Face of Truth: The Alternative Plan to Ignite Blue Nile
Ibrahim Shaglawi
Blue Nile State, located in southeastern Sudan on the border with Ethiopia, is witnessing early signs of tension that could turn into a new front of conflict amid the shifting dynamics of the Horn of Africa. Sudan Tribune quoted a Sudanese official as saying that the army is preparing to repel a potential attack by the Rapid Support Forces and their allies, who are conducting military training in four border areas within Ethiopia’s Benishangul-Gumuz region.
The camps include the Rapid Support Forces militia, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North led by Joseph Tuka, the forces of Ubaid Abu Shotal, in addition to mercenaries from Ethiopia and South Sudan. They have been equipped with quantities of military hardware in preparation for an attack on the cities of Kurmuk and Qissan. The information also revealed the unloading of military equipment at two air bases inside the Benishangul region and the upgrading of Assosa Airport to support operations, reflecting clear regional coordination between Ethiopian authorities and militia backers, and making the likelihood of the Blue Nile front igniting a real possibility.
The possibility of Ethiopian intervention in Sudan is not merely a hypothesis, but rather a reflection of the fragility of the political and geographic phase in the region. Sudan and Ethiopia are neighboring states brought together by geography and history, yet divided by conflicting interests and border tensions, at the heart of which lie the Blue Nile region and Al-Fashaga, amid ambitions over agricultural lands, weak border management, and the preoccupation of the Sudanese state.
Nevertheless, any military adventure would face strategic constraints: high costs, exhaustion of the army, and exposure to regional and international reactions, especially since any move against Sudan would automatically be read as a threat to Egyptian water security linked to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s visit to Riyadh, then Cairo, then Ankara, and his messages rejecting any truce as long as the Rapid Support Forces remain present, reflect Khartoum’s awareness of the importance of Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue and its rejection of external dominance over any negotiations, while emphasizing that the army is the guarantor of national sovereignty.
Despite internal challenges, Sudan has managed during the war to rebuild the army’s systems and enhance its technical and logistical capabilities, and to regain control over the capital Khartoum and a number of states. This positions Sudan as an active player in the regional equation, not merely a piece manipulated by external powers. The Sudanese army, with its capabilities, historical standing, and clear popular support, renders any new front within a “stretching the peripheries” strategy doomed to failure in its objectives.
International politics are calculated through balances of power. The situation inside Ethiopia suffers from divisions, ranging from regional conflicts to the fragility of the national social contract, making any external adventure fraught with risks. Nevertheless, the nature of ambitions surrounding Sudan makes it imperative to hedge against all scenarios, while placing the army and the internal front at the highest levels of readiness.
On the other hand, Egyptian reactions, with declared red lines and the activation of the joint defense agreement, make Cairo’s intervention both possible and realistic, whether through providing military support or via direct action under international law. This adds a deterrent dimension to the region and facilitates Egypt’s ability to secure control over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
Israel’s recognition of the “Republic of Somaliland” adds a new layer of complexity, as it weakens Arab consensus and redraws lines of influence in the Red Sea, turning Somalia into an open strategic point for Israeli influence on regional security, including control over ports and maritime corridors. This move deepens risks to Sudan and makes it more vulnerable to external pressure given the complexities of the current phase, politically and economically, placing it at the heart of a regional power game that includes the UAE and Ethiopia, all seeking to exploit the vacuum to achieve strategic gains.
Likewise, the gradual independence of the Port of Bosaso through Emirati influence intensifies regional competition in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. Additionally, transformations within Ethiopia, alongside continued state fragility and deep conflicts in the Tigray region, make any decision to open an external front laden with strategic risks.
Direct invasion is not the least costly option; however, managing conflicts through proxies and supporting militias remains the most likely scenario, given the ability of external powers to exploit the vacuum and expand their influence. Here the most important question emerges: Where does Sudan stand? Is it an arena tugged by regional powers, or a state that regains the initiative and asserts its presence as an active player in the Horn of Africa equation? It is certain that the answer is contingent upon internal cohesion, the maturity of elites, and societal awareness that protecting the land precedes all calculations. Without the existence of the state, the homeland becomes fuel for others’ projects.
Thus, Sudan stands at a crossroads. Its internal strength, the awareness of its elites, and the army’s ability to endure are what will determine its position in the Horn of Africa. Any new front or external intervention will be read in light of Khartoum’s ability to manage its alliances and protect its sovereignty. In the end, land is not a game, and politics is not a mere momentary move, but a sustainable strategy capable of control and maneuver.
According to #Face_of_Truth, what is happening in Blue Nile is a reflection of proxy wars over Sudan’s resources and strategic location. Politics intertwine with geopolitics, water, and regional security, making the balance between defending the land and political maneuvering the key to Sudan’s success in preserving its role as an active player in the Horn of Africa—a role that does not begin at the borders alone, but from within, through restoring the state system, activating institutions, and recognizing that national security is a responsibility achieved through the intelligent use of winning cards.
Wishing you continued well-being and good health.
Tuesday, 30 December 2025
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