The Face of Truth: The Will of the Sudanese… and the Blackmail of Capitals

Ibrahim Shaglawi

President Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan’s choice of Abu Qaroun Mosque in East Nile for Friday prayers was no coincidence, nor was the timing of his statement, “We have no middle-ground or gray solutions,” delivered concurrently with the UN Security Council session. Rather, it was a calculated political message addressed to both domestic and international audiences, defining the limits that Khartoum sets for any potential peace process.

In the following lines, we attempt to shed light on certain facts that may escape many observers, given the scale of regional and international pressures.

In substance, the statement did not constitute a rejection of negotiations, but rather a rejection of any settlement that preserves the crisis under the banner of peace. He reinforced this position more explicitly by stating that any talks not based on dismantling the militia and surrendering its weapons would be unacceptable.

It is precisely here that the fundamental point of divergence emerges between the Sudanese government’s vision and many international approaches that regard a ceasefire as an end in itself, whereas Sudanese view it as a means devoid of value if it merely reproduces the causes of war.

This reading explains much of the political and diplomatic activity witnessed in recent days. Western statements, UN Security Council sessions, U.S. sanctions, UN movements, and the recent regional meetings in Cairo involving Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and the United States are not isolated events, but rather parts of a single scene. The closer military operations come to reshaping the balance of power on the ground, the faster political efforts accelerate in an attempt to influence the shape of the endgame.

This is not unique to Sudan; rather, it is one of the established rules of conflict management in the international system, where the real political battle often begins as the military battle approaches its decisive phase.

From this perspective, it becomes easier to understand why certain capitals insist that the war cannot end with a military victory. Such rhetoric reflects not only a desire to end the fighting, but also concern that a decisive outcome could impose a new political reality that would be difficult to alter.

Consequently, efforts are directed as much toward managing the outcome of the war as toward ending it, a dynamic that often turns political settlements into instruments for regulating the balance of power rather than genuine gateways to addressing the roots of the crisis.

What appears evident in the Sudanese case, however, is that the war has reshaped the national consciousness. Widespread violations against civilians—including killing, looting, displacement, and attacks on lives and property—have fundamentally redefined how a broad segment of Sudanese perceive the nature of the conflict.

As a result, the debate is no longer about how to share power, but about how to ensure that the experience is never repeated. In this context, Al-Burhan’s remarks acquire a political dimension that goes beyond military rhetoric, reflecting the understanding that any settlement which does not eliminate the existence of weapons outside the authority of the state will remain merely a truce, not peace.

Perhaps the most significant statement in his speech was his assertion: “If the war does not end with the victory of the army and the people, the militia will return to the scene and once again terrorize the people of Sudan.” This reflects a strategic perception that the issue is no longer who wins the war, but who ensures that its causes never return.

Herein lies the difference between one approach that views war as a manageable crisis and another that sees it as a crisis that can only end by eliminating its root causes.

By contrast, regional and international movements cannot be separated from the geopolitical context. Sudan has become part of the ongoing realignment of the balance of power in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa following the transformations the region has witnessed in recent months. Consequently, the positions adopted by various capitals are not governed solely by humanitarian considerations, but also by calculations of influence, the security of maritime routes, regional balances, and the emerging security architecture taking shape across the region.

From this perspective, what appears to some as diplomatic mediation appears to others as instruments of pressure aimed at reshaping the outcome of the conflict in line with the interests of regional powers. This is the essence of political blackmail in international relations—not necessarily through direct threats, but through the use of sanctions, mediation mechanisms, diplomatic pressure, and humanitarian discourse to influence the sovereign decision-making of states as they fight their decisive battles.

Yet today, these pressures are confronted by a reality that is difficult to ignore: the will of the Sudanese people is no longer what it was on April 15, 2023. Despite its brutality, the war has produced not only widespread destruction but also a new awareness among broad segments of society that the stability of the state cannot rest on settlements that merely postpone the next explosion, nor on solutions that recycle the crisis under different labels. Accordingly, the discussion of the “day after” no longer refers merely to a ceasefire, but to the nature of the state that will emerge from this war, its relationship with arms, its authority, and its ability to protect its citizens.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of reading the Sudanese scene, according to #The_Face_of_Truth, is reducing it to a conflict between the army and the Rapid Support Forces militia, while the battle is fundamentally one between a national will reshaped by the war and external attempts to steer the future of the state according to their own calculations. Peace will gain legitimacy only if it preserves the state and its monopoly on the legitimate use of force, because although foreign capitals may influence the course of events, they cannot compel the Sudanese people to forget their sacrifices or accept the reproduction of the causes of their tragedy.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Sunday, June 28, 2026

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