Face of Truth: Return to Khartoum and Mufaddal’s Message
Ibrahim Shaglawi
The Transitional Council of Ministers issued Circular No. (18) for the year 2025, directing the Ministries of Justice, Agriculture and Irrigation, Minerals, Animal and Fisheries Resources, Infrastructure and Transport, Digital Transformation and Communications, Education, Higher Education, Human Resources and Social Welfare, Religious Affairs and Endowments, and Culture, Information, Antiquities and Tourism to begin arrangements for their transfer from Port Sudan to Khartoum.
Although the decision appears administrative, it is not without political implications. These ministries had been operating in Port Sudan with limited capacity and restricted functions, and their return now means recalling the full workforce of the state, providing operational capabilities, and restoring the pulse of the executive apparatus to the center of authority.
At the same time, their move to alternative premises within Khartoum—outside the central district—comes in accordance with the assessments of General Jaber’s committee, which is studying the redesign of the central area to construct a modern capital. Here, the decision acquires its strategic dimension: the state is not merely returning to Khartoum, but perhaps returning while redefining the very heart of the capital in light of the new reality, in a step that combines the restoration of institutions with the initiation of the architecture of the coming state.
The return of the federal government to Khartoum this December redraws the center of power in Sudan after more than two years of forced dispersion caused by the rebellion of the Rapid Support militia. Khartoum, which witnessed systematic destruction and lost its role as the stage of national decision-making, now returns to become the symbol of the state and the mirror of its authority on the ground, at a time when security threats and political risks remain present.
This decision redefines the relationship between the center and the executive apparatus and recalibrates institutional performance on a basis that ensures the stability of the capital and the government’s ability to impose its will—especially as we approach a new year’s plan carrying many goals and challenges.
In parallel, yesterday’s visit by the Director General of the General Intelligence Service, General Ahmed Ibrahim Mufaddal, to Khartoum State comes at the heart of this strategy. It carries a dual message: internally, it warns of the activity of collaborators with the militias and sleeper cells, and affirms that the return is not merely a moment of triumph, but the beginning of a precise management of the post-war phase; and externally, it confirms the state’s ability to control Khartoum and reinforce its political and security presence prior to any arrangements.
Mufaddal’s choice of this timing is not a coincidence. It coincides with the decision to move the ministries, therefore aiming to regulate the internal scene and control the security and political rhythm in the capital, and serves as a smart signal that every governmental movement is occurring within a clear plan coordinated with all security agencies.
Mufaddal’s statements also affirmed the symbolic importance of security, civil society, and culture in reinforcing the state: mending the social fabric, rejecting hate speech, and ensuring the participation of state institutions with the community—all tools that make authority not merely material power, but moral strength capable of reshaping the internal scene.
Therefore, the return carries clear messages to the internal front: that waiting for the decision will not be an option, that Khartoum will be the center of the upcoming initiative, and that any internal political movement must take into account the nature of the authority being reestablished in the capital. The real danger now lies not only in the remnants of militias, but in the political vacuum or institutional fragmentation that could enable internal opportunistic forces or external actors to reshape the reality at the expense of the state.
Politically, the decision reshapes the balance of power between the state and its people and confirms that the government is moving according to a centralized, gradual strategy: restoring sovereignty over the capital, recalibrating the executive apparatus, and blending security performance with political action—creating greater capacity to manage the crisis and anticipate the next phase. These measures send a message to all regional and international actors: Khartoum is the heart of national decision-making; with its return comes balance, and the national will regains its coherence.
The return to Khartoum, therefore, is not merely the relocation of ministerial headquarters or a recalibration of governmental executive performance, but a reconstruction of the state itself from within the capital, placing all parties—senior leadership, administrators, security officials, and community actors—within a clear vision aimed at achieving political cohesion and strategic stability.
According to #Face_of_Truth, the return represents a multi-dimensional strategic move: internally, it affirms the state’s ability to manage authority and organize the political scene; security-wise, it reestablishes control over the capital and confronts threats; and regionally, it sends strong signals that the government remains capable of initiative and maintaining control. Khartoum today is not merely a headquarters but a platform for redefining authority and sovereignty, and the core of any national or potential negotiation strategy. What Mufaddal said confirms that the upcoming phase will be managed with caution, blending politics, security, and institutional administration into a single mold to ensure the continuity and stability of the state.
Wishing you all goodness and well-being.
Wednesday, December 9, 2025
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