On the Table: The Conditional Mood Model

By: Mohammad Al-Zain El-Tayeb

The ongoing war in which the rapid support murdered thousands of innocent civilians, and the displacement of millions from their homes, let alone those who took refuge in neighbouring countries, poses vital questions jumped on our minds, which has nothing to do with political loyalties and household looting, but also to existence of man on the map of time, and the existence of the homeland on the map of the place
Since this war took many of them by surprise, they found themselves as the owners of a hijacked ship, asking each other: Who are these pirates and what do they want? Did they infiltrate the leadership booth with their independent cunning, or do they have “supports” among us? Do they want to repair the ship or take it by force? Do they work on their own, or are they “big pirates” recruiting them, and forcibly taking each ship? Shall we flee and leave the ship for them, or fight them over it, or what should we do? Questions that take each other’s necks and look for answers. The answers – whatever they are – are not a solution to the problem, but they pave the way for their understanding.
Most of the Sudanese forces have emerged from the circles of influence, and are occupied by major actors (in the regional and international arena). They have been sharing the Sudan file since the last years of the ousted, but their presence has increased with the events of the popular revolution that overthrew the regime.
As for the external forces, they are not working to restore a missing democratic system, or to build well-established civil or military institutions, or to share with prominent national figures. All it goals in to cease power and lead the country in post-revolution Sudan to devolve what is known in social psychology as the conditional mood that can be controlled by the great actors to achieve their interests.
This, and it is not an exaggeration, to say that contemporary Sudanese politics, before the war, are controlled by conditional mood leaders who can move the internal marginal figures and can also move itself from abroad without being embarrassed.
After the catastrophic war erupted by the Rapid Support mulitia and the decline of the role which Himidti can play (politically and militarily), did the strategy of Group 4 changed accordingly? Is there any intension towards a gradual pull out from Himidti and his forces in light of the visits and calls that took place.

Perhaps the question that poses itself is what are the most important conclusions that can represent an approach to the solution in the coming days?