Sudan.. The Fragmentation of the Battlefield and the Engineering of Politics
Wajh Al-Haqiqa | Ibrahim Shiglawi
What is taking place in our country these days is closer to a comprehensive rearrangement of the theater of war and politics. The timing of the announcement by field commander Ali Rizq Allah, known as “Al-Savana,” of his defection from the Rapid Support Forces militia, coinciding with leaks about Saudi efforts to gather civilian and political forces, followed by the sudden opening toward Ethiopia through Djiboutian mediation, are all indicators suggesting that the Sudanese file may indeed have entered a phase of transition from the logic of managing war to the logic of engineering the post-war order. The question here is: are we facing the beginning of an undeclared implementation of the Jeddah Agreement signed on May 11, 2023, concerning security and humanitarian arrangements?
At the military level, the defection of “Al-Savana” cannot be viewed in isolation from the series of cracks that have struck the structure of the Rapid Support Forces militia in recent weeks.
When names with field weight such as Al-Nour Al-Qubba and Al-Savana begin leaving the militia, while others await the completion of arrangements, the matter goes beyond individuals to the disintegration of the command and control structure. In asymmetric wars, collapse usually does not begin on the battlefield, but from within networks of loyalty. And when loyalty begins shifting from Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo to Musa Hilal, this means the restoration of hard centers and the wisdom of leadership.
This explains why defections now carry intelligence and political value greater than their military value.
But what is striking in Al-Savana’s case is that he announced his defection from the Rapid Support Forces without explicitly declaring his joining of the armed forces. This is an extremely important political and security detail. In military norms, one who leaves rebellion ends either in full surrender to the state or in reconstituting himself as an independent actor.
Therefore, the important question remains: are we facing an individual defection in preparation for surrender, or the nucleus of a new formation awaiting arrangements? The answer here is not related to Al-Savana alone, but to the extent of the Sudanese state’s readiness to absorb the accelerating wave of disintegration within the militia’s ranks through clear arrangements that include disarmament, rehabilitation, and reintegration or demobilization, away from cities and centers of civilian friction.
Politically, the picture appears even more intriguing. The leaks related to Riyadh hosting separate meetings with Mariam Al-Sadiq, Omar Al-Digair, Al-Wathiq Al-Bereir, and Babiker Faisal, coinciding with talk of an anticipated meeting between the “Sumoud” alliance and the Democratic Bloc in Cairo, do not appear to be ordinary movements. What is taking place is closer to a regrouping of civilian forces under a new regional umbrella, led this time by Saudi Arabia more clearly than before.
This means that Riyadh has begun moving beyond a ceasefire toward engineering the political process.
If this is true, then we are facing a regional consensus being built under the banner of “Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue,” but with pre-established political conditions. This explains the intensity of Saudi movement, Cairo’s return to the forefront of coordination, and Djibouti’s movements on the Ethiopian line. Even the potential de-escalation between Khartoum and Addis Ababa does not seem separate from this context, because any internal settlement in Sudan first requires neutralizing regional fronts and preventing borders from being used as platforms for restarting war.
Here, linking this to the Jeddah Agreement becomes necessary. The agreement was not merely a humanitarian document, but a political platform whose implementation was postponed. What now appears to be happening is an attempt to reactivate this platform, but in a more realistic form, based on the principle: ceasefire first, then the reshaping of the civilian scene, then the launch of the political process.
However, the most sensitive question concerns who will be inside this equation, and who will remain outside it. The recent statements of Dr. Abdullah Hamdok to Asharq, regarding there being no place for Islamists in the political process, appear closer to an early declaration of the conditions for entering the coming settlement.
However, Hamdok himself remains surrounded by the Addis Ababa Declaration, which he signed in early 2024 in the name of the Civilian Forces Coordination with the Rapid Support Forces militia, a declaration that placed him, in the eyes of many Sudanese, before ethical, political, and legal questions.
The man who presents himself as carrying the project of the civil state now finds himself facing a fundamental question: what basis grants him the right to exclude a political current, while he entered into direct understanding with an armed force proven, according to international reports, to have been involved in grave violations against civilians in El Fasher, El Geneina, Wad Al-Noura, and Al-Sariha, some of which amount to war crimes and crimes against humanity.
From here, Hamdok’s recent discourse is not read as merely a political position, but as an attempt to redefine political legitimacy in Sudan from outside the balances of war existing on the ground. Yet this attempt collides with a completely different social and political reality. A broad segment of Sudanese no longer view Islamists through the lens of old ideological conflict, but through the lens of their alignment with the armed forces and popular resistance in confronting the Rapid Support Forces militia, whose name in the collective consciousness has become associated with widespread violations affecting homes, property, honor, and the economic infrastructure of the state.
Thus, the war has reconstructed the concept of legitimacy within Sudanese society. It is no longer measured by the history of the political actor, but by his position in the battle for the state itself.
Accordingly, according to #Wajh_Al_Haqiqa, any project aimed at reshaping the political scene before ending the war, resolving the issue of arms, and achieving justice, will remain vulnerable to being popularly perceived as an attempt to recycle the crisis rather than transcend it. At the heart of this scene, Abdullah Hamdok’s position has become even more controversial, after many viewed his discourse as closer to providing political cover for the militia, in exchange for repeated criticism of the Sudanese Armed Forces in international forums.
Between battlefield fractures, regional movement, and shifting balances of power, Sudan appears to stand before a moment that may not end the war yet, but may perhaps lay the foundation for what comes after: who possesses the legitimacy of force… and who possesses the right to speak in the name of the state.
Stay well and in good health.
Wednesday, May 13, 2026
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