Al-Burhan… The Diplomacy of the Decisive Moment

The Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shiglawi

In the Sudanese political experience, major transformations have often emerged at moments when public attention was occupied away from political details—during holidays, weekends, or religious seasons, when the public mood turns more toward social affairs than toward the movement of power and its fluctuations.

It is therefore no coincidence that the recent movements of the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, coincide with the first ten days of Dhul-Hijjah—a period during which political noise traditionally subsides, yet major decisions often intensify behind closed doors.

From this perspective, current readings suggest that the Gulf tour, which included Saudi Arabia, Oman, and then Bahrain, goes far beyond being an ordinary diplomatic move.

We are facing a tour carrying dimensions and implications related to arrangements for the next phase, at a highly sensitive regional moment where the files of war and peace, settlement, and the redefinition of alliances intersect.

In Manama, President Al-Burhan met King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. While official statements spoke of cooperation and mutual support, the political messages carried far more than that. Khartoum’s declaration of support for Gulf security reflects Sudan’s transition from a position of seeking backing to one seeking to redefine its place within the regional security equation. These movements come at a moment when efforts to end the war, rearrange alliances, and dry up sources of funding are intensifying, which explains Al-Burhan’s resort to presidential diplomacy, recognizing that part of the solution to Sudan’s crisis is being shaped in certain Gulf capitals.

Notably, the Manama visit came after two highly significant stops: Riyadh and Muscat. If Saudi Arabia has gradually moved from the position of “mediator” to that of “architect of settlement,” then Oman today appears closer to being a platform for backchannel diplomacy, given its balanced relations with various regional and international actors. In this context, Al-Burhan’s tour appears to be part of a new political engineering process, under the title: arranging for the post-war phase before the war itself ends.

In parallel, Sudan is no longer merely a domestic issue; it has become part of regional security equations in the Red Sea. Yet the paradox is that the expanding external role has not been solely the product of the complexities of war, but also the direct result of the failure of political forces to produce a coherent national vision or build even a minimum level of consensus on managing the post-war phase. This political vacuum has granted the military institution broader room for diplomatic movement and opened the door for regional capitals to become influential partners in shaping the future of Sudan’s crisis.

However, a deeper reading of Al-Burhan’s movements cannot be complete without pausing at the most sensitive and complex file of this tour: the relationship with the United Arab Emirates. This file is no longer merely a bilateral disagreement; rather, it has become one of the most complex lines of Sudan’s crisis within regional entanglements that have directly affected the course of the war and its balances.

In this context, reports of indirect contacts between Khartoum and Abu Dhabi, through channels extending between Washington, Manama, Muscat, and Rwanda—if confirmed—place Al-Burhan’s movements in a context that goes beyond seeking political support toward testing the possibility of reopening paths that have remained closed despite their importance, reflecting a transformation in the structure of war management—from direct confrontation to dismantling the structures financing it.

Yet any attempt to reopen a channel with the UAE faces an internal obstacle: trust. In Sudanese political consciousness, the dispute is no longer viewed as merely a diplomatic divergence, but has become linked to a complex perception concerning the nature of external support, responsibility for prolonging the war, and its human cost. Therefore, any potential breakthrough in this path will not simply be a political decision, but a precise test of the leadership’s ability to balance national security requirements with the sensitivity of domestic public opinion.

And if external movements reflect an effort to rearrange the political and regional environment surrounding the war, what is happening on the battlefield is no less significant. The defections within the Rapid Support Forces reveal transformations, indicating an influential intelligence penetration that has weakened their cohesion and reshaped their internal calculations.

If these developments are linked with the regional movement led by Al-Burhan, this may enhance the prospects of new political arrangements. Despite growing talk of reshaping the government according to these arrangements, this appears closer to a deferred entitlement, tied to the completion of the settlement architecture leading to the day after the war.

According to #The_Face_of_Truth, the current reading suggests that the movements of Abdel Fattah al-Burhan go beyond diplomatic activity toward a quiet reshaping of the equation of security and peace in Sudan. They reflect a transition from the logic of military resolution to an awareness of the complexity of the scene, where force alone is no longer sufficient to end the war. Rather, what is required now is dismantling the support networks surrounding it and rearranging balances through smarter political tools. With the visible erosion in the militia’s structure, the crisis appears to be heading toward a new phase in which the tools of the state are being redefined between the battlefield and politics. Thus, “The Diplomacy of the Decisive Moment” reveals the beginning of the road.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Sunday, May 17, 2026
Shglawi55@gmail.