Face of Truth: The Government of Hope… A Book Sudanese Have Not Read
Ibrahim Shglawi
In a political scene still vivid in the memory of Sudanese citizens, Dr. Kamal Idris introduced himself, moments after being sworn in as Prime Minister, in three languages, holding in his hands a large book he described as “a comprehensive plan for managing the transitional period,” with another book behind it detailing implementation mechanisms. The moment seemed like the dawn of a new era built on planning, vision, rationality, governance, and institutional reference.
Yet more than two months have passed since that scene, and the book remains closed. It has not been published to the public, debated, or adopted as a political or administrative reference for government plans. Simply put, it has not been read — even by the Sudanese who were promised it would serve as a roadmap toward stability. Here lies one of the clearest manifestations of confusion within the so-called “Government of Hope”: the absence of a declared strategy in the public domain, confined instead to the executive elite, even as the country moves into the 2026 plan and its new budget — which was supposed to form the basis of a new social and human contract to overcome the challenges of transition.
Managing such a complex transitional phase without genuine public participation reflects a conceptual flaw that is unlikely to escape the Prime Minister’s attention; no government that came with an implicit popular mandate can rely on undisclosed documents and operate with tools unseen and unevaluated by its people. A plan that is not open to discussion cannot be the basis of consensus, and a discourse that is not rooted in transparency quickly turns into a political burden — one that may hinder progress rather than advance it.
This institutional opacity has extended beyond the missing plan to include controversial executive decisions, most notably the merger of the Ministry of Irrigation with the Ministry of Agriculture, while neglecting the water resources portfolio. The move was met with sharp criticism from experts, who saw it as a direct threat to national water security in a country whose economic, environmental, and political fate is tied to a complex regional water system — foremost among them the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and the Nile Basin Commission.
On the foreign relations front, the picture is no less unsettled; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs remains without a minister, despite being the very institution tasked with leading Sudan’s efforts to regain its regional and international standing — including restoring its suspended African Union membership. The Prime Minister recently denied taking on the role himself, stressing that “foreign affairs require full-time dedication,” yet offered no explanation for the vacancy, even though the Minister of State appointed to the post was announced before Idris was tasked with forming the government.
A similar pattern appeared in the appointment of Dr. Ahmed Al-Tijani as Minister of Animal Resources, which sparked controversy due to his possession of Emirati citizenship. In Cairo, Idris announced the withdrawal of the appointment without explaining why he was nominated in the first place, or how such information escaped the vetting process. More troubling still was the justification offered: the existence of a “fifth column” within state institutions — a description that invites conspiracy theories more than it provides objective answers.
In this context, the Government of Hope seems unable to complete its cabinet formation or even hold a full meeting of the Council of Ministers. Nearly three months have passed since the government was formed, and major files remain suspended: no published plan, no foreign minister, no declared vision for reconstruction — despite promises to allocate hundreds of billions for the purpose — and no tangible steps to activate what Idris described as a “Sudanese Marshall Plan.”
Even announced initiatives, such as a “special youth unit” and a “peace council,” remain in the realm of intentions without transforming into functioning structures or clear public policies. Notably, the Prime Minister stated that any minister who fails to deliver within three months will be dismissed — prompting the straightforward question: will this rule apply to all?
To its credit, the government has registered some positive signals, such as Idris’ confirmation that the government will return to Khartoum in October, progress in restoring basic services, coordination with Egypt on education, health, and water security issues, and improvements in security in some states. Yet these gains will remain limited unless they are built on institutional foundations and a clear plan.
According to #Face_of_Truth, the greatest challenge facing the Government of Hope is turning plans and slogans into tangible realities and translating promises into measurable, accountable actions. Trust in the Prime Minister’s abilities — no matter his academic stature or international experience — cannot substitute for transparency or a shared vision. Sudanese citizens respond not to those who merely raise theoretical projects, but to those who involve them in implementation and lead with a vigilant executive will for change. Unless Dr. Kamal Idris brings his project out of the realm of concepts into the arena of executive and political action, his government will remain pregnant with hope — yet unable to give birth.
Best regards,
Saturday, 9 August 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com