The Face of Truth: Oman and Sudan’s New Deal…

Ibrahim Shaglawi

The security and political landscapes indicate that the country is entering a new phase of transitional arrangements—one that goes beyond managing war toward redefining the equation of the state and governance, in a way that opens the door to sustainable stability. In this article, we approach this reality from multiple angles to understand its complexities and anticipate its near and distant trajectories.

The progress achieved by the armed forces along the Kordofan and Blue Nile axes can be read as a reweighting of the center of initiative within the state. Regaining territory in the context of a prolonged war practically signifies a shift from defense to redefining the conditions of political and military action, thereby enabling the formulation of a post-war order.

This transformation intersects with a political track that has gradually begun to take shape, represented by Prime Minister Kamil Idris’s announcement of launching a Sudanese-Sudanese dialogue next May, aimed at integrating political forces into the state’s equation after years of fragmentation. However, this path does not move in isolation from the fluidity of transformations, as there is growing talk of anticipated constitutional arrangements that may return the country to operating under the 2005 Constitution, with developments in legal contexts. This opens the door to reengineering governance, reflecting the transition from managing war to stabilizing the state.

Accordingly, it is likely that approaches will be proposed for transitioning into a new phase that may witness a redefinition of the head of state, followed by a restructuring of the cabinet, within the framework of a potential political settlement that redefines the relationship between the military institution and other components of governance.

Regardless of the credibility of the circulating details, the most important indication is that the discussion is no longer about managing war, but about re-founding the state.

Regionally, the scene is taking shape at a new and more complex rhythm. The visit of President Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to the Sultanate of Oman, following his stop in Jeddah and meeting with Mohammed bin Salman, reflects the continued role of Saudi Arabia in holding the threads of the Sudanese file, extending its role in the Jeddah negotiations that resulted in the May 11, 2023 agreement. In contrast, Oman enters the line as a calm diplomatic mediator, capable of opening channels of communication with the United Arab Emirates to pass what other capitals burdened by polarization and calculations of influence have failed to achieve.

In this context, the report cited by the “Al-Muhaqqiq” platform regarding the possibility of Omani mediation between Sudan and the UAE carries significant implications, if true. It does not appear merely as an attempt to stop the war, but rather as an effort to manage a “political exit,” aimed at reducing the cost of attrition and rearranging relations among regional actors involved in the conflict, in a way that allows for a stable political transition in the country.

But the key question is: why is the idea of ending the conflict in Sudan through dialogue being raised through Oman in particular? And why now, rather than before? And why at a moment when there is increasing talk of political and diplomatic movements related to the potential return of a number of opposition politicians and the launch of a political dialogue?

In any case, this picture is incomplete without examining the more complex internal structure within the state. The scene is not based on a singular leadership, nor on equal allies, but rather on a leadership alliance surrounded by multiple layers of support.

Within this framework, the Darfur peace movements—led by Minni Arko Minnawi, Gibril Ibrahim, Tambour, Malik Agar, and others—represent an advanced level of political-military partnership that has gone beyond the idea of support to actual participation in state governance. They are not merely allied forces but have become part of the executive and political decision-making structure, making them key actors in shaping the conditions of stability.

Alongside this, the mobilized youth current with an Islamic background forms a different dimension in this equation. It represents a broad social mobilization force that the war has reproduced within the military sphere. This current does not directly participate in institutional decision-making, but it constitutes a “popular depth” for the state, granting it the capacity to sustain the war and influencing the ceiling of political options through the logic of mobilization, making any future settlement compelled to take this dimension into account.

On the opposing side, the return of Al-Nour Quba, one of the prominent field commanders within the Rapid Support Forces militia, to the fold of the nation does not merely signify an individual defection, but reflects the possibility of a gradual fracture within the militia’s internal structure. The war thus begins to shift from external confrontation to internal disintegration. Leaders at this level are not merely fighters, but carriers of organizational networks and field and tribal loyalties, especially considering the potential alignment with Sheikh Musa Hilal, who had earlier sided with the Sudanese state.

At these intersections, the scene is shaped by three circles: one that rebalances power in favor of the state; another that represents an internal track reshaping the constitution and governance structure through dialogue and settlements; and a third that reflects regional movement attempting to manage the transition without disrupting balances. Between these circles, the new deal takes shape.

According to #The_Face_of_Truth, Sudan does not stand before a war to be settled or a peace to be declared, but before a highly sensitive transitional moment in which the state is being reconstructed—from the lines of combat into the realm of politics. A space is being built between military resolution and constitutional order, between internal alliances and regional repositioning, and between what is settled by force and what is stabilized through politics and dialogue. It is a moment not reducible to a single event, but to be read as a complete process of re-founding the Sudanese state, being born from within its own trial.

Wishing you continued health and well-being.

Thursday, April 23, 2026

Shglawi55@gmail.com