Can the U.S. Peace Act Change the Rules of the War in Sudan?
By: Dr.Abdoalnasir Solum Hamed
Washington’s Shift from Managing the Crisis to Targeting the War Economy
More than three years into Sudan’s devastating war, Washington is no longer asking how to stop the fighting—it is asking how to make continuing it far more costly. That shift in strategic thinking is embodied in the proposed Preventing External Aggression and Conflict Escalation (PEACE) in Sudan Act of 2026, a bipartisan bill introduced by four senior U.S. senators—Republicans Jim Risch and John Cornyn, alongside Democrats Chris Coons and Jeanne Shaheen.
Although the legislation has not yet completed the congressional process, it already represents one of the most significant attempts to redefine U.S. policy toward Sudan since the outbreak of war in April 2023. Its importance lies not merely in expanding sanctions, but in the broader political and strategic message it sends. After years of failed ceasefire initiatives, limited sanctions, and unsuccessful mediation efforts, Congress appears to have concluded that the existing approach has failed to alter the trajectory of the conflict.
The proposed legislation reflects a growing consensus in Washington that Sudan is no longer simply the site of an internal civil war. Instead, it has become a strategic challenge affecting regional stability, Red Sea security, humanitarian interests, and the geopolitical balance across the Horn of Africa.
More importantly, the bill signals a transition from reactive crisis management toward a long-term institutional strategy. Rather than relying primarily on executive decisions that may shift from one administration to another, Congress is seeking to establish a legislative framework that would require the executive branch to pursue a coherent policy, submit regular progress reports, and maintain sustained diplomatic engagement with the Sudan crisis.
Why Now?
At first glance, the proposal appears overdue. The war has been raging for more than three years, raising an obvious question: why has Congress chosen this moment to introduce such comprehensive legislation?
The answer lies in the transformation of the conflict itself.
What began in April 2023 as a struggle for political and military control between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has evolved into a far more complex regional crisis. State institutions have weakened dramatically, humanitarian conditions have deteriorated, millions have been displaced, and illicit financial networks have become increasingly sophisticated.
Meanwhile, Sudan’s strategic geography has become even more significant. Located on the Red Sea and connected directly to the Horn of Africa, the country sits at the crossroads of global shipping routes and regional security dynamics. Continued instability therefore affects not only Sudan’s neighbours but also broader international interests, including maritime security, migration, and counterterrorism.
The legislation also emerges at a time of increasing geopolitical competition across Africa and the Red Sea corridor. While the bill itself does not explicitly frame Sudan through the lens of great-power competition, the broader strategic environment undoubtedly reinforces Washington’s interest in preventing prolonged instability in one of Africa’s most strategically important states.
A Changing American Understanding of the War
During the first months of the conflict, U.S. policy focused primarily on securing ceasefires, evacuating foreign nationals, facilitating humanitarian assistance, and imposing targeted sanctions against selected individuals.
Those measures, however, produced limited results.
The fighting intensified, mediation initiatives repeatedly collapsed, civilian suffering deepened, and the conflict expanded geographically. More importantly, policymakers gradually realized that the war was being sustained not only by military capabilities but by extensive financial, logistical, and political support networks.
That realization fundamentally altered Washington’s understanding of the conflict.
Instead of viewing Sudan primarily as a humanitarian emergency, U.S. policymakers increasingly began to see a conflict sustained by an interconnected war economy—one involving illicit finance, smuggling networks, external military assistance, and exploitation of natural resources.
The proposed PEACE Act reflects this intellectual shift. Rather than concentrating solely on the battlefield, it seeks to reshape the economic and political environment that enables the conflict to continue.
Beyond Traditional Sanctions
Unlike earlier U.S. sanctions on Sudan—which largely focused on designated individuals or entities—the proposed legislation attempts to address the broader financial ecosystem sustaining the conflict.
The bill authorizes expanded sanctions against individuals and organizations involved in supplying weapons, providing financial resources, facilitating logistics, recruiting child soldiers, obstructing humanitarian assistance, or profiting from Sudan’s natural resources to finance military operations.
Its references to gold and gum arabic should therefore not be interpreted as targeting those commodities themselves. Instead, the legislation seeks to sanction those who exploit, smuggle, or use revenues derived from such resources to prolong the conflict.
