Face of Truth: Khartoum and Washington: The Diplomacy of Possibilities..!
Ibrahim Shaglawy
Washington is currently taking steps aimed at reshaping regional balances and redrawing maps of influence in the region, with Sudan standing at the center of this equation—exposed, despite possessing opportunities to be a key player. The visit of Foreign Minister Mohieldin Salem and the accompanying delegation to Washington goes beyond the official statements to carefully managed leaks.
For many considerations, we attempt to read this visit in a way that brings together what is declared and what is concealed, in light of the rapidly unfolding events.
Khartoum enters this stage while attempting to reassert its presence as an existing and active state, in the midst of a war that has raised numerous questions. The battle on the ground is not isolated from the battle of diplomacy, and the ability to reach Washington at this particular time signals that Khartoum seeks to shift the conflict from the logic of military force to the logic of politics and possible approaches.
In this sense, the visit appears to be an attempt to affirm that the state is still capable of addressing the world as a decision-maker, not as a passive actor in the context of a crisis.
Washington, for its part, views Sudan as a space where delicate regional and international interests intersect. A war without horizon would turn the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa into an open arena for competing forces, and would risk creating a strategic vacuum difficult to contain. Thus, the U.S. administration acts based on practical motives more than ethical ones. The matter is not “advice for peace,” but arrangements to manage the balance of influence and prevent collapse in a region of high geostrategic importance.
In this context, the central question must be: what will Washington demand from Khartoum, and what can Khartoum offer in terms of a comprehensive vision for the future of the state and its internal balance of power? Negotiations in such a context are not built on rhetoric, but on realities shaped by frontlines, alliances, and circles of influence. What takes form on the ground will be the realistic ceiling for any future settlement—whether imminent or delayed.
The success of the visit, then, is not measured by statements, but by Khartoum’s ability to manage two parallel equations: consolidating the balance of power on the ground, and stabilizing it within a political discourse capable of transforming military gains into diplomatic leverage.
From here emerges the concept of the “Diplomacy of Possibilities” as a key to understanding Sudan’s current political movement—a path that does not promise an immediate solution, but opens a political window in the wall of war, giving Khartoum the opportunity to redefine itself as a regional actor, rather than a battlefield for proxy conflict. The success of this path may shape the future of Sudan—and perhaps the entire region—considering the American plan to re-engineer the Middle East and the Horn of Africa.
However, according to several leaks, what is taking place in Washington does not appear to be a direct bilateral dialogue with the United States as much as it is an interaction with the UAE under American mediation. It is also a dialogue with the “Quartet.” Washington seeks economic and political gains while keeping the Sudan file among its priorities, especially given the intersections between regional security, energy, and maritime routes.
This interpretation is reinforced by the composition of the Sudanese delegation, which included Foreign Minister Mohieldin Salem, the Head of Intelligence Lt. Gen. Mohamed Ali Subair, Colonel Amro Abu Obeida, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, and the Sudanese Ambassador in Washington—indicating that the issues on the table extend beyond economic concerns to strategic political and security matters.
The absence of a clear vision among the delegation may render the dialogue vulnerable to unbalanced understandings, which necessitates formulating a unified national position to ensure the process results in an equitable political deal—one that includes lifting sanctions, designating the Rapid Support Forces as a terrorist organization, and attracting Gulf investments for reconstruction in a way that protects Sudan’s interests during the ongoing war.
It appears that what is taking place in Washington does not aim to produce direct peace, but rather to rearrange American influence and interests in Sudan, at a time when the usefulness of the Rapid Support Forces has declined due to their violations and the erosion of their social base.
Simultaneously, Washington seems inclined toward repositioning itself by supporting more stable political arrangements, possibly embodied in a new government supported by a military reference led by Lt. Gen. Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan—or reconsidering Burhan himself if internal cohesion appears weak—while reducing the roles of some Juba Agreement signatory groups, and leaving the “Sumood” and “Ta’sees” coalitions outside the power equation, pushing various political actors to reassess their strategies.
Here, the role of the Sudanese street remains significant in the absence of a legislative institution that could have acted as a major line of defense, were it not for short-sightedness and delays in completing state structures per the amended 2025 Constitutional Document.
In this context emerges the possibility of the return of Islamists as one of the influential components in the coming power arrangement. Despite the controversy surrounding their past role, it cannot be denied that they formed a key organizational and social support base for the army during the war and contributed to stabilizing defense lines against the Rapid Support Forces. This reality places their presence within the internal balance of power that cannot be bypassed in any future settlement.
However, their return will not be in their previous ideological form, according to leaks. Washington, aware of their real weight, will not accept the reproduction of the old regime. Thus, their role is likely to continue through public support for the military institution and via civilian fronts with a national rather than partisan character.
In this sense, current realities may reproduce the Islamists as a power of influence within the state, not as a ruling power—considering their declared stance: “No return except through elections.” In return, they will maintain a balance between supporting the battlefield and preserving national sovereignty while navigating international pressures.
This shift also reflects American pragmatism. Washington no longer operates on the logic of total exclusion, but rather political containment—since completely sidelining Islamists risks losing a significant social constituency and pushing it toward destabilizing opposition.
Regionally, the divergence of positions between Cairo and Abu Dhabi on one side, and Doha and Ankara on the other, will determine the space within which Islamists might operate in the upcoming settlement, whether as supporters of the army or as partners in an adaptable transitional arrangement.
Meanwhile, an internal movement is rising in Port Sudan to reshape the relationship between the state and its allies, seemingly preparing for a new phase of regional and international negotiation that is increasingly pressing on Sudan.
In the end, the country today stands before the task of redefining the state itself, in a turbulent regional moment reshaping the balance of influence. Without a clear national project, the scene will remain open to all possibilities.
In any case, according to Face of Truth, politics remains the art of managing what is possible—not recycling wishes and emotions. And the open question remains: will the Washington visit be the beginning of a path to reconstitute the state through a national project and balance of internal power, or merely a temporary maneuver in a deepening crisis that may fracture internal unity and the country itself?
Wishing you wellness and peace.
Sunday, October 26, 2025
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