Face of Truth: The Absent Portfolios… and the Postponed Stat

Ibrahim Shglawi

The government of Dr. Kamal Idris emerges as a unique political phenomenon—both in terms of its ministerial composition and the unconventional, fragmented approach to its formation. Over the span of several weeks, the Prime Minister announced his cabinet appointments in intermittent batches, reaching fifteen ministers so far, while seven key ministries remain vacant—some of them pillars of the state’s executive structure.

Although this gradual approach has been presented as a sign of careful selection, the delay in completing the government indicates hesitation and perhaps a lack of political vision regarding the distribution of executive authority.

Notably, three of the most critical ministries remain unfilled: Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet Affairs Ministry, and Energy. These portfolios shape the state’s political, administrative, and economic direction. The Foreign Ministry represents Sudan internationally, the Cabinet Affairs Ministry is the coordination hub of the executive branch, and the Energy Ministry is the economic lifeline—especially amid recurring fuel and electricity crises.

This sluggishness also reflects the nature of the relationship between the Prime Minister and the political environment around him. A significant number of the appointed ministers were not directly chosen by him but came through nominations from armed movements or understandings with security forces.

This raises deep questions about the actual limits of the Prime Minister’s authority and the independence of his decisions amid prevailing power balances. In fact, some appointments appear to have been predetermined, with the Prime Minister merely endorsing a fait accompli.

On the other hand, Dr. Idris chose to surround himself mostly with professionals, leaning towards an academic character, without including political figures with strong legacies or grassroots presence. While this may lend the government a calm image and initial public acceptance from citizens eager for a technocratic administration, it simultaneously weakens the government’s resilience against political pressures and limits its ability to take initiative and make strategic decisions in a complex landscape.

One of the government’s structural challenges is the lack of female representation. So far, only one woman has been appointed, despite the constitutional charter stipulating at least four women ministers. This is not merely a legal violation, but also a flaw in political equity—especially considering that women have previously held key ministerial positions with distinction. With seven ministries still vacant, there are no clear signs of an effective plan to address this imbalance.

Further complicating the scene is that some armed movements participating in the cabinet—despite facing widespread criticism—have shown a degree of flexibility in changing their ministerial nominees and introducing new faces. Yet, these changes continue to occur within elite circles, without genuine public participation or clear policy programs presented to the public, undermining their credibility, regardless of good intentions or competent selections.

From a regional and international perspective, it is notable that Dr. Idris’s government includes no confrontational or provocative figures—except for the Minister of Culture and Information, Khalid Al-Ayesir, known for his boldness and his vocal defense of public concerns against regional and international pressures.

This trend prompts significant questions: Does the government’s composition reflect implicit understandings with regional or global powers? Is the intention to steer Sudan quietly through a delicate transitional phase, avoiding any escalation that might complicate the scene?

Such doubts are amplified by leaked reports suggesting that the Prime Minister may assume the Foreign Ministry portfolio himself—an idea widely rejected by political observers. They argue that managing foreign policy—especially under current regional and global circumstances—requires full-time dedication. Moreover, such a move may be interpreted as diminishing the Prime Minister’s stature at a critical time when Sudan is striving to regain its regional and international influence as an independent actor, not as a subordinate to foreign interests.

Another point of concern is the absence of an organizational structure clearly defining the functions and authorities of each ministry, in line with the new vision previously announced by the Prime Minister and used as a basis for ministerial appointments. This structure should have been issued in tandem with the formation process to ensure clarity of responsibilities and institutional coherence.

In historical comparison, the experience of Dr. Al-Jazouli Dafalla’s government in 1985 comes to mind—it succeeded in forming a technocratic government within a few weeks despite the difficult circumstances. That cabinet combined professionalism and independence without falling into the trap of political quotas or delay. By contrast, Idris’s government—despite similar political conditions—has yet to demonstrate the same decisiveness, raising questions about the current civilian leadership’s readiness to manage the transition.

In conclusion—and in line with the #Face_of_Truth—this government, despite its stumbles, still represents a rare opportunity to recalibrate the relationship between state and society, and to establish a civilian executive apparatus after years of zero-sum conflicts and political polarization.
However, this opportunity cannot materialize without the swift completion of cabinet appointments, fair representation of women and youth, and a clear political vision that transforms the government from a purely administrative body into an active force in the national landscape.

Sudan cannot afford to wait any longer—it remains caught between the absent portfolios and the postponed state.

Wishing you well and in good health
Thursday, July 17, 2025
📩 Shglawi55@gmail.com