The Truth’s Face: Sudan’s Peace, the Failure of Elites, and the Disjointed Quartet..!
Ibrahim Shaglawi
Since the outbreak of the war in Sudan on April 15, 2023, between the Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces militia, the internal, regional, and international political scene has been opened to entangled complexities; ranging from the ambiguity of roles, to the erosion of national depth, and the lack of political efforts with a unifying reference to which one can resort.
At the heart of this chaos, vague concepts of peace are being redefined, and initiatives are being presented that lack depth and balance, while Sudanese are asked to make existential concessions without even being granted the right to define the criteria for the solution, or to identify who is the aggressor and who is the victim. These interferences clearly reveal the failure of Sudanese political elites to come up with real solutions to the country’s crisis.
In this context, the International Quartet—consisting of the United States, Britain, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and recently Egypt—emerged as one of the clearest manifestations of international confusion toward Sudan. This formula appeared after the fall of Omar al-Bashir’s regime in 2019, without a clear legal reference; neither from the United Nations, nor from the African Union or IGAD.
It is a political pressure group closer to a circumstantial alliance formed in response to common interests among these countries. Therefore, it lacks the components of honest mediation or an effective role in solving the Sudanese crisis.
The last statement of the Quartet issued on September 12, 2024, was clearly biased when it called for “preventing the return of Islamists” and considered them primary drivers of the war, without mentioning the direct responsibility of the militia that ignited the war, looted banks, committed massacres, and destroyed state institutions.
This blatant bias raised an essential question: How can a party involved in supporting the militia—such as the UAE—be presented as a peace mediator? And can the Quartet be considered a neutral umbrella for the political solution in a country torn apart by regional and international interventions?
It is clear that the latest statement represented an unofficial declaration to restructure the Sudanese scene away from the popular will and national sovereignty.
The discourse began aimed at imposing a preconceived international vision of the nature of the post-war Sudanese state; the same approach previously followed by this Quartet, which was one of the reasons for the country’s slide into war.
This vision has continued to exclude Islamists, considering them an “ideological threat,” while overlooking the armed militias that have committed documented violations simply for adopting a false “modernist” discourse.
On the other hand, the official response from the Sudanese government was firm and clear, with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirming that national sovereignty is a red line, and any international initiative must pass through the state institutions. This was not a defense of a specific political current, but rather a foundational principle: true peace cannot be achieved through mediators who do not recognize the existence of the state itself or seek to shape its future apart from its people, army, and national institutions.
In contrast, the parallel government supported by the Rapid Support Forces welcomed the Quartet’s statement, seeing it as an opportunity to exclude its political opponents, in complete harmony with the international discourse, seeking to gain external legitimacy to compensate for its lack of any internal legitimacy. This position revealed that the war in Sudan was no longer just an internal conflict; it had turned into a regional tug-of-war, with militias being used as tools to achieve political gains for regional sponsors.
Amidst this fragmentation, Sudanese political elites—from various directions—seem incapable of producing a unifying national discourse or even the minimum coordination. Some have engaged in empty dialogues, like the “Promediation Workshop,” which is managed outside the national context, attempting to engineer agreements with parties that are rejected by the people, while others remain prisoners of old ideological calculations and zero-sum rhetoric.
As usual, the elites fall behind the people’s struggle, intersecting with external agendas without presenting a clear vision for ending the war or building real peace.
The current field reality paints a clearer picture: the Sudanese army, despite the challenges, has withstood, advanced, and repositioned itself in vast areas of the west of the country. If it completes its military operations in Kordofan and Darfur, the militia will lose its justification for existence and will turn into a scattered force with no strategic impact. However, any delay in the military resolution or dragging the army into unequal negotiations before completing its goals may lead to catastrophic results: the first being legitimizing the militia, and the second being the division of Sudan.
It is well known—according to #TheTruthsFace—that Sudanese do not reject negotiations, as all major wars end with an agreement, but they refuse to negotiate under the pressure of international extortion. Negotiation cannot be conducted with those who arm and fund militias without first acknowledging their responsibility and ceasing to do so immediately. The UAE is not a mediator, but an active party in the war, and unless the Quartet reconsiders its composition and positions, it will remain part of the crisis, not a means of solution.
The real solution to the Sudanese crisis does not lie in relying on external mediations that impose their agenda at the expense of national sovereignty, but in the ability of Sudanese elites to regain their awareness, unite their ranks, and build a unified national vision that preserves decision-making independence and safeguards Sudan’s future.
Stay safe and well.
Tuesday, October 7, 2025
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