Truth Perspective: Sudan and Ethiopia Between Water and Fire
Ibrahim Shaghlawi
It is well known that the relationship between Sudan and Ethiopia is no longer a traditional neighborly relationship; rather, it has been shaped over centuries through human and social interconnection, trade, migration, and economic interests, making the communities on both sides more intertwined than the calculations of temporary politics.
However, this deeply rooted legacy is now facing real tests, in which the war in Sudan, political restructuring in Ethiopia, and regional and international competition over the Horn of Africa intersect. Amid all this, water security emerges as the most sensitive issue.
The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has represented a turning point in redefining the Blue Nile equation, not only from the perspective of development and power generation, but also from the perspective of managing water flows during flood seasons. With its storage capacity reaching approximately 74 billion cubic meters, the impact of storage and discharge decisions becomes more sensitive for downstream countries, foremost among them Sudan, where this issue is inseparable from considerations of national security, agricultural stability, and infrastructure safety.
Yet this water-related assumption does not operate in a vacuum. Sudan today faces an extremely complex internal reality, where the existential war has weakened the state’s capacity to maintain infrastructure and manage environmental risks. With the arrival of the rainy season, this weakness becomes a multiplying factor of danger, as rainfall is no longer merely a seasonal phenomenon, but a practical test of the state’s ability to absorb shocks.
In this context, Sudan’s Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation issued early warnings at the beginning of the week regarding rising water levels and the possibility of moderate flooding in several areas, including parts of Sennar State and regions in Kordofan.
These warnings gain greater significance in light of what the 2025 season reports revealed, indicating that at least ten people died as a result of floods and heavy rains, alongside warnings of rising water levels in the Blue and White Niles across several states, reflecting the increasing pressure on riverside infrastructure that has not yet fully recovered from the effects of war.
However, reading these indicators solely from a climatic perspective is insufficient, as water in Sudan is no longer a separate environmental issue, but rather part of a security and political equation.
The danger of this coincidence between the rainy season and weakened infrastructure lies in the limited emergency response capacity. Poor water drainage channels and inadequate maintenance make any increase in water flow — whether from rainfall or from the Blue Nile — an additional burden on a system that has not yet recovered from the effects of war.
Water management is also linked not only to natural factors, but to technical and political coordination regarding dam operations and data exchange during peak periods. Any disruption in this coordination, or any absence of accurate and timely information, directly affects Sudan’s ability to manage the risks of floods and inundations, especially around the Roseires Dam and vulnerable areas.
Yet the picture remains incomplete without addressing the tense security dimension in the relationship between Khartoum and Addis Ababa. Alongside the water-related complexities, recent months have witnessed mutual political and media tensions, ranging from official accusations.
In addition to circulating reports pointing to military activities and the use of drones targeting Khartoum Airport, as well as Reuters’ remarks regarding data linked to satellite imagery revealing a logistical base deep inside Ethiopian territory. These indicators reflect an unprecedented level of tension, considering the depth of relations between the two countries.
Herein lies the core dilemma: how can tension be managed without falling into the trap of military confrontation? In fragile regional environments, the greatest danger does not lie in direct action itself, but in the transformation of information into political certainty, and in the collapse of quiet communication channels in favor of the logic of merely preserving relations.
Sudan’s strategic interest at this delicate moment is not based on denying risks, nor on taking direct action, but rather on managing the balance between security caution and diplomatic openness. Despite its complexities, the relationship with Ethiopia remains governed by an unchangeable geography, unavoidable water interests, and an internal and regional reality that cannot withstand the opening of new fronts of tension.
Accordingly, the most rational option does not lie in escalation, but in containment based on activating technical channels, strengthening mechanisms for exchanging water data, and reviving paths of regional coordination, alongside building a more resilient internal system for managing water and environmental risks, especially during the rainy seasons.
In conclusion, according to #Truth_Perspective, Sudan today stands before a delicate equation between water and fire: how can it manage escalating political tension and renewed water risks at the same time? Between water that creates life and fears that shape politics, the real challenge remains the ability to transform complexity into an opportunity to rebuild the logic of the state, rather than merely coexist with its crises and challenges.
Wishing you continued health and well-being.
Tuesday, May 19, 2026
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