Face of the Truth: Government of Hope… Calculations of Staying or Leaving
Ibrahim Shaglawi
In times of transition, governments are not measured by what they have accomplished, but by how necessary they remain. Some governments endure because they have succeeded, while others endure because the cost of replacing them is greater than the cost of keeping them. Within this equation, Dr. Kamil Idris’s Government of Hope now stands at an extremely sensitive political crossroads, where the challenges of war, economic pressures, and the calculations of a possible settlement converge, making the question of its survival far more complex than a simple assessment of its performance.
When Idris accepted the appointment, he did not assume office without a vision. He presented two documents: the first contained a work plan, while the second outlined a vision for its implementation, thereby establishing a theoretical framework for managing the current phase. Yet experience has shown that possessing a vision is one thing, while transforming it into a political and executive project is another.
The vision remained confined to documents and failed to find the political and media machinery capable of turning it into a mobilizing narrative that would give Sudanese people the sense that the “Government of Hope” is not merely a name, but rather a state-building project around which institutions, elites, and public opinion can unite.
Perhaps this was the first sign of dysfunction. At this stage, the country needs more than a sound government program; it requires leadership capable of building trust, inspiring hope, and managing public opinion with the same competence applied to executive affairs. Therefore, the challenge was not a lack of ideas, but rather the absence of political support capable of turning them into reality.
The manner in which the government was formed added further indications. The ministerial lineup was announced in stages, its completion was delayed, and several portfolios, including the Ministry of Environment, remain vacant. Meanwhile, the position previously held by Minister Lamia Abdel Ghaffar—one of the government’s most active figures in its early days—has remained unfilled since her departure. These details may appear administrative, but politically they reflect the level of cohesion within the executive branch and its capacity to govern.
Externally, the Prime Minister engaged on multiple fronts, yet foreign policy lacked a coherent narrative linking visits with outcomes. His visits to the Arab Republic of Egypt, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom illustrate this point. For various reasons, these visits did not produce political or economic breakthroughs commensurate with their significance, reinforcing the impression that the government moves more than it influences and travels between capitals more than it builds sustainable strategic paths.
Domestically, the economy has remained the most difficult test. As we previously noted in the article “Government of Hope and the Deferred Recovery,” the government’s real battle would be fought at the citizens’ dining table, because market stability and the restoration of the value of work and production are the standards by which people judge the success of any government. So far, this battle remains unresolved, while economic hardships and living pressures continue to mount, widening the gap between expectations and results.
Nevertheless, none of these observations necessarily lead to the conclusion that the time has come to dismiss the government. Politics is not the management of desires, but the management of timing. In my view, Sudan today faces a different equation. Regional and international diplomatic contacts suggest that the coming months may bring the outlines of a political settlement, or at least the beginning of a new negotiation track, making any decision to replace the government at this moment one that requires careful calculation.
Any new government would need time to be formed, organize its priorities, and build its working team—a process that could take two months or more before entering its performance cycle. If a new political process were then to emerge in the following months, the country would once again be compelled to restructure the executive authority to align with the arrangements of the new phase. In that case, the state would have consumed time and effort in two successive reshuffles, whereas that time would have been better invested in consolidating the current performance and preparing for the coming challenges.
Therefore, the most realistic option may not be changing the Prime Minister, but rather reviewing his government. Ironically, this standard was established by Kamil Idris himself when he declared that remaining in office would depend on performance evaluation. If that is indeed the case, then the present moment appears appropriate for applying this principle by reviewing ministers’ performance, replacing those who have failed to make a meaningful contribution, and bringing in new competent figures capable of strengthening the government’s ability to confront the challenges of this phase.
Maintaining the government in its current form may not be convincing, just as dismissing it entirely may not be the optimal choice. Between these two options lies a third, more balanced path: restructuring and completing the government, strengthening its efficiency, while preserving the minimum level of stability the state needs as it navigates one of the most sensitive political and economic periods in its history.
According to #Face_of_the_Truth, the question today is not: Should Kamil Idris leave? Rather, it is: How can the state navigate the remainder of this phase with the least possible losses? If the coming months are indeed likely to redraw the political landscape, then wisdom requires managing time efficiently rather than wasting it on changing governments. As for the Government of Hope, its survival will not be justified by the mere passage of time, but by its ability to review itself, regain the initiative, and demonstrate that the performance standard it adopted as its slogan has become a genuine practice rather than a deferred promise, while reducing external movements that lack vision and tangible outcomes capable of reshaping Sudan’s political and economic landscape.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Tuesday, June 30, 2026
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