A State of Integrity or a State of Pursuit?
Face of Truth | Ibrahim Shiglawi
On Tuesday, Prime Minister Dr. Kamil Idris issued a decision appointing Police Lieutenant General Abdeen Al-Tahir as head of the Integrity and Transparency Authority, in a step that is counted among arrangements to reactivate the state’s oversight institutions.
The decision, as it appears, carries important political implications, as it came in response to growing demands to rebuild confidence in state institutions and restore discipline in the management of public funds.
The appointment of Al-Tahir, with his security background and his distinguished record within the police and criminal investigations, reflects a clear inclination toward the logic of field effectiveness in dealing with the corruption file.
The man whose professional awareness matured in an environment of investigation and organized crime is now being summoned to a different arena, one surrounded by challenge and complexity—the arena of public funds and networks of administrative and economic influence. Here begins the paradox, as the action moves from pursuing criminal offenses to confronting deeply rooted systems of corruption in which politics, administration, and economics intersect within the structure of the state.
In this context, the question about the nature of the leadership that has been assigned becomes an entry point to understanding the state’s philosophy in managing one of its most complex current battles: Is corruption viewed as a crime that requires the tools of the policeman, or as a structural flaw in the system of governance that requires the tools of the judge and the logic of institutional justice?
The comparison between the two models reveals a significant difference in the state’s perception of its function. The police model is based on the logic of control, pursuit, and investigation, where corruption cases are seen as networks that must be dismantled through swift and deterrent tools.
The judicial model, on the other hand, is based on the logic of evidence, guarantees, and the separation between investigation and judgment, making justice a procedural path rather than merely an outcome. In the Sudanese case, where networks of corruption have extended into the joints of the state, neither model appears sufficient on its own, which imposes the need for a methodological vision that balances firmness with legitimacy, and speed with guarantees of justice.
However, this discussion remains incomplete without recalling the most important constitutional entitlement, as the amended Constitutional Document of 2025 stipulated the establishment of an Anti-Corruption Commission among a package of other commissions. This text reflects an orientation toward re-engineering the state through supreme institutions that undertake the formulation of public policies and the regulation of the governance system, making the Anti-Corruption Commission the “organizing mind” of the integrity and transparency system, not merely an additional body within the executive structure.
In contrast, the Authority comes as an executive arm closer to regulating daily practice, placing the two institutions before a delicate equation between integration and overlap. From here, an important question emerges: Does the announcement of the Integrity Authority obstruct the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission?
The answer, in terms of constitutional text, is clear: the Anti-Corruption Commission is a binding entitlement that does not lapse with the establishment of a parallel authority. However, the real problem begins when executive establishment precedes constitutional entitlement, creating a “soft structural disruption,” whereby the Authority turns into a practical substitute that precedes the Commission rather than an extension of it, causing institutional realities to take shape before legal references are fully completed.
From here begins the real challenge before Lieutenant General Abdeen Al-Tahir. The success of the Integrity and Transparency Authority is not measured by the speed of movement in pursuing corruption cases, but by its ability to clearly establish the boundaries of its mandate. What powers does it possess? Where does its role begin and where does it end? And how is the relationship between it, the prosecution, the judiciary, and other oversight bodies managed without conflict or overlap? Then comes the most important foundation:
Building an integrated institutional team that is not based on personalization or clique formation, but on the integration of legal experts, financial experts, and auditing units, thereby preventing the Authority from becoming an extension of its chairman rather than an institution of the state.
Here emerges an essential observation that has surfaced in a number of political and legal discussions, namely that the Integrity and Transparency Authority, by its very nature, is not a police body concerned with direct criminal pursuit, but rather an oversight institution concerned with monitoring state performance in managing public funds, consolidating governance standards, and regulating the relationship between authority and resources.
From this perspective, many argue that such institutions are more naturally led by a judicial mind, or an expert deeply rooted in public administration and governance, rather than being an extension of the security enforcement school, regardless of the competence of its members.
From here, a legitimate question arises before Prime Minister Dr. Kamil Idris: Has a clear establishment order been issued for this Authority? What are its tasks, jurisdictions, and the limits of its legal mandate? Is there a precise formulation that prevents overlap of its powers with the prosecution, the judiciary, and other justice institutions? The absence of such boundaries may open the door to reproducing disgraceful experiences that Sudan lived through during the days of the “Empowerment Removal Committee,” when reform tools turned into parallel centers of power, producing constitutional controversy whose cost institutions continue to bear to this day.
According to #Face_of_Truth, the issue does not appear to lie in the appointment of Abdeen Al-Tahir, but in the timing at which the state begins building anti-corruption tools before completing their constitutional architecture. When an executive authority advances to the forefront of the scene before activating the Anti-Corruption Commission as a constitutional entitlement, the question no longer concerns who leads the battle against corruption, but under what reference this battle is managed: by the constitution or by the logic of necessity? And when necessity precedes the text, the difference between a “State of Integrity” and a “State of Pursuit” is no longer merely a difference in tools… but a difference in the direction of the state and in the way governance is managed.
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Saturday, May 9, 2026
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