Has the War Begun to Reshape the Sudanese State?

From Armed Rebellion to the Construction of Parallel Institutions of Power

Dr. Abdelnasser Solum Hamid

The war in Sudan is no longer merely a military confrontation between the state and an armed rebel movement, nor is it simply a struggle over cities and strategic locations. After more than three years of fighting, the central questions are no longer about who is advancing on the battlefield or who controls a particular city or region. Rather, they concern whether the war itself has begun to reshape the Sudanese state.

Protracted wars do not merely alter balances of power; they often reshape institutions of governance, sources of authority, and patterns of administration. What is taking place in Sudan today cannot be understood solely through maps of military control, because deeper transformations are emerging beyond the battlefield. These developments may ultimately prove more enduring than the outcomes of military engagements themselves.

This raises a fundamental question: Are we still witnessing an armed rebellion seeking to impose military and political realities, or has the conflict entered a new phase that goes beyond rebellion toward the construction of parallel institutions and authorities capable of influencing the future shape of the state?

Since independence, Sudan has faced recurring challenges in managing its geographic, cultural, and political diversity within a vast and complex state. Despite wars, coups, and successive crises, state institutions remained the framework that preserved Sudan’s unity and continuity. Regardless of periods of weakness or instability, the state continued to serve as the ultimate reference point for political and administrative life across the country.

When South Sudan seceded in 2011, many believed that Sudan had overcome the greatest test of its national unity. Yet the years that followed demonstrated that many of the underlying issues that contributed to that separation remained unresolved. Questions surrounding power-sharing, development, and the relationship between the center and the periphery continued to shape Sudan’s political landscape. Economic and developmental disparities between regions persisted, and the challenge of building a state capable of accommodating Sudan’s diversity remained unanswered.

The war that erupted in April 2023 brought these questions back to the forefront with unprecedented intensity. What began as a military confrontation quickly evolved into a comprehensive crisis affecting governance, the economy, public services, and the social fabric itself. As the conflict expanded and the state’s ability to perform its functions weakened in certain areas, new arrangements began to emerge in an effort to fill the vacuum created by war.

Yet the most significant consequence of the conflict is not merely the human and economic losses or the destruction of infrastructure and cities. Rather, it lies in what is unfolding in territories beyond the direct control of the state. Long wars do not only create battlefronts; they also generate political, administrative, and security structures designed to manage the realities imposed by conflict.

This is where recent developments in areas controlled by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and their allies become particularly significant. These developments have moved beyond military activity and increasingly involve the establishment of institutions and structures that traditionally perform state functions.

Among the most notable of these developments is the announcement of a Security and Defense Council within areas under RSF control. At first glance, this may appear to be an administrative measure. However, its implications extend far beyond routine governance. Security and defense represent core elements of sovereignty. A modern state is defined not only by its borders or international recognition, but also by its ability to manage security and maintain a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory.

When this development is considered alongside the appointment of a central bank governor, the formation of parallel governmental structures, and arrangements concerning education and public services, a broader picture begins to emerge. These are not merely temporary wartime measures; they reflect attempts to administer society and institutions outside the framework of the central state.

The true significance of these steps does not lie in any single action, but in the broader pattern they collectively create. When institutions responsible for security, administration, economic management, and education begin to accumulate within a specific geographic area, they gradually form an emerging structure of authority that extends beyond the temporary arrangements commonly associated with conflict. At that point, the key question becomes whether these institutions are simply tools for managing an exceptional period or whether they represent the foundations of a new political and administrative reality.

This highlights the distinction between a conventional rebellion and the construction of a parallel authority. A rebellion typically seeks to impose military or political realities. A parallel authority, by contrast, seeks to build institutions capable of governing society, providing services, and performing functions traditionally associated with the state. Military power may secure control, but institutions are what enable authority to endure.

Viewed collectively, these developments raise a more complex question. The issue is no longer simply who controls a particular city or region, but whether the war is producing new centers of authority capable of evolving from military structures into governing institutions.

A state is not measured solely by the military power it possesses. It is also defined by its ability to administer daily life, provide services, enforce laws, and protect institutions. When an actor begins performing these functions within a defined geographic area, the discussion moves beyond warfare and into the realm of state-building and governance.

Control over territory is often confused with control over the state itself. Territorial control may be achieved through military force, but control over the state requires the management of economic activity, public services, education, and security. For this reason, wars are not always decided by battlefield outcomes alone. They are often determined by which side can establish a sustainable model of governance.

In this context, Darfur occupies a particularly important position. The region is not merely a vast geographic area; it possesses significant economic resources and a strategic location. Nyala, in particular, has increasingly become a center where political, administrative, and economic arrangements linked to areas of control are taking shape. As a result, attention to Nyala extends beyond the city itself and toward the broader political project gradually emerging around it.

The developments unfolding in Sudan inevitably evoke comparisons with the experience of South Sudan, not because the two situations are identical, but because they illustrate an important historical lesson: major political transformations are rarely sudden events. More often, they are preceded by long periods of institution-building, shifting centers of authority, and the gradual emergence of new political realities on the ground.

What makes this issue particularly relevant to Sudan is that many of the developments now taking shape resemble early stages witnessed in other prolonged conflicts, where temporary wartime arrangements gradually evolved into enduring political structures. States do not fragment overnight, nor do alternative centers of power emerge fully formed. They are usually built step by step through the accumulation of administrative, security, and political institutions.

For this reason, the significance of what is happening today lies not only in the institutions that have already been established, but in what those institutions may become if the conflict continues. The longer a war lasts, the greater the opportunity for parallel structures to consolidate their authority, develop administrative capacity, and build relationships with local communities.

Darfur occupies a central place in this discussion not only because of its size and strategic location, but because it has increasingly become the space in which new political and administrative realities are being tested. The growing importance of Nyala reflects more than wartime necessity; it reflects the emergence of an alternative center of administration, finance, and political coordination whose long-term implications remain uncertain.

In such circumstances, time becomes one of the most important factors shaping the future. Every additional month of conflict allows emerging institutions to adapt, expand, and deepen their roots. What may initially appear to be a temporary response to wartime conditions can gradually evolve into an accepted political reality.

The greatest risk, therefore, may not be immediate separation or formal partition. Rather, it may be the normalization of parallel systems of governance within a single state. History shows that fragmentation often begins long before declarations of independence. It begins when competing centers of authority become accepted facts of daily life.

Ultimately, the question facing Sudan today is not merely who will win the war, but what kind of state will emerge from it. Battles may determine territorial control, but institutions shape political realities. And while wars eventually end, the structures built during them often survive long after the fighting stops.

Sudan therefore stands at a critical crossroads. Either its national institutions regain their cohesion under a single sovereign authority, or the conflict will leave behind parallel structures capable of reshaping the country’s political landscape for generations.

If that moment arrives, future historians may not ask how the war began in April 2023. They may instead ask how it gradually transformed the Sudanese state itself.