Washington and the Rapid Support Forces: A Moment of Decision Approaches
By: Dr. Abdelnasser Selum Hamed
Sudan is no longer a distant crisis Washington can afford to observe from afar. The war that erupted in Khartoum and expanded into Darfur and Kordofan has evolved into a complex strategic emergency where genocide intersects with regional smuggling networks, advanced military technology, and geopolitical rivalries along the Red Sea. For the United States, the question is no longer “What is happening in Sudan?” but rather “Where will this conflict lead if left unaddressed?” And at the center of this recalibrated thinking stands the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—the actor most capable of reshaping regional security dynamics and undermining U.S. interests and those of its allies.
The shift in Washington’s posture began to take clear shape on January 7, 2025, when the administration of President Joe Biden, through Secretary of State Antony Blinken, formally declared that the RSF and allied militias had committed genocide in Darfur. This was more than a legal designation—it was a recognition that the RSF’s pattern of violence had crossed all thresholds, rendering engagement with it as a legitimate political actor increasingly untenable.
Less than two weeks later, power shifted to the administration of President Donald Trump, and Senator Marco Rubio assumed the role of Secretary of State. From his earliest public remarks, it became evident that the new administration would adopt a far firmer approach. In his initial briefings and public comments, Rubio spoke bluntly about actors “that do not abide by agreements and expand violence,” a clear reference to the RSF, even without naming it. As the war in Darfur intensified and the siege of El Fasher grew more catastrophic, his tone sharpened further.
The most consequential moment in defining Washington’s evolving stance came during the G7 Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Canada. Speaking at the closing press conference in Niagara, Rubio delivered his most unequivocal statement to date:
“Something must be done to stop the flow of weapons and support that the Rapid Support Forces are receiving as they continue to advance and commit atrocities. It is clear they are receiving assistance from outside… and this has to stop.”
He added that the United States is exerting pressure on countries supplying arms to the RSF or enabling their transit, stressing that the ongoing flow of weapons represents a threat to regional stability and to civilians in Darfur. These remarks—delivered on a platform bringing together the world’s major industrial powers—signaled that Su ربdan had moved beyond a humanitarian concern and had become a strategic challenge with international ramifications.
Compounding Washington’s concerns was the appearance of advanced Chinese drones at Nyala Airport under RSF control. Yale Humanitarian Research Lab documented the presence of aircraft likely belonging to the CH-95 or FH-95 class—sophisticated combat platforms with operational ranges of 100–200 kilometers. For U.S. policymakers, the RSF’s acquisition of such technology raised pressing questions about training, technical support, and the broader supply networks operating outside international oversight. Amnesty International later confirmed that advanced Chinese weapons had entered Sudan through re-export from the United Arab Emirates, in clear violation of the Darfur arms embargo.
Yet what ultimately shifted Washington’s internal calculus was not the drones or the weapons alone, but what unfolded in El Fasher. Over recent months, the city became the largest theater of systematic violence in Sudan. What took place was not a conventional battle but a total siege, where starvation, isolation, and the destruction of medical facilities became instruments of war. The RSF encircled the city from three directions, severing supply routes and repeatedly striking critical medical centers—forcing the Saudi Hospital and Al-Salamabi to cease operations for prolonged periods.
As civilians were trapped, RSF-operated drones conducted reconnaissance and precision strikes. The ground assault followed a “slow encirclement” tactic: seizing northern and western suburbs, triggering mass displacement, and advancing toward the city’s core. Satellite imagery revealed extensive destruction—most notably in the Zagalona district—while survivor testimonies described mass killings during the RSF’s advances.
As parts of the city opened up, even more alarming evidence emerged. According to credible independent estimates—supported by satellite imagery and field testimony—there are at least 15 suspected mass grave sites around El Fasher. Human rights researchers and local experts estimate that the number of civilians killed during the siege and assault may exceed 10,000 people. While UN verification remains limited, the convergence of field reports, satellite evidence, and humanitarian assessments has lent significant credibility to these figures.
These developments prompted the U.S. Congress to take an unprecedented step by adopting the legislative amendment S.Amdt.3626, requiring the State Department to conduct a 90-day formal assessment of whether the RSF meets the criteria for designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). The amendment does not impose the designation automatically, but it marks the penultimate stage in the U.S. policy process—a clear indicator of the seriousness with which Washington now views the RSF’s evolution.
A closer examination of the three U.S. legal criteria for FTO designation—foreign entity, engagement in terrorism or the capacity for it, and posing a threat to U.S. national security—shows that the RSF is rapidly approaching full qualification. It is implicated in systematic mass killings, employs violence to pursue political objectives, possesses advanced weaponry through external networks, and controls transnational gold-smuggling routes that finance its operations.
The Pentagon sees an additional layer of risk tied to the Red Sea. The region is already defined by intense geopolitical competition, and the emergence of a heavily armed non-state actor equipped with drones and cross-border mobility introduces dangerous volatility into one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. Even if the RSF has not directly threatened maritime navigation, its territorial expansion in an area crowded with foreign military bases raises serious strategic alarms.
Amid these challenges, the Sudanese Armed Forces are fighting a complex war against an opponent receiving substantial external support, possessing superior weaponry, and benefiting from transnational smuggling networks. For this reason, Washington refrains from criticizing the Sudanese army or Egypt; intelligence and operational realities point clearly to the actor that is benefitting from foreign support and reshaping the balance of power.
While designating the RSF as a terrorist organization would incur diplomatic costs—especially for U.S. relations with parts of the Gulf and with China—the cost of not acting may be far greater. Allowing an armed actor that commits mass atrocities, besieges cities, deploys advanced drones, and finances itself through international gold networks to operate unchecked could set a dangerous precedent, potentially replicating similar models across other conflict zones.
El Fasher—through the magnitude and scale of the crimes committed there—has become the defining moment in Washington’s recognition that Sudan is no longer a local crisis but a strategic dilemma with regional and global implications. In a world where power is exercised through technology, money, and organized violence, the decision on whether Washington will act against the RSF is no longer a question of if, but of when—and how.
Dr. Abdelnasser Selum Hamed
Senior Researcher and Director of the East Africa & Sudan Program at FOx Research – Sweden
Specialist in Crisis Management and Counter-Terrorism, and Analyst on Regional Conflicts and Human Rights