The Truth Lens: The Communist Party Reads Turabi’s Book..!
Ibrahim Shglawi
The Sudanese Communist Party has long remained a controversial force—despite its calculated tactics and continuous attempts to position itself outside the traditional binaries of power and opposition. Amid the war-torn Sudanese landscape, with its collapsing infrastructure and public services, the party’s initiative in Atbara stands out as a notable political gesture. It goes beyond mere service provision and signals an overt return to political engagement—through the gateway of community involvement.
The party, known for its storied legacy and radical stances, appears to be re-reading the current moment with a renewed consciousness—one that blends ideological discourse with practical responsiveness to real-world challenges.
One of the party’s notable stances during the ongoing war has been its clear and consistent condemnation of the atrocities committed by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), whether in Khartoum or the states of Darfur and Al-Jazirah. Unlike some political groups that have remained silent or issued equivocal positions, the party has taken a firm line, holding the RSF directly responsible for civilian massacres.
For instance, following the April 2025 attack on the Zamzam camp in El Fasher, the party labeled it a “barbaric massacre” that required urgent international intervention to protect displaced civilians and hold the perpetrators accountable. Similarly, in March 2024, the party condemned crimes committed by the RSF in Al-Jazirah villages, describing them as part of a broader campaign of ethnic cleansing and genocide.
However, the party’s stance was not one-sided. It also held the military institution partly responsible for igniting the war and fueling political polarization. It called for a comprehensive solution—not merely one that condemns the RSF—but one that dismantles all parallel armed structures, ends military interference in politics, and establishes a democratic civilian authority. This dual position—firm against the militias and critical of the army—places the party in an uncomfortable gray zone politically, yet reinforces its credibility among wide segments of the public.
The Atbara initiative—proposed by the party and welcomed by the state government—involved funding a solar power network to operate both the new and old main power stations. The goal: to address power outages and reduce reliance on costly diesel generators. This move reflects a pragmatic shift within the party. Politics, for the party, is no longer just about ideological posturing or loud statements—it is now embedded in daily life: electricity, water, inflation, and the collapse of basic services.
In doing so, the party seems to be revisiting the famous proposition of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi in his book “Issues of Renewal”, where he argued that radical change does not emerge from the center, but from the marginalized peripheries—where awareness is born from suffering, and action comes from those without tools of power but armed with insight.
Nonetheless, this initiative cannot be viewed in isolation from the broader national context. The war has reshaped Sudanese public sentiment—people are yearning for stability and seeking a national consensus that can spare the country further division. In this context, if the party seeks a return to Khartoum as a national political actor, it must reassess its traditional tools—particularly its reliance on the street as a pressure mechanism. What is needed today is not mobilizing the masses, but sitting with them, listening, and building on their realistic aspirations.
This approach raises a legitimate question: could this initiative pave the way for some form of rapprochement between the party and the government?
On the surface, both sides seem aligned in rejecting and condemning the RSF’s actions. However, beneath this tactical convergence lie fundamental differences. The party does not recognize the current government as a legitimate civilian authority—it views it as an extension of a military coup—and it proposes an alternative project aimed at dismantling violent state structures and rebuilding the nation on democratic foundations.
Moreover, unlike the government, the party has no qualms about demanding accountability from both the army and the RSF leadership, firmly rejecting any trade-off between justice and stability.
Thus, what may appear as convergence is likely a temporary overlap on shared opposition to the RSF, not a strategic alliance. It may even turn into future tension if the government seeks to capitalize on the party’s position to legitimize itself or sideline opponents under the banner of “anti-insurgency.” Conversely, if the party truly wishes to return to Khartoum and the political forefront, it must acknowledge the shift in public sentiment—toward consensus and away from confrontation—and evolve from revolutionary rhetoric toward practical proposals that promote peace and national cohesion.
In this sense, the Communist Party is not just reading Turabi’s book—it is reinterpreting it through the lens of Sudan’s current reality, drawing on the philosophy of “change from the periphery” without abandoning the core of its own political project. Perhaps, in repositioning itself through such initiatives, the party has indeed begun “reading Turabi”—not as a rival, but as a thinker whose insights may illuminate new paths in the post-war political landscape.
In post-war Sudan, political action is no longer reserved for those who shout the loudest—but for those who offer the most realistic, deeply rooted solutions that strengthen society and foster stability.
Best regards,
Thursday, August 7, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com