Classifying Terrorism: Between Principle and Whim

By: Mustafa Abdelaziz Al-Batal

I have before me a short article written by Mr. Ibrahim Osman, in which he compiled a selection of statements made by some leaders of the “Sumud” organization in televised or published interviews. The conclusion the reader draws from these statements is that classifying the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) as a terrorist organization is almost a futile act; it neither prevents war, nor redresses grievances, nor does it make any difference. Therefore, in their view, demanding this classification appears to be a pointless pursuit.

Here are some of the statements compiled by Habib Ibrahim:

1. Bakri Al-Jak (Official Spokesperson for “Sumud”): Will the defections within the RSF stop the war?

2. Bakri Al-Jak: Does committing terrorist acts necessarily mean classifying an entity as a terrorist organization?

3. Bakri Al-Jak: Let’s suppose the European Parliament classifies the RSF as a terrorist organization, will that end the war or address its historical roots

4. Bakri al-Jak: Many organizations have been designated as terrorist, yet they haven’t stopped fighting; in fact, they’ve simply adopted new names.

5. Bakri al-Jak: Let’s suppose the European Parliament imposes sanctions on countries supporting the war, including the UAE. Will that end the war?

6. Jaafar Hassan: If the world designates the Rapid Support Forces as a terrorist organization, will that stop the war? That’s the fundamental question.

7. Khalid Omar: Did designating Hamas or the African National Congress stop the war?

End of observation.

After thanking these dear friends for this intensive lesson in the economics of feasibility, I would like to pose this question:

If designating the Rapid Support Forces—the militia that has killed, raped, looted, terrorized, displaced, and forced millions to flee their homes, committing unspeakable crimes and atrocities—is pointless and worthless because the designation won’t change anything on the ground, then why has designating the Islamist movement become such a crucial political and legal act, a legitimate demand with real value and priority? What has changed? Is it the concept of classification itself, or the identity of the entity to be classified?

Let’s generalize the principle to save time and effort: if any classification is ineffective, useless, and doesn’t prevent wars, then why do countries and organizations designate terrorist groups in the first place? Why impose sanctions? Why create terrorism lists in the first place? Aren’t all these measures, according to this logic, merely bureaucratic activity that accomplishes nothing?

The strange thing is that the criterion “Will it stop the war?” only appears when the discussion is about the Rapid Support Forces. But when the discussion turns to the Islamist movement, this criterion suddenly disappears, as if it never existed, and the classification itself becomes a major political achievement worth striving for, even though the justification here is nothing more than the mere possibility of future terrorism or violence by the Islamist movement. Meanwhile, the indescribable crimes and atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces, witnessed by the world with their victims, witnesses, and evidence, are not enough to convince those who subscribe to this logic of the value of classification!

No one has ever claimed that designating any group as terrorist is a magic wand that ends wars. Designation is not a substitute for political or military solutions, but rather a tool to isolate an entity, dry up its sources of funding and weapons, restrict its movement, increase the cost of dealing with it, and strip it of any political or legal legitimacy.

If these effects are significant when it comes to entities other than the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), why do they suddenly become worthless when the RSF is the target? Why does designation transform from a legitimate legal and political tool into a futile and pointless act, simply because the entity to be designated is the RSF?

The real question is not about the effectiveness of designation, but about the double standard. If the designation of terrorism is based on the nature of the acts and crimes, then the RSF is more deserving of it than many organizations that have previously been included on those lists. However, if the designation is granted or withheld based on the identity of the perpetrator, not the reality of their actions, then we are no longer discussing a legal or ethical principle, but rather political selectivity where principles change with the names of those involved.

In that case, the problem is not with the designation of terrorism, but with the concept of terrorism as some perceive it. It is not a description of actions nor a judgment on crimes, but rather a title that is granted and withheld according to the identity of the opponent!