The Face of Truth: Has Hemedti Left the Sudanese Scene?!
Ibrahim Shiglawi
On the 69th anniversary of Sudan’s independence, the rebel Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, “Hemedti,” leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia, delivered an audio speech broadcast through media channels. This speech raised fundamental questions about its content and political and security implications amidst the current circumstances. This analysis delves into the contradictions within the speech, its impact on Sudan’s political and security landscape, and what it signifies about Hemedti’s condition and the future of his militia, considering the developments on the ground, where credibility and media warfare intertwine.
It is essential, in dissecting the speech, to highlight the clear contradictions between the announced narrative and the realities on the ground. Regarding Hemedti’s claims of “victories by his forces,” the reality reflects the militia’s retreat before the army on several fronts. Notable among these is the liberation of Sennar, which represents a strategic victory for the army, bolstering its control over key areas between Sennar, Gezira, and the Blue Nile. Additionally, the army’s advances in Bahri locality, nearing the Signal Corps, indicate its approach toward complete control over Khartoum, given the covert operations in the Al-Mogran and East Nile areas via the Manshia Bridge. The strategic Zaraq base operation further underscores the armed forces’ ability to reclaim pivotal points formerly under militia control.
This ground reality exposes the contradictions in Hemedti’s speech and demonstrates a real crisis in his ability to direct events or control the course of the war. Another aspect of concern is his reliance on an audio message rather than a direct appearance, raising questions about his health. According to the “Today News” website, citing a source from humanitarian organizations in Nairobi, Kenya, Hemedti’s health has deteriorated significantly over the past month. In a recent meeting, it was noted that he suffers from chronic hepatitis and exacerbated side effects due to neurological disorders and psychological stress. He has become extremely frail and unable to stand, contrasting with his past image as a field leader among his troops. This narrative reinforces the hypothesis that he has been politically sidelined.
Hemedti’s speech also sought to appeal to the international community, emphasizing terms like “human rights,” “democracy,” and “civilian rule.” This rhetoric seemed aimed at garnering international sympathy rather than addressing the Sudanese people. For the first time, Hemedti’s speech garnered little attention, even among his supporters. Experts described it as the weakest since the war began, noting its lack of coherence and the emergence of a defeatist tone. This assessment reflects the dwindling popularity of Hemedti among both supporters and opponents, as he has failed to make any notable impact.
The inconsistencies between his speech and on-ground practices further highlight the state of confusion and fragmentation within the militia, which faces mounting pressure from the Sudanese Armed Forces. Additionally, the speech reveals diminishing international and regional support for the militia. It appeared as an attempt to reintroduce Hemedti as a reconciliatory figure but lacked credibility and coherence. Clearly, the speech marks a critical phase in the rebellion, transitioning to another stage marked by the weakening cohesion of a militia facing increased military pressure and significant battlefield losses.
Moreover, the speech failed to present a new vision or effective strategies, reflecting Hemedti’s declining ability to lead the battle. Governmental and public reactions also highlight this weakness. The Sudanese government described the speech as “contradictory and dubious.” Sudanese Minister of Information Khalid Al-Eisar focused on exposing the gap between Hemedti’s words and the actions of his militia. On social media, the speech received minimal attention, and experts deemed it the weakest since the war’s outset, signaling the rebellion leader’s state of retreat and frustration.
The current stage of the RSF militia resembles similar phases experienced by armed rebel groups defying central governments. This is evident in the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army under Joseph Kony, which was neutralized after losing international and regional support and was isolated in remote areas in 2012. Similarly, Angola’s rebel movements faced a comparable fate in 2002 after losing key leaders. Ethiopia’s Tigray rebellion, which began in 2020, saw the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) control vast areas in northern Ethiopia, including Mekele, the regional capital. After two years of conflict, the rebellion was subdued in November 2022, with the Ethiopian government regaining control. These examples show that armed rebellions losing external support often succumb to central state authority.
Based on these facts and the current advances of the Sudanese Armed Forces in reclaiming strategic areas, the balance of power has started to tilt in favor of the central state. This shift opens the door to new scenarios that could reshape Sudan’s landscape, fostering stability and ending the RSF’s era. Hemedti’s latest speech signals his departure from the Sudanese scene as a political and security actor, amid declining regional and international support. This suggests that the war’s potential end may involve subordinating the militia to state authority, neutralizing its leadership, and reconfiguring Sudan’s reality to ensure stability and security for its people.
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Saturday, January 4, 2025
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