Civil-military relations in ruling Sudan

By: Dr. Ahmed Al-Mufti

First: From a practical point of view, it is very important to recall the periods of military rule alone in Sudan, the periods of civil rule alone, and then the periods of joint rule between them, during the 68 years that have passed since independence.

Second: Those periods were as follows:

1. The military has unilaterally ruled Sudan for 52 years: Six years for Abboud, 16 years for Nimeiri, then 30 years for Al-Bashir, where civilian ministers were involved in most ministries, but the military monopolized power, especially with regard to appointing and relieving ministers.

2. In addition, they shared governance with civilians after the April 1985 uprising, with a supreme council of the Armed Forces headed by Suwar al-Dahab, and now with a membership in the Sovereignty Council, presiding over it for a longer period than that of civilians.

3. And 68 years have passed since the independence of Sudan, purely civil rule in Sudan has not exceeded nine years.

Third: After evoking that history, and the suffering of the citizens to this day, despite the fact that Sudan is a country rich in natural resources, and colonialism left it in a good state – regarding civil service, railways, river transport, post, and the educational system – it is evident, without a doubt, that the national rule throughout that period (military, civil, and mixed), has not met expectations as evidenced in the fact that the situation of Sudan today is worse than it was left by colonialism.

Fourth: We have no doubt that the responsibility lies with the military and civilians, according to the proportions of the term of rule of each of them, and this is something that does not concern the citizen, as much as it is concerned with removing the burden off them.

Fifth: As for the right to rule, it undoubtedly belongs to civilians. Therefore, we see that the military members in the Sovereignty Council explicitly acknowledge this. This is recognized by international and African public opinion, international human rights covenants, meaning that there is consensus that civilians chosen in a democratic manner should be the ones the most entitled to rule as they represent the will of the masses, contraily the military does not represent the will of the masses rather they have a different role not less important which is basically securing the country, along with other government agencies, such as the police and security.

Sixth: As for the other roles played by the soldiers in the areas of economy, trade, public emergencies, and so on, they are secondary roles carried out within the framework of the laws legislated by civil authority.

Seventh: With regard to the military’s relationship with civilian authority, we cite what the US Chief of Staff recently said that he advised the US government not to withdraw from Afghanistan in such a hasty manner, but the US government did not listen to his advice and he resigned accordingly, because his role ends with providing advice in the military fields while the decision is taken by the President of the Republic, who was chosen by the masses.

Eighth: The basis for transferring power to civilians is performed in a democratic manner, and not to the military, despite the discipline of all military personnel and their high qualifications, especially in strategic areas, simply civilians represent the “will” of the masses, and the masses are the owners of “sovereignty” and the source of all powers. Therefore, the democracy we witness today is called “representative” democracy.

Ninth: Applying that concept on the ground, we find that the masses are the ones who toppled the government of General Abboud, the government of General Nimeiri and the government of General Al-Bashir.

Tenth: But there is no objection to that as the masses sometimes welcome those generals when they seize power from an elected civilian government due a failure by civilians to meet their aspirations. However, it is a temporary welcome, which is shortly followed by a call to democracy by the masses.

Eleventh: We believe that the masses welcome military coups for two reasons, namely:

1. The interest of the members of the executive body in their own interests.

2. A structural shortcoming in “representative” democracy itself, because the masses do not control the executive body, but they monitor it through parliamentarians, who are themselves, have their own interests, and when those interests conflict with the interests of the masses, the parliamentarians tend to stick to their own interests except for those who fear god, who are rarely to be found.

Twelfth: Therefore, concern for private interests is not dealt with by the official oversight, which is represented in the legislative councils, because alliances quickly occur between the elites of the executive body and the legislative body elites, and thus the rights of citizens are wasted, and the clearest example of this is the failure of different legislative bodies of the Bashir regime, at the federal, state and local level, in monitoring the executive bodies.

Thirteenth: The remedy proposed by the human rights mass movement, which was founded at the Khartoum International Center for Human Rights in 2005, is the presence of “public watchdog for sustainable human rights” on the executive and legislative bodies, and this human rights watchdog (the masses incubator) calls for various requirements. And, we have continued to raise awareness since the founding of the movement in 2005.

Fourteenth: As for the structural shortcoming in “representative” democracy, ancient democracies in all parts of the world got aware of it and began to find remedies for it, the most effective of which, in our opinion, is the Swiss experience, which made the decision on important matters not for “representative democracy” parliaments. However, for general referendums, in which all citizens participate in “direct democracy,” it is well known that this can only be applied in a highly developed country.

Fifteenth: Among the efforts exerted in this direction is making the principle of “widening the base of public participation” one of the most important principles of good governance, which is done from a practical point of view, by giving localities a greater role in executive decision-making.

Sixteenth: However, our political society still does not think of addressing that structural imbalance in “representative” democracy, and the greatest evidence of this is that Al-Bashir’s Constitution of 2005 summarized good governance in one phrase in Article 25, by stipulating that “good governance should be observed at all levels of government.” As for the current constitutional document, it did not mention good governance.

Seventeen: This means, in our estimation, that we are on the verge of, after the transitional period, a representative democracy, which is no different from democracy following the October Revolution of 1964, and the uprising of April 1985.

Eighteenth: But for our part in the mass human rights movement, we believe that the revolution must be sustained during the elections by spreading human rights awareness in a sense that voters are aware enough to vote for their rights not the party, and then maintain the revolution after the elections to form the masses as Rights-based entities, along with political parties, to exert sustained pressure on the political elites to meet the basic demands of the masses as a priority.

Nineteen: We have published a book on the resistance committees, as “masses incubator” of the revolution and as the political incubator of the revolution, whose membership is confined to some participant revolutionaries, different to the body that involve all revolutionaries to function as a monitoring body to oversight the performance resistance committees involved in the executive, legislative, and partisan activities. We have not lost hope that those revolutionaries desiring to get involved in politics during the transmission period to reconsider their position. Sudan will not be a country that accommodates everyone and provides them with a decent life in the absence of a public human rights incubator that reconciles partisan political practice and does not serve as a substitute.