This represents an important conceptual shift. Modern wars are rarely sustained by military force alone; they depend equally on financial flows, commercial networks, and political protection. By targeting those enabling structures, Congress hopes to increase the costs of continuing the war rather than merely punishing its visible actors.
More Than Another Sanctions Package
Viewing the PEACE Act simply as another sanctions bill would therefore be misleading.
The legislation requires the U.S. Department of State to develop a comprehensive strategy for ending the conflict, mandates regular reporting to Congress regarding developments on the battlefield and external support networks, proposes extending the mandate of the U.S. Special Envoy for Sudan, and calls for legal assessments regarding whether certain armed actors meet the statutory criteria for designation as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
Equally important is its constitutional significance.
Unlike executive sanctions—which can often be modified or reversed by successive administrations—legislation enacted by Congress establishes a more durable legal framework. In effect, Congress is attempting to institutionalize U.S. engagement with Sudan, reducing the likelihood that policy will fluctuate according to changing political priorities inside the White House.
An Initial Assessment
In my assessment, the proposed legislation’s greatest significance lies not in the number of sanctions it may eventually authorize but in what it reveals about evolving American strategic thinking.
Washington increasingly recognizes that Sudan’s conflict is no longer simply a confrontation between rival military forces. It has become a multidimensional crisis sustained by financial networks, regional actors, illicit resource exploitation, and transnational political interests.
The PEACE in Sudan Act is therefore better understood not as a blueprint for ending the war, but as an attempt to reshape the incentives that sustain it. Rather than assuming sanctions alone can produce peace, Congress appears to be betting that increasing the political and economic costs of continued fighting may eventually alter the calculations of both domestic actors and their external supporters.
Whether that strategy succeeds, however, will depend less on the legislation itself than on Washington’s ability to translate it into coordinated international action. Without broader cooperation from regional governments, international organizations, and key global partners, even the most sophisticated sanctions regime is unlikely to produce the political breakthrough that Sudan urgently needs.
If the proposed PEACE in Sudan Act of 2026 reflects a shift in American strategic thinking, the more important question is not whether the United States possesses additional legal authorities to impose sanctions—it already does. The real question is whether this new legislative approach can alter the calculations of those fighting the war, financing it, or benefiting from its continuation.
This distinction is crucial.
Congress is not claiming that the legislation will end the conflict. Rather, it seeks to raise the political and economic costs of sustaining the war. Sanctions are not presented as a substitute for political negotiations but as a mechanism for reshaping the conflict’s strategic environment, making continued warfare less advantageous than pursuing a negotiated settlement.
This represents a notable evolution in American policy.
During the first years of the conflict, Washington largely relied on targeted sanctions, diplomatic mediation, and repeated calls for ceasefires. Yet the continuation of hostilities, the collapse of successive mediation efforts, and the worsening humanitarian catastrophe convinced many lawmakers that the existing approach had failed to influence the trajectory of the war.
The proposed legislation therefore marks a transition from managing the crisis to changing the conditions that allow the crisis to persist.
What Does Congress Really Want?
Some observers have interpreted the legislation as favoring one side of the conflict over the other. Neither the bill itself nor the public statements made by its sponsors support that conclusion.
Congress is not advocating U.S. military intervention, nor is it endorsing a military victory by either the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) or the Rapid Support Forces (RSF).
Instead, lawmakers appear to share a different assessment: that a decisive military outcome has become increasingly unlikely and that prolonging the conflict threatens not only Sudan’s future but also the broader stability of the Red Sea region and the Horn of Africa.
The strategic objective, therefore, is best understood as containment.
Washington seeks to prevent further regional spillover, restrict the financial resources sustaining the conflict, discourage external support networks, and create conditions under which political negotiations become more viable.
This marks an important departure from the early stages of the war, when U.S. policy focused primarily on humanitarian relief and ceasefire diplomacy without an overarching long-term strategic framework.
Why Has Congress Taken the Lead?
The legislation raises another important question.
If the executive branch already possesses extensive sanctions authorities, why has Congress chosen to intervene?
The answer lies in the nature of the American constitutional system.
Executive actions can be modified—or even reversed—by future administrations. Congressional legislation, by contrast, establishes a more durable legal framework and creates statutory obligations that extend beyond changes in presidential leadership.
