Face of Truth: Sudan’s Peace and the Balances of Dark Rooms
Ibrahim Shglawi
In the world of politics, battles are not fought solely in public; many are cooked behind closed doors and settled in dark rooms through delicate balances and shifting deals. Today, Sudan embodies this complex reality in its most vivid form. Since the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023—sparked by the Rapid Support Forces’ coup against the transitional framework—the Sudanese arena has been turbulent with regional and international dynamics where military calculations intertwine with political and economic agendas, amid a deadlock nearing stagnation.
Statements by newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, as reported by news agencies, declaring Sudan a diplomatic priority for the upcoming phase, reflect a belated American realization of the Sudanese conflict’s threat to regional security. Notably, the appointment of Massad Boulos—an economist with deep familiarity with African affairs—as the U.S. envoy to Sudan suggests a multidimensional approach beyond a mere ceasefire, encompassing reconstruction, economic restructuring, and possibly investment in post-war arrangements.
This U.S. move, coinciding with its successful mediation in the Rwanda–Democratic Republic of the Congo file, indicates Washington’s desire to reclaim its role as an influential actor in African conflicts—especially following the waning influence of key regional players such as Egypt, torn between Emirati pressure and a desire to preserve Sudan’s unity; and Ethiopia, seeking favorable support in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) negotiations and the Nile Basin Initiative. The effectiveness of the African Union and IGAD has also visibly diminished.
Qatar’s presence alongside Washington in the Congo and Rwanda dossiers—and previously in the Darfur peace process—has further boosted regional trust in its capacity to provide an acceptable negotiating umbrella. Sudanese actors still recall the Qatari mediation that laid down important precedents in peace negotiations. Hence, reactivating Qatar’s role as part of a broader U.S. strategy may open a window for a more inclusive peace in Sudan.
Domestically, ongoing consultations over the formation of what is being called the “Government of Hope,” led by Dr. Kamal El-Din Idris, expose deep divisions within the ruling camp, amid evident competition between the army and armed movements seeking to secure power. The army insists on appointing independent technocrats, while the former rebel groups—once symbols of resistance—now strive to expand their political influence, particularly after siding with the army during the conflict.
However, these movements face another fundamental challenge: societal legitimacy. Public sentiment increasingly views some of them as part of the problem rather than the solution, due to their lack of a clear political vision and failure to present new faces capable of convincing the people of their leadership potential during this critical transitional phase.
Interestingly, despite regaining some of its political and social influence by aligning with the army and playing an active role in organizing and supporting the so-called “Popular Resistance”—which contributed significantly to shifting the war’s balance in favor of the national army—the Islamic movement in Sudan appears to be politically excluded from the next government.
This movement, once a pillar of governance for decades, has opted to remain in a “backstage support” role during this phase, issuing only a brief statement by Secretary General Ali Karti endorsing Kamal El-Din Idris’s appointment as Prime Minister, without outlining any demands or political conditions. This stance has been interpreted as a form of cautious pragmatism, and perhaps loyalty to earlier declarations that tied their participation to popular mandate.
Such absence places the Islamic movement before a major challenge: how to maintain its grassroots momentum without becoming an obstructionist force? And how can it redefine its role in the post-war phase amid shifting international balances?
In this context, the leaked nomination of Ambassador Nour Eldin Satti as a potential candidate for Minister of Foreign Affairs reopened a contentious debate, reflecting tensions between the civilian vision and traditional power structures. Despite official denials from the Council of Ministers, indications suggest that Satti remains a contender, due to his diplomatic background and involvement in “dark room” negotiations. Yet, his nomination sparked sharp controversy between those who see him as a competent diplomat and others who consider him a political chameleon who served successive regimes. Thus, the key question resurfaces: should the standard be professional merit, or political loyalty?
The revival of the idea of a technocratic government led by Kamal El-Din Idris signals a domestic and international desire to move beyond the experience of partisan power-sharing. However, it also raises contentious questions about how to balance independence and competence, amid pressure from armed movements to preserve their gains under the Juba Agreement, and demands from other forces calling for its review following shifts in power dynamics and new demands for inclusion from central, northern, and eastern Sudan.
Amid all this, the likelihood of political deals leading to the appointment of controversial figures remains, risking a relapse into tensions once again.
From the perspective of Face of Truth, Sudan now stands at a crossroads. The proposed U.S.-Qatari mediation offers a potentially viable opportunity for a satisfactory settlement—but it cannot succeed without transparent and realistic internal arrangements. This requires objective criteria for selecting leadership, away from ideological calculations and narrow interests. Equally vital is the establishment of a serious transitional justice process that ensures fairness, strengthens trust, and restores citizens’ rights.
Wars are not settled by statements, but through balances and negotiations. And if not managed with political awareness and national responsibility, the outcome will be further foreign intervention and internal fragmentation—putting the very existence of the state at risk.
Wishing you well and in good health,
Monday, May 30, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com