Gentle Waves: Rational popular resistance against “Janjaweed”
Dr. Yasser Mahjoub Al-Hussein
The heated controversy over the life or death of the leader of the Rapid Support militia rebellion is no longer a significant factor in the Sudanese crisis. Instead, the intensity of the controversy is now tied to a new variable that has taken over the entire scene. There was perhaps a rush, even reaching a point of hysteria, to invest excessive time and focus on the leader’s charisma.
This rebellion has a proactive relationship and objective with this new variable, which could potentially alter the course of the country’s violent conflict. The investment is aimed at perpetuating the herd mentality among the militia members. The new variable in question is the emergence of popular resistance and a massive mobilization of ordinary citizens to protect their lives, dignity, and property against the relentless violations committed by the militia. These violations are not deterred by any religious, moral, or ethical boundaries. Donations of both money and goods have been pouring in, and military training and mobilization have taken place in all regions of Sudan.
The level of public anger has escalated to such an extent that the popular resistance has taken matters into its own hands, acquiring weapons instead of relying on the army for provision. This genuine popular resistance will undoubtedly pose a challenge and a tool against the Janjaweed’s naïve aspirations of bringing about demographic change and exerting control over governance in the country. What is unfolding cannot be considered solely as a civil war, but rather a form of popular self-defense in response to marauding gangs that target them for looting and theft. Simultaneously, it is crucial for the rising popular resistance not to provoke any faction based on regional affiliations, as that aligns with the agenda of the predominantly non-Sudanese Janjaweed. All of Sudan’s inhabitants are affected by the Janjaweed’s violations, including the people of Darfur, who must actively participate in the collective effort to quell the chaos.
The inherent values that have united everyone in Sudan for centuries continue to distinguish them. Maintaining a calm, rational mindset coupled with foresight serves as a major deterrent against all forms of attacks and targeting, particularly given that the Janjaweed are predominantly driven by ignorance and follow a herd mentality. Contrary to this, the brave soldiers of Sudan’s army are entrapped by the borders, safeguarded from calamity, despite facing untimely deaths while their unfulfilled needs weigh heavy on their chests. This is a just and lawful war that adheres to a set of standards and regulations, aimed at curtailing violence, revenge, or aggression against the civilian population.
A just war gains its legitimacy from a legal and moral source, based on human responsibility and rooted in a system of values. This separates it from being seen as an aggressive or retaliatory war. After nine months of this imposed war on Sudan and its people, the main rebel force has been significantly weakened in terms of equipment and manpower. Their presence in the capital has been dismantled, with only a few remaining foundations that are unlikely to last long. These foundations aim to gain an advantage during negotiations.
Politically, the militia has lost all legitimacy due to its ongoing commission of crimes, including crimes against humanity such as genocide and ethnic cleansing. It is increasingly viewed internationally as a terrorist organization, with no reasonable person willing to defend it.
At the regional level, the current structure of the IGAD organization and the Sudanese government’s lack of confidence in it make it seem unable to effectively achieve any political agreement to resolve the crisis in Sudan. The Sudanese government considers the organization’s recent statement, made during a summit in Djibouti dedicated to Sudan and attended by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council, to be distorted and marred by forgery. It did not align with the agreed-upon points from the summit. Khartoum has also hinted at considering withdrawing from IGAD in protest against the organization’s non-neutral handling of the Sudanese crisis and its existence of self-interested relations between parties, including the rebel leadership.
The concerns about the situation of multiple governments in Sudan, similar to Libya, appear to be justified. The Rapid Support Militia lacks the organizational capacity to formulate a coherent political discourse and establish a functioning government. There are also doubts about the extent to which a central leadership controls its diaspora spread throughout the country. Many areas are under the influence of chaotic forces with a bad reputation, hindering the formation of a government.
As the war nears its end, expectations, mixed with hope and objective analysis of current events, suggest that post-war conditions will be different from what they were before. The entire political landscape will change, and new political thinking will emerge to address the mistakes that led to the war. Perhaps the aftermath of war and its effects will necessitate a period of recovery before normal political and civil interactions resume in the country.
It is expected that full authority and initial arrangements will be in the hands of the military and security authorities, who will be responsible for developing a plan to disarm the populace and confine weapons to the state and its security institutions. It is unlikely that the Rapid Support Militia will be allowed to play any political or military role, and it may be internationally designated as a terrorist organization. The greatest challenge for the state, along with its official and popular institutions, will be rebuilding the infrastructure and institutions destroyed by the war. Reconstruction will not succeed if it relies solely on the outside world and waits for promises from potential donors to be fulfilled.
As we reflect on the lessons learned from war, it is evident that isolating and societal forces under any pretext is politically absurd. The heavy tolls on the country’s security and stability resulting from the zero-sum equation (either us or them) are undeniable. Therefore, the state’s social, religious, and media institutions must confront the challenging task of social recovery. This necessitates addressing the deep-rooted effects of hatred and animosity that have taken hold in people’s hearts due to the criminal practices of militias. An essential part of this endeavor entails reintegrating and rehabilitating individuals associated with the misled Sudanese militia, as well as those who supported it from different factions, regions, or tribes. Our aim is to help them become productive members of society, contributing positively to its stability and progress.