What Are the Prospects of Gulf Intervention in the War Against Iran?

Abdulnabi Shaheen – Riyadh

In my article yesterday on an Arabic news website , titled “What Are the Prospects of European Intervention in the War Against Iran?”, I examined the issue from one angle. Today I turn to the Arab side that has been most directly affected by the war : the Gulf Arab states.

Despite the increasingly strong statements these countries have begun issuing in response to the intensive Iranian attacks against them — which reached approximately 2,600 military strikes during the first week of the war alone, some of which Iran denied responsibility for and instead blamed on the United Arab Emirates — military analysts still consider direct Gulf involvement in a war against Iran unlikely.

The Gulf states, which so far bear the largest share of the consequences of the Iranian strikes aimed at distributing the costs of the war and pressuring Washington to halt its offensive, are fundamentally seeking to avoid a wider regional conflict. The region is extremely sensitive from the perspective of global energy security. Moreover, these countries have, over the past five years, embarked on the most ambitious economic transformation programs in their modern history.

The strategic visions adopted by the Gulf states are based on leveraging their hydrocarbon wealth, their geoeconomic position, and the scale of their domestic markets in order to attract foreign capital and talent, while diversifying their economies away from oil. Yet this premise fundamentally depends on stability — a condition that has now become uncertain. This is one of the most important reasons why these countries are reluctant to see further tensions in their vital geographic environment.

Another factor supporting the assumption that Gulf states are unlikely to enter a direct war against Iran at this specific moment is the concern that such a move could be interpreted across the Islamic world as aligning with Israel, the perceived aggressor, against a neighboring Muslim state, Iran, which many would view as the victim of aggression. This represents an ethical and historical dilemma that Gulf states cannot easily escape in the medium term.

Furthermore, their participation in a war against Iran would likely increase Iranian targeting of critical economic infrastructure — including oil facilities, seaports, airports, and other key projects linked to their ambitious economic transformation programs — in addition to attacks on their military infrastructure, potentially weakening their defense capabilities. Such an outcome would serve a strategic objective that Israel might seek to achieve through Iran.

There is also no guarantee that Russia, China, and North Korea would not align — even covertly — with their ally Iran. Unconfirmed reports have already suggested that these countries may be providing intelligence to Iran about American targets. Meanwhile, inside Iran, the domestic front appears cohesive, and no internal uprising against the regime has materialized, contrary to what President Donald Trump and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had anticipated. Many Iranians appear to view the conflict as a sacred defensive war, one that has ignited a strong sense of national solidarity regardless of internal political differences with the ruling system.

There are additional reasons that may lead Gulf states to absorb the Iranian strikes — which so far have not resulted in significant human or material losses — and maintain a defensive posture as a strategically less costly option. These attacks may be viewed as an unavoidable price to be paid, despite attempts by Tel Aviv and Washington to draw the Gulf states into the war on their side. According to this perspective, Washington could eventually withdraw, leaving Gulf states to face Iran in an open confrontation that would exhaust both sides and weaken them — an outcome that could serve the strategic interests of both the United States and Israel.

Another reason for the Gulf’s reluctance to enter the war is the likely divergence of views within the Gulf itself should such a difficult option be proposed. Participation by all Gulf states would be far from guaranteed. Oman and Qatar, for example, would almost certainly refuse to take part even if their own oil facilities were damaged. Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi warned that Iran is not the only target and that there is a broader plan affecting the region. Many regional actors, he suggested, are aware of this, but are betting that siding with the United States might eventually compel Washington to reconsider its decisions and policies.

In conclusion, the Gulf Arab states — which in many ways are victims of a war they never sought — need to unify their vision regarding possible solutions and pursue collective diplomatic initiatives that Washington and Tehran may currently be unable to develop on their own. One possible approach would be for Gulf states, together with Turkey and Egypt, to engage international powers such as China, Russia, Pakistan, and even India in opening diplomatic channels capable of accommodating American assertiveness, Iranian national dignity, and Israeli pride shaken by the fierce Iranian strikes.

Many political and military experts also consider the best option to be the proposal previously put forward by Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi to build a joint regional defense bloc. It may now be wise for such an initiative to be led by Turkey and Pakistan, with the participation of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria — among the region’s strongest military powers — forming what could be considered a powerful Sunni axis capable of confronting both the Israeli and Iranian threats in the Middle East and establishing a formidable military force at the regional and global levels.

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