Sudan After the War… Who Owns the Political Project?
Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shiglawi
As the war approaches its final stages, Sudan is heading toward a political moment no less complex than the moment of its outbreak in April 2023. Parallel to the military advances on the ground, the issue of possessing a political project capable of governing the state in the post-war phase has moved to the forefront of the national political scene.
In this article, we attempt to unpack the features of this landscape and explore a practical political horizon that could support the transition process and lay the foundation for sustainable stability.
It is well known that the war has radically reshaped Sudan’s political map, not only in terms of the balance of power but also in terms of the nature of political alignments.
Political forces that had been competing before the outbreak of the war found themselves, under the pressure of an existential threat related to protecting the Sudanese state and preventing its collapse, united in what can be described as an “alliance of necessity.” This alliance brought together the Sudanese Armed Forces, the Joint Forces, the Popular Resistance supported by Islamist youth, as well as political and societal forces and traditional community leaders.
However, this alliance has remained, so far, more of a defensive coalition than a comprehensive political project. It succeeded in unifying positions around the battle for survival, but it has not yet succeeded in producing a shared vision regarding the shape of the future state or the nature of the political system that should govern the post-war phase.
Accordingly, political forces face a difficult test: preserving a minimum level of cohesion during the war while preparing for the period that follows. The Sudanese experience, like many others in the region and around the world, confirms that alliances formed in the context of armed conflict often encounter severe challenges when transitioning from the phase of defense to the phase of reconstruction, and from the logic of confrontation to the logic of state governance.
Within the reality that has reshaped Sudan’s political landscape into two principal blocs, the forces supporting the state and the army appear objectively closer to transforming from a temporary alignment into a comprehensive national project. Yet this transformation remains contingent upon their ability to move beyond the defensive alliance stage toward a political project through the formulation of a unified political vision that accommodates the diversity of its components and rebuilds a minimum consensus around the state and its unity.
In this context, the condition for sustainability becomes the management of this diversity on the basis of national interest without exclusion, alongside a clear separation between political activity and judicial accountability.
Accountability should be left to the judiciary as the competent authority, free from politicization, while the people, through elections, remain the ultimate source of legitimacy and the final arbiters of who governs the state thereafter.
The Democratic Bloc represents a revealing example of this dilemma. In an earlier phase, it succeeded in bringing together political and societal forces around relatively convergent positions regarding transitional arrangements.
However, the differences that recently emerged concerning engagement with political initiatives aimed at ending the war, and the disputes surrounding participation in the recent Addis Ababa meetings, revealed that the real challenge has become the production of a unified political vision. The divergence within the bloc reflects not merely differences in political tactics but touches upon the nature of the political project that binds these components together and the limits of consensus among them in the post-war phase.
On the other hand, the Islamist movement stands out as one of the most present and influential actors within the camp supporting the state. Regardless of one’s position toward it, its organizational experience, mobilization capacity, and extensive social and political networks cannot be denied, making it a key player in the post-war equation. Yet this organizational strength alone does not resolve the question of the future.
The real challenge facing this movement lies not merely in returning to political activity but in the nature of that return and its ability to present a political project capable of accommodating the transformations that have taken place since 2019 and the new realities imposed by the war.
This challenge becomes even more complex with the emergence of differentiation within the Islamist political environment itself, particularly in light of the fragmentation of the former National Congress Party. Alongside a current that seeks to reposition itself based on its organizational legacy and previous experience, there are growing voices calling for deeper revisions affecting organizational structures, political discourse, and the nature of future alliances. This divergence does not necessarily indicate a final split, but it reflects a fundamental reality: the post-war phase will compel all actors to redefine their positions and roles.
Meanwhile, the “Sumoud” Alliance, led by Dr. Abdalla Hamdok, faces a challenge no less complicated, namely a crisis of trust within the domestic political arena. The political experience associated with both the pre-war and post-war periods has left impressions among public opinion that make its repositioning within Sudan dependent on its ability to rebuild trust through clear political positions regarding the war, state sovereignty, and the Rapid Support Forces, so that it can become part of any potential settlement.
Against the backdrop of this landscape, the issue of political settlement and transitional justice remains one of the most sensitive and complex matters. Public sentiment among broad segments of Sudanese society is increasingly inclined toward rejecting any political arrangements that ignore responsibilities for the war or bypass them without accountability. In this context, there is growing support for excluding the Rapid Support Forces militia and its supporting circles from future political arrangements, on the grounds that any settlement not founded upon justice and accountability will remain vulnerable to reproducing the same crisis in different forms.
At the same time, Sudan’s situation cannot be separated from its regional and international environment, where competing geopolitical and economic interests continue to shape political developments. With every military shift on the ground, attempts are renewed to redefine the form of the future Sudanese state. This makes the struggle for national sovereignty a multifaceted one that extends beyond military and security dimensions to encompass the political and intellectual sphere, particularly the ability of Sudanese themselves to formulate their own national project.
The most dangerous challenge facing Sudan today, according to #Face_of_Truth, is not merely the continuation of the war, but the absence of a comprehensive national project capable of transforming a unity of necessity into a unity of vision built around a minimum set of shared principles. Despite its brutality, the war succeeded in uniting a large segment of political forces around the goal of defending the state. Yet it has not succeeded in producing a common answer to the question of the state itself: How should it be governed? And on what foundations should it be rebuilt?
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Saturday, 5 June 2026
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