The Face of Truth: Ineffective International Platforms and a Disoriented National Initiative

Ibrahim Shaglawi

The participation of the Prime Minister, Dr. Kamel El-Tayeb Idris, in the UN Security Council session—at the request of the Government of Sudan—came as a platform through which the Prime Minister presented a “peace initiative” that purported to offer a comprehensive vision to end the war, address its humanitarian, political, and security repercussions, and restore the state.

At face value, the speech appeared structurally coherent, clear in its demands, disciplined in language, and laden with reassuring messages to the international community. However, a careful political reading reveals that the initiative, in its substance, context, and the forum in which it was presented, falls within a gray zone. In this article, we attempt to deconstruct all these contexts in order to understand the initiative.

The Security Council briefing on Sudan exposed the depth of the crisis and laid bare the international system. The deliberations and UN reports placed on the table were sufficient—in terms of facts and legal and moral standards—to classify the Rapid Support Forces militia as a terrorist organization. Yet this did not happen, due to the Council’s inability to take decisions beyond formal condemnation.

What transpired inside the chamber reflects a bitter truth: the Security Council is not a legal authority, but rather a pliable space of intersecting interests, where justice is bartered for influence, and decisions are frozen whenever any party is shielded by an external protector.

Amid this disgraceful atmosphere, Prime Minister Dr. Kamel Idris presented the Sudanese government’s initiative, which, as he stated, does not stem from an “illusion of victory,” but from a national and moral responsibility to stop the bloodshed, protect civilians, and restore state authority.

This formulation enjoys legal and moral acceptability, yet politically it ignores the characterization of the war as an externally driven proxy aggression. Idris missed the opportunity to underscore what the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, stated when he described the conflict as a proxy war driven by greed for natural resources.

According to field realities and documented evidence, Sudan is facing a complex war fueled by arms supply networks, cross-border mercenaries, and logistical and financial support from known sources. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister’s speech lacked explicit reference to the role of the United Arab Emirates or to the issue of foreign mercenaries, despite the forum allowing these facts to be placed before the international community.

This omission represents a political failure at a moment when the speech could have been transformed from merely presenting an initiative into a carefully constructed accusation grounded in international law. Consequently, it was interpreted as an attempt to open backchannel tracks with the UAE under American–Saudi sponsorship, particularly in light of talk about arrangements currently taking place in Washington, especially following the announcement of a lengthy leave for the Prime Minister that may extend for a week.

In substance, the initiative introduced nothing qualitatively new—aside from confidence-building measures—compared to what was included in the Jeddah Declaration of May 11, 2023, or the government roadmap submitted to the United Nations in March 2025. A ceasefire conditioned on militia withdrawal, cantonment, disarmament, DDR programs, voluntary return of displaced persons, and transitional justice are all previously announced provisions that the Rapid Support Forces militia has failed to honor. The question here is: what has changed in the balance of power or the international environment to render these provisions implementable now?

It is evident that the Prime Minister chose the wrong forum—and the weakest timing. The Security Council is not a negotiation platform, nor an authority to endorse national initiatives. Presenting an initiative during a briefing session, without prior sponsorship by a state or guarantor bloc to advance it, renders the speech finished the moment the session ends—as indeed occurred.

Compounding the scene’s complexity was the timing of the session, politically dormant at year’s end, weak media preparation, and the absence of an international press conference that could have been arranged to support the initiative. Most critically, the Sudanese mission failed to request the right of reply to the UAE representative, allowing the session to conclude with serious accusations without formal procedural response.

A deeper problem raised by the initiative concerns the very concept of an “initiative.” Politically, an aggressed party does not initiate in the sense of offering concessions or opening tracks, but rather presents its vision in response to initiatives offered to it, or demands guarantees to halt the aggression. When a government—while being the victim of aggression—presents an initiative without naming the aggressor and its supporters, it unintentionally redefines the conflict as an “internal crisis amenable to political settlement,” a definition that serves adversaries rather than the state.

Amid this internal confusion, it cannot be ruled out that the initiative is part of regional and international arrangements, perhaps an attempt to demonstrate the government’s lack of objection to negotiation and to set its own conditions rather than having them imposed. This is an understandable tactic. However, the danger lies in confusing the domestic front and affecting the morale of forces fighting on the ground. Peace in the Sudanese context cannot be produced outside the equation of the battlefield. Any political path not supported by a decisive shift in the balance of power will remain fragile and vulnerable to breach and blackmail.

The initiative reflects political goodwill, but suffers from strategic shortcomings. It is linguistically coherent, tactically weak, and limited in impact unless backed by influential military, political, and media support. Its success remains contingent upon three key conditions: significant military progress redefining the balance of power; a genuine international shift in dealing with regional backers of the militia; and clarity in official discourse in characterizing the war as external aggression rather than an internal conflict. Otherwise, the situation will remain scattered between ineffective international platforms and a disoriented national initiative.

In conclusion, according to The Face of Truth, the initiative does not appear to be a leap into the dark, but neither is it a guaranteed path to peace. It is an attempt at political and diplomatic repositioning, and at anchoring the state’s conditions on the table rather than having them imposed upon it.

Wishing you well and good health.

Wednesday, December 24, 2025

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