Truth Lens: Islamists… From Isolation to Inclusion

Ibrahim Shiglawi

In politics, positions do not change because convictions suddenly shift; rather, because realities on the ground impose themselves on old calculations. This perhaps explains the notable transformation whose features have begun to emerge in the way some Western capitals are dealing with Sudanese Islamists, after long years marked primarily by exclusion, isolation, and their removal from any present or future political arrangements.

If the circulating reports about meetings in Washington, London, and Brussels aimed at adopting a more open approach toward Islamists are accurate, they cannot be interpreted as an ideological shift or an intellectual revision of the West’s traditional position toward political Islam.

Rather, they reflect a new transformation in the strategic environment within which these international powers operate. Major states do not manage their policies based on political or moral acceptance or rejection of political actors, but according to the criteria of interests, balances of power on the ground, and the capacity to exert influence.

Throughout the years following the fall of the Ingaz regime, a conviction prevailed among segments of Sudanese political forces and some international actors that removing Islamists from the scene was a necessary condition for the success of the political transition.

However, the war that erupted in April 2023 quickly exposed the shortcomings of this approach. Instead of diminishing Islamist influence or removing them from the arena, the war produced a new reality that made them part of the equation of control and influence.

The Islamists clearly aligned themselves with the armed forces and the national will, and, alongside others, contributed to mobilization efforts and political and societal support to varying degrees. This made them, whether one agrees or disagrees with them, one of the influential and active components in the balance of power that emerged during the war. In politics, it is difficult to ignore any force that has demonstrated its ability to influence the course of events or to treat it as if it were outside the equation.

Yet the most significant variable may not lie within Sudan alone, but rather in the major transformations recently witnessed across the region. The open confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel, and the consequences it produced, have raised important questions about the future of the regional order in the Middle East. Despite years of sanctions, pressure, and isolation, the strategy of subduing Iran or reducing its influence has not succeeded as some Western and regional powers had hoped.

Indeed, recent developments related to the ceasefire have shown that Tehran still possesses the ability to impose a strategic cost on its adversaries, and that its networks of influence across the region remain part of the equations of power and balance. More importantly, they revealed that regional stability is no longer achievable through policies of exclusion, but rather through realistic arrangements for managing existing balances.

From this perspective, an important aspect of the shift toward Sudanese Islamists can be understood. The issue is no longer related solely to power arrangements in Khartoum, but also to Sudan’s position within the new geopolitical map of the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa. This region has become one of the most significant arenas of international competition, where American, European, and Gulf interests intersect with those of other regional powers seeking to expand their influence along vital maritime corridors.

In light of these realities, it is no longer easy for Western powers to risk pushing influential political components toward alternative options. Decision-makers in the West understand that policies of isolation may drive such actors to seek other paths outside the framework they are attempting to build to protect maritime routes. Therefore, a policy of inclusion appears more consistent with the requirements of the current phase than a policy of exclusion.

What further strengthens this interpretation is that the current discussion is not about returning Islamists to power, but about integrating them into the political process. Their declared position is based on not participating in any transitional governing arrangements, and that access to power should remain dependent on the will of voters through elections. Therefore, the essence of the current shift does not lie in granting Islamists authority, but in acknowledging the impossibility of building a comprehensive political process without them being part of it.

The experiences of the region have demonstrated that attempts to reengineer societies and political forces through exclusion often produce new crises more complex than those they seek to resolve. Consequently, bets on exclusion have gradually receded in favor of more realistic approaches based on managing differences and containing contradictions within national political frameworks.

Perhaps the impact of this transformation will not be limited to Sudan alone. If the region after the Iran war is indeed moving from a phase of breaking adversaries to one of managing balances with them, this may in the future be reflected in similar approaches toward other political forces in more than one Arab country. When policies of subjugation fail, political pragmatism becomes the less costly and more sustainable option.

According to Truth Lens, what we are witnessing today is not merely a shift in attitudes toward Sudanese Islamists, but rather a reflection of a broader transformation in regional and international strategic thinking. Just as the Sudanese war has reshaped internal balances of power, geopolitical transformations in the region have reshaped the priorities of international actors. Between isolation and inclusion, “political realism” has once again prevailed, because politics ultimately deals not with wishes, but with the realities imposed by balances of power, geography, and the interests of states.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

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