The Face of Truth: The Last Cards of Regional Blackmail
Ibrahim Shaglawi
The talk about the Rapid Support Forces militia seeking to acquire combat aircraft may be read as yet another episode in the psychological warfare that has accompanied this conflict since its outbreak on April 15, 2023. Yet the logic of politics in prolonged wars does not allow for dismissing such signals, however exaggerated they may seem, because what is circulated in propaganda media can, at a certain moment, turn into a strategic pressure tool at the heart of the battle.
It is well known that Sudan today is not facing a rogue militia, but rather a regional project that sought to exploit chaos as a gateway to re-engineering the state in line with interests linked to resources, geostrategic location, the Red Sea, and the depth of the Horn of Africa.
This project has received a crushing blow due to the steadfastness of the Sudanese army, backed by popular resistance, mobilized volunteers, the joint forces, and the rest of the security services, alongside the state’s adherence to a clear roadmap that excludes the militia and its supporters from any recycling in the political and security scene under any banner or title.
However, this project, now on the verge of collapse, often resorts to more dangerous tools to prolong the war, even if that means maintaining a hotspot of tension capable of blackmail and of undermining security and political stability.
In this context came leaks reported by the website “Middle East Eye” from a Sudanese intelligence source stating that the Rapid Support Forces are seeking to acquire MiG-25 and Sukhoi Su-24 fighter jets, with talk of purchasing six aircraft from arms markets in Serbia, dismantling them and transporting them through possible routes via Ethiopia or through the Kufra base in eastern Libya under the control of Khalifa Haftar’s forces, before reassembling them.
Although these data have not been officially confirmed, their mere circulation at this timing carries a political significance that goes beyond their military dimension.
If proven, the possession of combat aircraft by a rogue militia would mean opening a wide door to internationalizing the war in a far more dangerous way. Aviation by its nature is a tool used only within state frameworks and complex intelligence work: maintenance, spare parts, training, reconnaissance information, and cross-border supply routes. That means whoever provides the militia with this capability is not betting on its military victory as much as betting on turning Sudan into a long-term arena of attrition, in which security and stability are redefined according to the logic of chaos, the destruction of the country’s capacities, and the displacement of its people.
This picture grows even darker when placed against the other scene now dominating news platforms, where there are intense efforts by Riyadh, Washington, Cairo, and Ankara to contain the conflict in line with the Saudi initiative and Sudan’s peace roadmap presented recently by Prime Minister Dr. Kamil Idris before the Security Council. If these capitals indeed possess the keys of influence capable of curbing the war, as their movements suggest, then any continued flow of weapons to the militia can only be read as either a dangerous failure of control or a double game being played on Sudan under the guise of mediation and prolongation.
Peace offered in diplomatic halls has no meaning if the skies of war are being refilled in secret, because that would amount to political sedation intended to buy time to recycle the militia as a new tool of blackmail.
From here, Sudan cannot afford to wait or to act in good faith. It must treat this file as an existential threat. This requires a shift from a logic of reaction to a logic of deterrence engineering, by consolidating its air and intelligence superiority, expanding surveillance and jamming networks, and drying up arms-smuggling routes, because sovereignty is not protected only on the ground but also in the domain of control and supply.
At the same time, this threat should be turned into an international political file, as a danger to the security of the entire region from the Red Sea to Libya and the Horn of Africa, where every aircraft smuggled to a militia becomes an indictment of the international system for arms and terrorism control and of those who claim to protect civilians while arming those who threaten them.
More than that, Sudan must re-engineer its regional and international alliances on the basis of solid interests rather than diplomatic courtesies. Stability in Khartoum is no longer a local affair but a node in the balance of the entire region, from Red Sea security to counter-terrorism and irregular migration. These are real geopolitical cards which, if well employed, will make any attempt to recycle the militia a heavy burden on its backers rather than a pressure card against the state.
Here Sudan’s options must be defined clearly. The first option is to consolidate the deterrence equation by deepening the army’s air and intelligence superiority, expanding surveillance and jamming networks, and drying up any potential routes for arms transfers, as a sovereign act that redraws the state’s boundaries in the regional space.
The second option is political-diplomatic: moving this threat to the table of the international community as a danger to the security of the entire region, from the Red Sea to Libya and the Horn of Africa. Every aircraft smuggled to a militia is a declaration of failure of the international arms-control system, and a moral and legal scandal for the international community.
The third option, and the deepest, lies in re-engineering Sudan’s regional and international alliances on a new basis: not only who stands with us in statements and diplomatic action, but who commits in practice to protecting the unity of the state and preventing its dismantling by regional states that provide weapons without restraint. States that fear the spread of cross-border chaos will find in Sudan’s stability a direct interest, not a political favor.
According to #The_Face_of_Truth, Sudan today stands at a pivotal moment. If the militia is allowed to extend into the sky after it has been pushed back on the ground, the message sent to the region and the world will be harsh: that a state can be blackmailed even while it fights and wins. Therefore, the battle is no longer only against a militia, but against those who seek to make Sudan one of the cards of regional blackmail. Either this card is seized and burned, or the entire homeland is left hostage in the hands of those who see in it nothing but a square on the table of interests and miserable balances.
Wishing you well and good health.
Sunday, January 25, 2026
Shglawi55@gmail.com