Face of Truth: The Sudanese Scene After the Colombian Sanctions..
Ibrahim Shaglawi
President Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan’s statements to Al Arabiya and Al Hadath channels carried clear messages aimed at imposing a political and military equation on all active parties. When he declared that there would be no truce before the Rapid Support Forces surrender, and no dialogue before they hand over their weapons, he was redefining the boundaries of power and drawing a red line over any negotiating path that bypasses the army or seeks to impose a political formula detached from the balance of national sovereignty.
These statements preceded the accelerating regional and international movements, indicating that the army holds the initiative before it is shaped in other capitals. In this article, we attempt to read all these developments to understand the scene clearly.
One of the notable developments is that the U.S. Congress included a special provision on Sudan in the annual defense bill, requiring the Central Intelligence Agency to develop a 90-day plan to enhance intelligence support in confronting foreign influence that threatens to prolong or expand the conflict in Sudan. This includes sharing intelligence with regional and international allies, and collecting and analyzing information that enables the United States to thwart any external attempts to fuel the conflict, reflecting Washington’s keenness to protect its national security and regional stability.
This move was a declaration that Sudan has shifted from the margins of attention to the heart of American national security calculations, and that the conflict is no longer an internal affair, but rather intertwined with maritime security, the security of the Horn of Africa, and the rivalry of major powers in Africa and the Red Sea. Anyone who reads this provision closely realizes it is not merely an observation plan, but the first step in re-engineering the Sudanese landscape from a determined American viewpoint—balancing between countering Russian influence, limiting the Emirati role, and constraining the supply networks feeding the Rapid Support Forces.
Regional movements were not late either. Cairo, which sees Sudan as a natural extension of its national security, has revived its political and military engagement through the meeting between President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi and Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar in Cairo. The meeting was more than coordination; it resembled a restructuring of the western Sudan and triangle landscape amid Egyptian concerns about the war’s prolonged duration. It is clear that Cairo rejects two things: any attempt to divide Sudan, and any scenario that allows the Rapid Support Forces to become a de facto power.
In the Gulf, the visit of the Emir of Qatar to Riyadh yesterday, and his talks with the Saudi Crown Prince, signaled a desire to recalibrate the diplomatic rhythm and create common ground on the region’s explosive files, foremost among them Sudan. Saudi Arabia, which proposed a political initiative in recent weeks, realizes that the continuation of the war threatens the region’s balance entirely, while Doha sees the return to coordination with Riyadh as essential for crafting a more coherent political path, especially amid expanding external interventions.
On the international military front, the visit of the commander of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) to Libya confirmed that what is happening in Sudan is not isolated from North African dynamics. American movements in Libya are directly linked to controlling smuggling routes, monitoring armed groups, and securing a corridor stretching from the Sahel and Sahara to the Red Sea. Choosing Libya to host part of upcoming AFRICOM exercises reveals a new reading of the region as a potential arena for terrorist activity, given the raging war that has turned Sudan into a central pivot point.
Amid these developments, the U.S. Treasury announced—via Reuters—sanctions against four entities and four individuals, most of them Colombians, accused of providing direct support to the Rapid Support Forces. The Treasury statement highlighted crimes of child recruitment, systematic killing of civilians, men, and boys, sexual violence, and the involvement of Colombian fighters in battles such as El-Fasher. Based on the language used, this American decision is a clear indicator that the Rapid Support Forces have moved beyond the realm of control.
This characterization is an explicit attempt to place the Rapid Support Forces in the category of “armed groups of a terrorist nature,” paving the way for bigger steps later—either through comprehensive sanctions or a potential terrorist designation if the equation demands it. In political language, crimes like rape and child soldiering are not mentioned randomly; they are used to pave the way for harsher decisions supported by legal and moral legitimacy. These measures are not unlikely.
Thus, these sanctions carry two clear messages:
The first is to regional powers that continue to support or turn a blind eye to the Rapid Support Forces, indicating that Washington has begun the “hard pressure” phase and that its previous balancing between the two sides is no longer acceptable.
The second is to the Sudanese state, signaling that the United States is reshaping its internal calculations, with the army appearing closer to the position of the internationally acceptable key actor, as opposed to a militia deeply implicated in violations.
According to #Face_of_Truth, Sudan is entering a new stage of power balances—a stage that requires its leadership to read the surrounding developments carefully and turn emerging opportunities into regional and international gains, even transforming them into a lever for national interest. The future of the Sudanese state now stands upon a thin line stretched between military victory, political transition, and diplomatic effort, so that the country may emerge triumphant from this existential war that has exhausted the land, people, and resources.
Wishing you well and safety.
Wednesday, December 10, 2025
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