Face of Truth: Al-Matamma… State Discourse and the Memory of Blood

Ibrahim Shaglawi

The brief visit to Al-Matamma locality, specifically the village of Al-Sanahir, appeared in its timing and messages as a carefully crafted political announcement of the features of the next phase in Sudan, following the major military transformations witnessed by the country in recent months.

Al-Matamma, upon receiving President Al-Burhan during his performance of Eid prayers, transformed into a political platform carrying messages of war, the state, and history, and consolidating the features of a new discourse seeking to redefine the shape of the Sudanese state after the war.

The large popular reception enjoyed by Al-Burhan in the area carried a striking political significance, as it came in a spontaneous manner without prior arrangements. The importance of this detail lies in the fact that it reflects, in moments of war, a growing need for a clear societal backing and popular alignment supporting the government. Accordingly, the visit carried a message to all that wide segments of Sudanese society see the military institution as a guarantee for protecting the state and ensuring its continuity.

Al-Burhan, during previous periods, made several visits to the states; however, the political reading of his visit to Al-Matamma carries notable dimensions. The locality, located close to Khartoum, represented during the war a vital passage and an important support hub for military operations that ended with the recapture of the capital from the Rapid Support Forces militia.

The “Al-Haqna” road extending to Wadi Seidna, one of the most important military command centers, turned into a highly significant logistical and security artery in the battle for Khartoum, in addition to securing the movement of civilians toward land crossings. Hence, Al-Burhan’s appearance among the people of Al-Matamma carried an implicit acknowledgment of the role this area played in stabilizing the strategic depth of the Sudanese state during the most dangerous stages of the war.

However, the importance of the discourse does not stop at the military dimension; it extends to what can be described as a political repositioning of the government. In his address to the Sudanese people on the occasion of Eid al-Adha, Al-Burhan clearly spoke about the imminent launch of a “comprehensive political dialogue” to be held inside Sudan and involving the “people of suffering,” a Sudanese expression carrying deep significance referring to the social and national forces that bore the real cost of the war, not those who conduct politics from capitals or deal with the Sudanese crisis as a file for regional negotiation.

This expression also reveals a clear shift in the nature of the official political discourse. The war, which began as a military confrontation with an ambitious armed rebellion, has today turned into an attempt to reproduce political legitimacy on new foundations.

Here, Al-Burhan is not speaking about a traditional dialogue to restore security and achieve peace, but rather hinting at the establishment of a completely different governance equation, built on the outcomes of war and on redefining the acceptable forces within the Sudanese political scene.

Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of the speech is the explicit rejection of what he called “capital-based dialogues,” referring directly to negotiation tracks led by regional and international actors in the past period. This position carries extremely important dimensions, as it reflects an internal orientation within the Sudanese state toward reclaiming national decision-making from external influence, or in other words, removing the influence of regional and international powers that have become part of the Sudanese crisis.

Here, Al-Matamma acquires a dimension that goes beyond place into memory and history. This city is not merely a social weight but an old wound in collective consciousness linked to the “Al-Matamma Bloc” of 1897, when disputes within the Mahdist state turned into one of the most horrific massacres in Sudan’s history. Therefore, with what Khartoum, Al-Jazira, and El-Geneina have witnessed of killing, looting, and displacement at the hands of the Rapid Support Forces militia, many Sudanese have become deeply concerned about rhetoric speaking of “revenge for the 56 state” or the liquidation of what is described as the historical center of power.

Accordingly, the popular perception of the war is reinforced as a conflict in which interests, wealth, and geography are intertwined, making its effects extend beyond the battlefield to threaten the social fabric. Therefore, speeches invoking historical grievances are read as attempts to reproduce a logic of collective revenge, with all the risks this entails of fragmenting the Sudanese state and weakening its unity.

Furthermore, the President’s talk about excluding “those whose hands are stained with the blood of Sudanese people” from the upcoming dialogue confirms that the authority may be moving toward building a new political alliance based on the sorting produced by the war, rather than the old balances that followed the fall of former President Omar al-Bashir’s regime.

This means, according to #Face_of_Truth, that Sudan today stands before a new political phase in which the state transitions from the “forced partnership” that led to war, toward “re-founding” that opens the path to peace and stability. However, the success of this phase is not linked to launching dialogue alone, but to the state’s ability to transform victory into a national project that rebuilds trust among Sudanese and establishes a state based on national participation away from the logic of quota-sharing.

May you remain in good health and well-being.

Friday, May 29, 2026

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