Al-Burhan Uses a New Tactic
By: Dr. Ibrahim Shaglawi
It appears that General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander of the Army, has chosen to shift from a position of political defense to a platform of strategic initiative. His article in The Wall Street Journal served as a carefully crafted message directed at the most influential circles in Washington: decision-makers, national security institutions, and the economic sectors that ultimately decide where partnerships are built and which states are supported.
In this article, we attempt to read the scene calmly, examining the content in a way that reveals a new political tactic that employs the language of interests and distances itself from traditional rhetoric. Al-Burhan appeared to be — indirectly — proposing a strategic deal to the United States, presenting himself for a new phase that transcends traditional frameworks, indicating that he wants Sudan to regain its role as a positive regional power.
He also reminded that “Sudan under his leadership took a historic step in 2021 by joining the Abraham Accords,” implying that he does not oppose normalization in exchange for preserving the historical rights of the Palestinian people in accordance with the two-state solution vision. This direction in Al-Burhan’s message — overlooked by the Arabic translations circulating — opens the door to a new phase. It presents Al-Burhan as a general who masters tactics, maneuvering, and political deals, and closes the door on his rivals. It also opens the way for American investments in partnerships and reconstruction, and signals readiness to align with the new political trends in the region, without an explicit declaration that could provoke domestic sensitivities.
This shift, if intentional, represents a clear pragmatic leap that reintroduces Sudan as a state seeking to reposition itself in the regional and international order, after years of isolation and political miscalculation that dragged the country into confrontations and brought painful sanctions. More importantly, Al-Burhan seeks to refute a narrative long promoted by some parties — that the army is under the influence of Islamists and that its decisions are not independent. The article came to say: the decision is Sudanese, and the state is seeking its own interest based on a new reading of the international reality.
At the same time, Al-Burhan realizes that speaking about normalization remains a sensitive issue in the Arab and Islamic consciousness, and that any reference could be understood as an attempt to extort external support or offer concessions at the expense of public opinion. Therefore, his message came cautiously, framed by the language of security, stability, and sovereignty, presenting the army as the guardian of the state and the guarantor of its stability, not a party in a power struggle.
But the most important element in this article is the narrative Al-Burhan presents to the world: this is not a war between two generals, as the militia’s propaganda and its supporters have tried to promote in international media. Rather, it is a war of a state facing an armed rebellion with a bloody record stretching from Darfur to Khartoum, supported by regional powers seeking a foothold in the Red Sea and the African Sahel. This narrative rearranges the diplomatic table entirely because it obliges the international community to treat the army as a “legitimate institution,” not as a party equal to the rebel Rapid Support Forces.
The article also reconnected the war with American interests: Red Sea security, counterterrorism, maritime safety, and the expansion of cross-border mercenaries. Thus, Al-Burhan transformed the Sudanese conflict from an “African internal file” into an American national security issue — the only language Washington has historically responded to.
The timing of the publication makes it clear that Al-Burhan aims to open a direct channel with the U.S. administration, benefiting from the language preferred by President Trump: the language of interests, deals, and political gains. The article grants Trump recognition of his international role and presents Sudan as a potential ally in a troubled region where Washington needs a trustworthy partner — a description that applies to no power other than the Sudanese army.
On another front, publishing an article of this magnitude in such a prestigious newspaper delivers a strong blow to efforts aimed at “legitimizing” the Rapid Support Forces within American lobbying circles. The article reveals — with numbers and evidence — the extent of the violations and places the militia in the category of “terrorist organizations,” making defending it or presenting it as a political actor costly for any regional or international party in Washington.
Domestically, the step carries multiple messages: raising the ceiling of international negotiations by asserting that dismantling the militia is a non-negotiable condition, and that integration can only be partial and limited to those not involved in crimes. It also reaffirms that the army remains committed to the civilian transition, and that the war disrupted the path but did not cancel it.
It signals to the Sudanese public that the state seeks to restore its regional position, and that Sudan possesses enough wealth, resources, and geopolitical value to rebuild itself — if serious and proper international partnerships are secured.
Domestically as well, the message places political forces before new balances. Civilian groups fractured by the war will read the message as an attempt to return to the consensus the government lost in past months. Meanwhile, Islamists will face more complex calculations: they do not wish to lose the influence they gained during the war, yet they also realize that an openness to interests may provide them an avenue for repositioning — if shaped in a way that preserves their ability to influence.
The Syrian experience under President Ahmad Al-Shar’a provides them with a tangible example: some ideological forces adapted to a pragmatic shift when they felt that engaging in an openness track would grant them new windows of influence. Sudan is moving along a similar path today, especially with Saudi Arabia — which engineered part of Syria’s transformation — now involved in the Sudanese crisis. This makes Islamists less able to reject outright and more inclined toward conditional engagement and caution in outcomes.
Neighboring countries will read the message with concern. Egypt, seeking stability along its southern border, will receive it cautiously but may see in it a gateway to restoring balance if accompanied by practical steps on the ground. Ethiopia will watch warily any message hinting at Khartoum’s ability to reorder its regional priorities, while Gulf states will look at the matter through the lens of investment, regional security, and particularly influence in the Red Sea.
Externally, the message poses a true test of Washington’s willingness to reconsider its approach to Sudan. The current American approach is not based on personalities but on guarantees of stopping the war, controlling arms, and preventing Russian expansion in the Red Sea. Therefore, Washington will not give Al-Burhan direct support, but will treat his message seriously as an initial signal — provided that it is followed by concrete steps. The Trump administration — based on his statements about Mohammed bin Salman’s initiative — appears more inclined toward swift settlements that ensure stability and curb Chinese, Iranian, and Russian influence in the region.
Regionally, Saudi Arabia represents the cornerstone of this shift. Since the Crown Prince presented his initiative to end the war — and Trump before him — it has become clear that Riyadh seeks to engineer a settlement that brings Sudan back into the stable regional sphere, as it did in Syria. It may use economic and political pressure to push Sudanese parties toward settlement. If Saudi Arabia reads in Al-Burhan’s message a genuine willingness for openness, it could play a decisive role in repositioning him internationally.
Publishing an article in American media is not new in international relations. Major leaders used it at critical moments to reshape their image: Putin when he opposed American intervention in Syria via The New York Times, Erdogan when he marketed his regional vision in The Wall Street Journal, Mohammed bin Salman when he reintroduced his reform project, and Rouhani ahead of the nuclear deal. All understood that addressing the American media core is an attempt to influence the deep state, not just the general public.
Al-Burhan entering this context means he realizes that the gateway back to the international community passes through Washington and the region, not the domestic arena alone. And if he succeeds in transforming this message from a media signal into a gradual political process — with regional guarantees and a reordering of internal relationships — this could mark the beginning of a genuine transformation that restores Sudan to the sphere of action and influence.
We can say, according to #Face_of_Truth, that the article is a calculated political step that returns Sudan to the regional and international equation — and particularly to Washington’s calculations. And if this new tactic is followed by concrete steps on the ground, it may represent the beginning of blocking the path to international conspiracies, regional ambitions, and crude narratives, in order to rebuild the state on new foundations that restore Sudan’s pioneering role.