Face of Truth: The Quad’s Engineering and the Islamists’ Tactics

Ibrahim Shglawi

The international Quad Committee — comprising the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE — and with anticipated involvement from Qatar and the United Kingdom, is leading efforts to craft a political settlement to end the conflict in Sudan and usher in a new phase. This initiative is based on a top-down political approach, aiming to merge the Jeddah and Quad tracks into a unified framework inspired by Western visions, to be passed through the UN Security Council as a binding agreement — a path that seeks to reshape Sudan’s political scene, largely detached from national sovereignty.

Despite the stated intentions of achieving peace, this approach raises deep concerns among wide segments of Sudanese society, as it is perceived to bypass national will and impose a ready-made solution driven by regional and international power dynamics.

These concerns are further fueled by the growing regional discourse hostile to Islamists, along with international agendas that propose their exclusion as a prerequisite for political transition. However, this path clashes with a more complex reality: Islamist currents in Sudan still maintain a broad social base, a seasoned political organization, and tactical skills that have historically enabled them to maneuver, endure, and adapt to political shifts.

It is important here to distinguish between opposing Islamists as a political movement and attempts to exclude them as a deeply rooted social component within the state and society.

Though much criticism has been leveled at Sudanese Islamists over their time in power, it cannot be denied that they remain a significant force — not only organizationally, but also in the broader national struggle against fragmentation. Alongside other actors, they took part in the popular resistance and in defending the country’s unity and sovereignty.

According to many observers, internal reform within the Islamist movement has become imperative. Efforts are already underway to revise their political rhetoric and shift from partisan centrism to a broader national project — one grounded in the understanding that the era of political monopoly is over, and that Sudan can only be governed through inclusive partnership and genuine consensus.

Islamists today face a critical juncture: either they unify their ranks and redefine their role as a forward-looking civic force capable of evolving, or they risk being pushed back to the margins under familiar pretexts that have only deepened division and instability in the past.

There are growing opportunities for Sudanese Islamists to reemerge as an accepted political actor — thanks to their nuanced understanding of the political landscape and their proven tactical flexibility. This possibility is reinforced by the Syrian precedent, where Ahmad al-Sharaa successfully transformed a once militant Islamist faction into a stable political entity that forged agreements with key regional powers — including Saudi Arabia, which recently signed an unprecedented economic deal with his movement and helped re-legitimize it regionally.

If such a transformation was possible for a more extreme group, then Sudanese Islamists — with their more cohesive structure and organizational experience — arguably stand a better chance of delivering a distinct and constructive political model, provided they effectively manage their internal disagreements, reforms, and alliances.

At this stage, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey represent influential regional partners that have shown openness toward inclusive political settlement pathways — recognizing that Sudan’s stability is integral to regional security.

Any settlement based on exclusion, therefore, reflects not only short-sightedness but poses a real threat of reigniting conflict in more complex forms. Sudan’s exit from the cycle of war requires a genuine partnership — one that upholds mutual recognition and balances power dynamics.

The real wager at this moment should not be on excluding Islamists or empowering them in isolation, but rather on building a stable Sudanese political system — one grounded in the ballot box and equal legal footing for all.

Islamists, like all others, do not possess a permanent mandate. But they should not be treated as outsiders either. If they engage in sincere introspection and contribute to building a national project, their organizational and popular weight makes them a potential part of the solution, rather than a source of the problem.

One must also recognize the Islamists’ notable tactical ingenuity: they excel at repositioning, forging alliances, and adapting to shifting dynamics. The real challenge, however, lies in their ability to break out of insular thinking and engage with the broader public sentiment — one that longs for a break from cycles of failure, exclusion, and bloodshed.

A renewed political discourse is needed — one that transcends rigid ideology, embraces national realism, and speaks to the people in the language of hope and renewal.

Whether one agrees or disagrees with them, Islamists do have a genuine ability to influence the scene — if they can liberate themselves from past illusions and extend a hand toward a sincere national partnership. On the other hand, the international Quad must, if it seeks a viable settlement, engage with all Sudanese forces realistically, rather than trying to trim the scene to fit its own interests.

From the lens of Face of Truth, Sudan does not need a political architecture drawn abroad as much as it needs a national project built from within — one crafted by Sudanese hands and inclusive of all actors. This cannot be achieved unless Islamist tactical prowess aligns with sincere national introspection, and the Quad abandons its top-down approach in favor of supporting a comprehensive, inclusive dialogue.

Wishing you peace and well-being.
Saturday, July 26, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com