The PEACE Act therefore seeks not merely to authorize additional sanctions but to institutionalize American engagement with Sudan.
It requires the executive branch to develop a comprehensive strategy, submit regular reports to Congress on developments in the conflict, identify external sources of financial and military support, and maintain sustained diplomatic attention to Sudan.
In effect, the legislation shifts Sudan from being primarily an executive-policy issue to one subject to continuous congressional oversight.
If the Bill Becomes Law, What Would Actually Change?
Should the legislation ultimately become law, the fighting will almost certainly not stop overnight.
What may change, however, is the environment in which the conflict operates.
International corporations, financial institutions, insurance companies, commodity traders, and commercial banks could face increased legal and reputational risks when dealing with entities suspected of financing the conflict or profiting from the illicit exploitation of Sudan’s natural resources.
Financial institutions would likely strengthen compliance procedures and due diligence requirements, particularly regarding transactions involving Sudanese gold or companies connected to wartime financial networks.
External actors providing military, financial, or logistical support may also encounter greater diplomatic pressure and potential sanctions exposure.
None of these measures would eliminate wartime financing entirely.
They could, however, substantially increase the financial and political costs associated with sustaining the conflict.
Why Is the War Economy So Difficult to Dismantle?
One of the legislation’s most ambitious objectives is targeting what policymakers increasingly describe as Sudan’s war economy.
Yet this may also prove to be its greatest challenge.
The financial networks sustaining the conflict do not operate solely within Sudan. They extend across borders through intermediaries, commercial enterprises, informal markets, and transnational trading routes that are often difficult to monitor or regulate.
Over time, the conflict has also generated powerful economic interests linked to gold smuggling, illicit cross-border commerce, weapons procurement, transportation services, and wartime logistics.
Consequently, disrupting the war economy requires far more than American sanctions.
It demands sustained cooperation among the United States, European allies, African institutions, Gulf governments, and the broader international financial system.
Without such coordination, alternative financial channels are likely to emerge, reducing the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions.
Who Benefits from the Continuation of the War?
Sudan’s conflict cannot be understood solely through military developments.
Like many prolonged conflicts, it has generated its own political economy.
After more than three years of war, extensive networks have emerged around illicit resource extraction, cross-border commerce, weapons trafficking, transportation, logistics, and informal financial systems.
For many actors, continued instability has become economically profitable regardless of military outcomes.
This explains why targeting those financial structures constitutes perhaps the legislation’s most innovative feature.
At the same time, it also represents its most difficult objective.
Unlike military targets, economic networks are decentralized, adaptable, and often capable of rapidly adjusting to new restrictions.
Three Possible Scenarios
If enacted, the PEACE Act could produce one of three broad outcomes.
The first—and most optimistic—is that increased economic and diplomatic pressure raises the costs of continuing the war sufficiently to encourage more serious political negotiations.
The second is that financial networks adapt by shifting toward alternative markets and informal channels, thereby limiting the practical effectiveness of American sanctions.
The third—and perhaps the most realistic—is that the legislation strengthens U.S. diplomatic leverage without fundamentally altering the military balance unless accompanied by broader regional and international cooperation.
Conclusion
The proposed PEACE in Sudan Act of 2026 is unlikely to end Sudan’s war by itself.
What it clearly demonstrates, however, is a profound evolution in Washington’s understanding of the conflict.
American policymakers increasingly recognize that Sudan’s crisis is not simply a confrontation between two armed forces. It has become a complex system of political interests, financial networks, illicit economic activity, external support, and regional geopolitical competition.
The central question is therefore no longer whether the United States can stop the war.
Rather, it is whether Washington can reshape the political and economic environment that has enabled the conflict to endure for more than three years.
If the legislation succeeds in changing that environment—even partially—it may alter the strategic dynamics of the conflict without necessarily ending it immediately.
If, however, American pressure remains largely unilateral and is not matched by coordinated regional diplomacy, sustained international cooperation, and genuine Sudanese political engagement, the legislation will remain an important instrument of pressure—but not, by itself, a pathway to peace.
Ultimately, wars rarely end simply because weapons disappear. They end when the political and economic costs of continuing the conflict become greater than the costs of negotiating its conclusion.
That, perhaps more than anything else, is the strategic logic underpinning the proposed PEACE in Sudan Act of 2026.