OPINION

The Face of Truth: Seventy Years Between Public Awareness and Elite Failure

Ibrahim Shaglawi

On December 19, 1955, independence was declared through a parliamentary vote, officially proclaiming the establishment of the Republic of Sudan on January 1, 1956.

However, seventy years after independence, our country still stands in the same place, holding a key that has not yet been properly used, and a map whose symbols have not been fully understood. This raises a fundamental question: why has the Sudanese state faltered in achieving true independence that extends to full national decision-making sovereignty and sustainable democratic stability?

The Sudanese people, across all social groups, remain a latent force capable of change, renewal, and advancement, as demonstrated by all previous revolutions that united diverse segments of society in their pursuit of freedom, peace, and justice.

Yet this people, who have excelled in their insistence on change, find themselves besieged by the failure of political elites to translate those aspirations into tangible reality. Despite popular will, elites have been unable to offer political solutions capable of overcoming the crises of the Sudanese state, placing Sudan before only two possible paths: either ambitions and conflicts continue until they lead to the fragmentation of the state, or a radical transformation is achieved toward sustainable peace that enables the building of a new state upon the ruins of incomplete independence.

Since the fall of Omar al-Bashir in 2019, political forces in Sudan have had a historic opportunity to rebuild the political system on new foundations that are more responsive to the hopes and aspirations of Sudanese citizens. However, these political elites failed to grasp the magnitude of their responsibility. Instead of striving to reestablish the social contract, they treated the situation as a prize of power rather than an opportunity for radical reform.

Rather than becoming active contributors to laying the foundations of a new state, Sudan’s political scene slid into narrow ideological conflicts, with the primary objective becoming the exclusion of opponents, turning justice into a tool for revenge.

The first manifestation of this failure was the transformation of the Empowerment Removal Committee from an instrument of justice into a means for settling political scores. This approach weakened the rule of law and led to the collapse of trust in national institutions, rendering discourse on justice in Sudan little more than a slogan without real implementation on the ground.

Instead of expanding the circle of political participation, some parties sought to monopolize power through fragile alliances. This was clearly evident in the Lawyers’ Constitution, which failed to achieve even the minimum level of national consensus, instead reflecting the desire of certain forces to exclude others. This step was proof that political forces lacked a vision aimed at construction rather than exclusion.

Yet the Sudanese crisis does not stop at the limits of internal failure alone; it is further complicated by regional and international interventions that have fueled internal conflict.

At a time when the Sudanese government was supposed to focus on managing the transition crisis, political forces were handing over the keys of the country to external actors, with regional and international mediations becoming active players in decision-making.

These interventions deepened national fragmentation, and political settlements began to be managed according to regional and international power balances rather than the will of the Sudanese people. Thus, national decision-making became threatened with the loss of its effective independence.

This context cannot pass without reference to the political chaos resulting from the absence of state control over forces of de facto power. Since the fall of al-Bashir, armed militias lacking oversight or legal legitimacy have proliferated, leading to the fragmentation of authority and its distribution among armed factions. This has stripped the country of its ability to achieve peace and internal stability, deepening the crisis and making the state’s monopoly over the use of force vulnerable to sliding into chaos.

Corruption in some sectors of the Sudanese state further deepens the political and economic crisis in the country. The issue is not limited to undermining financial resources; it goes beyond that to distort the structure of the state and widen the gap between ruling elites and the people. Sudan has failed to impose genuine mechanisms to combat corruption, and the persistence of corruption at various levels of the state has added heavy burdens on Sudanese citizens, making the achievement of social justice impossible.

Alongside this, the absence of the rule of law represents one of the most prominent problems Sudan faces today. Justice in Sudan suffers from bias and politicization and lacks the independence necessary to uphold principles of fairness and equality before the law. As a result, the Sudanese state has been unable to impose its authority in a manner that allows for the fair resolution of legal and political disputes.

Within this complex reality, Sudan today stands at a crossroads: either war and conflict continue to escalate to the point of disintegrating the Sudanese entity, or a comprehensive peace process emerges as the beginning of rebuilding the Sudanese state on sound foundations. The first option—continued war—means a major economic and humanitarian catastrophe whose consequences are unimaginable. The second option—peace—is difficult and arduous, but possible if there is sincere and courageous internal will from the Sudanese people, and a sincere international will free from mere coercion.

Restoring national sovereignty requires determination to rebuild the social contract, replacing policies of exclusion and accusations with genuine national partnership. Sudan needs a state of law, not a state dominated by armed factions or foreign interventions. It also needs political elites with a strategic vision that places the national interest above all else and believes that the only path out of the crisis cannot be through excluding others.

According to #The_Face_of_Truth, there will be no exit from the tunnel except through a genuine transition toward national coexistence, justice, and institutional reform. If Sudanese citizens do not hasten to correct the political course within a framework of internal consensus, they will continue to pay the price for the failure of political elites and their inability to craft policies that build a modern state, leaving Sudan mired in endless crises.

With best wishes for health and well-being.

January 1, 2026

Shglawi55@gmail.com