Face of Truth: The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam and Sudan’s Water Security..
Ibrahim Shaghlawi
Since its announcement, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has constituted one of the most complex geopolitical crises in the Nile Basin, due to its technical, strategic, and security dimensions that affect Sudan’s vital interests. While initial expectations hinged on the dam as a means of regulating the Blue Nile waters and protecting Sudan from flood fluctuations, recent events — particularly the 2025 floods — have revealed otherwise, most notably the lack of coordination and the consequences of the unilateral management of the project.
This year, Sudan witnessed a late and sudden flood that caused severe damage to properties, especially in areas along the Blue Nile. Despite the significant efforts made by Sudanese operating teams at the Roseires Dam and others to prevent a greater catastrophe, the reality revealed a continued technical fragility in managing the GERD file.
The flood was not merely the result of natural factors but of what can be described as a “man-made flood,” as Ethiopia proceeded with the completion of the fourth filling on 9 September 2025 — more than a month ahead of the usual schedule — coinciding with the celebration of the dam’s inauguration. This was followed by uncontrolled discharges exceeding 730 million cubic meters per day, at a time when Sudanese dams were already dealing with water abundance resulting from increased White Nile inflows. This exacerbated the situation and, according to experts, placed the Roseires Dam in a defensive posture that prevented preemptive storage or safe passage of inflows.
This scenario, and the recurrence of similar incidents in previous years, exposes the failure of one of the key provisions stipulated in the Declaration of Principles signed in Khartoum in 2015, as well as the bilateral agreement between Sudan and Ethiopia in October 2022, both of which clearly stipulated the establishment of joint mechanisms and technical teams for information exchange and prior consultation on seasonal dam operations.
However, the failure of this mechanism to convene and maintain regular meetings before filling or discharge operations has effectively removed Sudan from the equation, leaving it as a recipient of shocks rather than a partner in managing them. Here arises the essential question: Why wasn’t this mechanism activated? And why was Sudan absent from regular meetings?
It is evident that the shortcomings in dealing with the GERD file are not solely due to weak technical analysis or limited information, but also due to the absence of a national strategic vision. Ethiopia may have managed the file primarily as a political tool, benefiting from Sudan’s flexible stances and the goodwill that overshadowed risk assessment.
The 2025 experience has unequivocally proven that the Blue Nile is no longer a natural river with predictable behavior but has come under the control of the upstream state, which acts unilaterally without regard for the interests of its neighbors or the resulting environmental and humanitarian risks. Despite the fact that the statements issued by the Ethiopian side regarding the floods and the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation were consistent,
The pressing question remains: Can Sudan base its national security on an assumption of goodwill alone? The painful answer came in the form of villages submerged by water, farms destroyed by floods, and power stations going offline. This must be read as a strategic warning that should be utilized to balance strategic interests with the Ethiopian side and political ones with other partners.
Future preparedness has become an existential necessity, beginning with a political and technical repositioning in managing the file and extending to formulating a national water strategy that goes beyond reliance on Ethiopian notifications. It should establish an independent early warning system and operational models based on various filling and discharge scenarios.
Several experts believe that the first steps of preparedness lie in implementing strategic civil works, including completing the Rahad and Kenana spillways and the two canals, establishing an alternative emergency spillway, and ensuring operational readiness to handle exceptional water resources that may exceed normal levels. These proposals require Sudan’s Ministry of Finance to fund the studies by assigning the matter to reputable consulting firms.
There is also an urgent need to open flood pathways toward the Butana and Abu Delaig plains, estimated at more than ten million acres of arable land, making it a potential absorption project for any unexpected inflows. Therefore, it must be included in studies to prevent it from remaining mere thoughts and suggestions. All relevant authorities and affected states must be involved. This project could become a hub for agricultural and pastoral development, serving the food security of Sudan, Egypt, and Ethiopia, and contributing to enhancing water and food national security.
This vision requires strong political will, high executive capability, and expertise that Sudan possesses, in addition to institutional coordination that considers regional dimensions. This highlights the importance of joint projects that promote economic integration and secure food and energy sources in a region facing escalating environmental and geopolitical challenges.
Accordingly, it has become imperative for the Sudanese Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation to initiate urgent and comprehensive studies on all possible scenarios in case of water inflows exceeding normal levels under any circumstance, concluding with practical, actionable recommendations enabling the country to manage all potential outcomes, whether immediate or future. This is considering that Sudan is land for agriculture, not storage.
The riparian lands along the Nile should also be repurposed for agricultural uses, and population densities in at-risk areas should be reduced through attractive development projects in new regions. Investment in major development projects such as the Sabaloka and Shereik barrages is also important, along with the construction of stations to irrigate millions of acres, generate electricity, and achieve food security.
Sudan today needs a comprehensive and clear national vision to deal with potential developments in the GERD file and accelerating climate fluctuations. This vision should not remain locked in drawers but must become an urgent executive plan, starting with answering two fundamental questions: What happened? And why did it happen? Then moving toward practical preparedness to prevent its recurrence under any circumstances.
Sudanese experts must immediately undertake serious preparedness efforts based on knowledge and accurate field studies to minimize risks to the lowest possible level, whether in facing exceptional inflows due to climate change or poor coordination.
The 2025 flood crisis has exposed the fragility of Sudan’s decision-making in handling the GERD file. While technicians succeeded in managing the emergency, politics failed to prevent the disaster. Sudan’s water security and its economic and social stability, according to #FaceOfTruth, are today tied to a new approach to managing GERD as a strategic tool in a complex regional context.
What is required today is a complete restructuring of the file, to be managed by a sovereign committee comprising technical, diplomatic, and security bodies, as it is a top-tier national issue. The question remains: How long will Sudan remain in the position of a recipient, waiting for Ethiopia to decide on the Nile? And will future strategies be built on the naivety of cooperation or the pragmatism of interests?
Stay well and safe.
Monday, October 6, 2025
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