Face of the Truth: The Temporary Dictator..?

Ibrahim Shaglawi

Yesterday, Mr. Othman Mirghani, Editor-in-Chief of Al-Tayyar newspaper, based his column “Hadith Al-Madina,” titled “A Dictatorial System Is Required,” on the idea of the need for a strict system to protect state institutions from chaos, pointing to the importance of a “dictatorial system” as an alternative to the individual dictator.

This idea, despite its importance, intersects with what I previously presented in Face of the Truth under the title “Let Us Create a Dictator,” but from a different angle.

There, I called for empowering a single, effective temporary leadership that combines resolve, firmness, patriotism, and the values of sacrifice—leadership that does not know appeasement—tasked with managing the country during a clearly defined exceptional phase, to rebuild state institutions, entrench the rule of law, and complete reconstruction, paving the way for a return to democratic

From a critical perspective, both approaches agree on the necessity of a strong central authority at a moment of state collapse, yet they differ in the institutional and temporal framework that governs this power. Linking firmness to the system is important; however, any talk of a “strict system” remains incomplete unless its duration, accountability mechanisms, and limits of authority are clearly defined, to prevent sliding into permanent authoritarianism that obstructs the state’s development and renaissance.

Sudan today is passing through a delicate transitional phase that requires a degree of firmness to impose the rule of law and protect state institutions from collapse.

Yet firmness is one thing, and tyranny is another. Legitimate exceptional authority, governed by the constitution and the law, defines itself clearly: What are its objectives? What is its duration? Who oversees it? Who evaluates its performance? And how does it hand over power once its mission ends?

In political philosophy, Hobbes pointed to the necessity of a coercive authority to protect society from chaos, while Rousseau stressed that any authority not grounded in the social contract loses its legitimacy. Hegel, for his part, viewed the state as a moral entity that expresses the development of society, not a tool for dominating it.

Bringing these visions together leads to a conception of a rational exceptional authority: firm in safeguarding security, yet constrained by a clear national project, a defined time frame, and declared mechanisms of accountability.

Singapore’s experience in the 1960s offers a model worthy of reflection. Lee Kuan Yew led a strict rebuilding process that focused on institutional discipline, combating corruption, and building a modern administration. The experience was not a replica of military dictatorships, but rather a model of strong developmental leadership that left behind sustainable institutions. The lesson is not to replicate the experience, but to understand that firmness, when tied to institution-building rather than their abolition, can serve as a bridge to stability.

In Sudan, what is needed is not a new tyrant, but a responsible transitional leadership, limited in duration—three years, for example—working according to a declared program to rebuild state institutions, reform the civil service, impose the rule of law, and combat corruption, influence, and crime, with a clear roadmap for democratic transition. A power that builds rather than monopolizes, that protects the social contract rather than confiscates it.

Sudanese history shows that unconstrained authority—no matter how reformist its slogans—often ends in the personalization of the state and the erosion of its institutions. Therefore, the fundamental difference is not between a “dictator” and a “system,” but between an exceptional authority restrained by institutions and an absolute individual authority unchecked by safeguards.

In short, Sudan does not need someone who rules it through force and brutality, but someone who leads it with reason and wisdom, shortens crises, and rebuilds trust between citizen and state. What I mean by the “temporary dictator” is not a new despotism, but a disciplined transitional formula in which power is used to protect the law, not to suspend it, and authority is exercised to establish a state that endures after its holder departs.

Accordingly, and in line with #Face_of_the_Truth, this temporary authority is not despotism, but a tool to save the state and ensure its continuity, with commitment to institutional and temporal limits. A rational national leadership can transform a phase of collapse into an opportunity for revival, restore confidence in institutions, and build a state of law not ruled by the mood of an individual or a group, but governed by a clear national project, balanced between firmness and freedom, leaving behind an institutional legacy that remains after the end of its term.

This is the essence of the “temporary dictator”: a transitional, firm—not fragile—authority that employs decisiveness to build the state rather than undermine it, establishes a sustainable rather than an emergency system, opens wide horizons for ambition, promotes stability, consecrates national unity, elevates social reconciliation, and administers justice with fairness among the people.

With best wishes for your health and well-being.

Monday, 16 February 2026

Shglawi55@gmail.com