The Truth Face: The Quartet and the Dilemma of Mediation…
Ibrahim Shaglawi
The statements made yesterday by the U.S. President’s Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs, Massad Boulos, expressing hope for reaching a humanitarian truce in Sudan, clearly reveal the limitations of the international Quartet and the linkage of its positions to attempts to rescue the Rapid Support Militia, which has begun to collapse on the ground.
Boulos announced that the Quartet Committee had reached the final text of what it described as a “peace agreement,” along with a document believed to be acceptable to both parties to the conflict, paving the way for a humanitarian truce. He noted that the United Nations has put in place a mechanism for the withdrawal of fighters from both sides from certain areas to facilitate the flow of humanitarian aid.
However, this international framework, as seen by the Sudanese position, does not seek to end the rebellion as much as it works to entrench it, by consolidating areas of militia control and granting it indirect recognition, instead of classifying it as a terrorist group and holding it accountable for the crimes committed, while humanitarian assistance is used as a cover to strengthen those positions.
On the official side, the Sudanese government’s position has remained firm and clear. Foreign Minister Muhyi al-Din Salim previously that the “Quartet” is not a legitimate framework because it was not issued by a decision of the UN Security Council, and that Sudan’s foreign relations are built on parity and mutual interests, not on pressure and political blackmail.
The rejection of this track is no longer merely a diplomatic stance, but a national and moral position, especially after the proven involvement of a member state within it, the United Arab Emirates, in supporting the militia—something that has stripped this framework of its legitimacy in the eyes of the state and public opinion.
Notably, Boulos’s statements about a truce or humanitarian aid are always preceded by battlefield advances by the Sudanese army, which exposes the Quartet as acting as a political cover for a collapsing party, rather than as a mediator seeking to restore the state or protect civilians.
In contrast to the Quartet, Sudan has shown a hoped-for openness to the Saudi–American initiative, as it is a platform that respects state sovereignty and was not presented as a biased party. This makes it a viable framework for implementing the Sudanese Peace Initiative presented by Dr. Kamil Idris before the Security Council late last year: a monitored ceasefire, withdrawal of the rebel forces, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, transitional justice, followed by an inclusive Sudanese dialogue and free and fair elections.
This initiative represents the Sudanese government’s vision for peace, based on national legitimacy, not on international or regional blackmail or the protection of collapsing militias.
On the ground, and over the past days, the balance of power has shifted in favor of the state: the Sudanese Armed Forces have achieved tangible progress across the six Kordofan axes, lifted the siege on strategic cities such as Dilling and Kadugli, and are advancing toward others—granting them realistic legitimacy based on field control and the restoration of initiative.
Likewise, the affirmation by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Head of State and Commander of the Army, that any settlement or truce must take into account the reality of power on the ground and must include the withdrawal and disarmament of the militia, fully aligns with the Sudanese Peace Initiative. The battlefield victories here are not merely tactical advances, but a solid foundation for affirming national sovereignty and consolidating the political position before the world.
Regionally, Khartoum has smartly rearranged its cards: the Egyptian role has shifted from supportive mediator to strategic ally, affirming that Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity are existential issues and drawing red lines around them, while the Quartet’s monopoly over the initiative has receded in favor of new balances that include Turkey and Qatar, alongside growing coordination with Cairo and Riyadh—turning Khartoum into a political center of gravity from which the regional rhythm is reset and the Sudanese national vision for a solution is reinforced.
Khartoum has also succeeded in investing international sympathy following the atrocities of El Fasher to strengthen its narrative: the conflict is not an internal struggle, but a proxy war waged to control natural resources, using externally backed mercenary militias.
The Foreign Minister and all Sudanese missions abroad have skillfully articulated this narrative, affirming that what is taking place is an armed attack supported from abroad—placing the Quartet in an embarrassing position: its mediation attempt has become linked to re-protecting a collapsing party, rather than achieving peace or preventing violations.
With the widespread rejection of the Quartet and the rise of new regional alliances, three potential paths are taking shape: deepening the Saudi–Sudanese–Egyptian axis, the emergence of a parallel or supportive Turkish–Qatari mediation, or partial re-internationalization through the United Nations in accordance with the Sudanese roadmap, in light of a foreign tour currently being undertaken by Prime Minister Kamil Idris, including Geneva and other stops.
All these scenarios confirm that Sudan is no longer in a position of political defense, but has become an active player with a clear vision, multiple options, and the ability to impose its conditions.
Thus, according to #The_Truth_Face, it becomes clear that Sudan is now writing new rules for international mediation, based on sovereignty, field power, and diplomatic presence, while the Quartet remains in its dilemma, unable to offer any framework that protects the interests of the state or its people. Military victories accompanied by a calculated political and diplomatic discourse make any attempt to re-internationalize the crisis from abroad tied solely to Khartoum’s conditions—in a clear message that authority and legitimacy are not granted, but seized on the ground and imposed on the world.
Wishing you well and good health.
Thursday, February 5, 2026
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