in the alliance, but rather how the restoration of security within the country can itself become part of the alliance’s success.

This is where the need arises to redefine the role of Sudanese diplomacy within this alliance. Geography alone does not create influence; it does so only when the state knows how to employ it politically. Today, Sudan possesses a unique strategic asset: its ability to link the security of the Red Sea with stability inside Sudan. If maritime security is a priority for the participating states, its sustainability remains contingent upon ending the war and addressing the sources of instability along the western coast of the Red Sea. Therefore, the value of Sudan’s participation should not be measured by the scale of its military presence, but by its ability to transition from a state seeking support to one that contributes to producing regional security, participating in shaping its priorities rather than merely implementing its arrangements.

Accordingly, Khartoum should shift its dialogue with its partners from the logic of solidarity to the logic of strategic interests. If Riyadh is leading a project to redesign security in the Red Sea, its success remains dependent on peace in Sudan, as the largest hotspot of instability on its western coast. Consequently, the responsibility of the participating states extends beyond protecting maritime navigation to employing their political and diplomatic influence to end the war and dry up its agenda, for the sea cannot be secured while the causes of instability continue to regenerate on land.

From this perspective, the responsibility of states with influence over the Sudan file, foremost among them the United Arab Emirates, emerges in aligning their influence with the objectives of the alliance. If the new security project is based on safeguarding regional stability, then this requires using that influence to support Sudan’s sovereignty and prevent the flow of weapons to the Rapid Support Forces militia, because the security of the Red Sea cannot be achieved unless its western coast is stable.

Reading between the lines of this alliance, according to #Face_of_the_Truth, indicates that Saudi Arabia seeks to consolidate the legitimacy of regional leadership in the Red Sea. However, the legitimacy of leadership is not measured solely by its ability to protect maritime routes, but also by its ability to address the sources of instability that threaten them. From this perspective, the success of this project places an even greater political responsibility on Riyadh to employ its political and diplomatic weight, in coordination with the United States of America and other influential international powers, to support the sovereignty of the Sudanese state, halt the flow of weapons, and confront any regional interventions that contribute to prolonging the conflict, leading to the subjugation of the rebel militia to the authority of the state and the end of the rebellion, on the basis that Sudan’s stability constitutes a fundamental pillar of Red Sea security, rather than a marginal issue within its security equation.

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