Face of Truth: Baghdad Summit: Speeches of Support and Deepening Abandonment!
Ibrahim Shglawi
The 34th Arab Summit held in Baghdad on May 17, 2025, served as a revealing moment regarding the Arab position on the Sudanese crisis. Despite the political momentum surrounding the summit, the gap was evident between the declared rhetoric of solidarity and the absence of practical mechanisms and genuine responsiveness to the escalating Sudanese tragedy. Sudan, exhausted by a brutal internal war driven by regional and international conspiracies, once again found itself at the center of statements of sympathy, without real solidarity.
The participation of Lieutenant General Engineer Ibrahim Jaber, a member of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, was an attempt by Khartoum to affirm its political legitimacy and to reiterate its continued integration into the Arab regional system despite domestic challenges. The address delivered on behalf of Sudan presented what was described as a “roadmap to peace,” including a comprehensive ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) from cities, and the opening of humanitarian corridors in preparation for an inclusive political dialogue leading to civilian rule and elections. However, this ambitious vision has lacked sufficient support from mediators, alongside eroding trust among actors and foreign interventions that fuel rather than contain the conflict.
Statements by Arab leaders and the final communiqué once again affirmed their support for Sudan’s unity and rejection of foreign interference—familiar rhetoric aligned with the principles of Arab joint action. But when tested on the ground, the limitations of this stance become clear: no serious initiative was proposed to pressure the militias and their sponsors, no emergency economic support was pledged, and no diplomatic pressure was exerted to implement the Jeddah Agreement signed on May 11, 2023. Except for symbolic humanitarian aid, Sudan continues to face its war alone, amid a regional strategic vacuum that reflects a collective lack of political will.
One of the most telling moments of the summit was the meeting between General Jaber and Russian envoy Mikhail Bogdanov, signaling Sudan’s clear inclination to diversify allies and seek alternative avenues of support following the Arab bloc’s failure. This openness hints at Sudan’s willingness to leverage its strategic assets within more reliable international alliances, as past experience has shown—especially amid the growing geopolitical rivalry over Sudanese territory. Managing these relations requires Sudan to maintain a high level of political balance and to pursue its interests in a way that preserves its sovereignty and independence in the face of renewed regional conflict.
On the sidelines of the summit, a tripartite meeting was held between the Arab League, the United Nations, and the African Union in an attempt to coordinate positions on the crisis. Despite the importance of such coordination, the meeting’s outcomes once again highlighted the structural challenges hindering effective joint action: multiple points of reference, overlapping roles, and the absence of binding enforcement mechanisms. The agreement to continue consultations was insufficient to keep pace with rapidly evolving events on the ground, especially as the conflict expanded to target infrastructure through strategic drone strikes—described by Sudan’s government as acts of aggression. This underscores the urgent need for effective institutional Arab action.
In the same context, the absence of any explicit reference to the UAE’s role in supporting the RSF raised pressing questions. Despite direct accusations from Sudanese authorities against Abu Dhabi—which escalated to the level of severing diplomatic ties—the summit’s statements included no condemnation. This reflects a deep flaw in accountability mechanisms within the Arab system. Arab summits, operating on a principle of “minimum consensus,” tend to avoid addressing internal disputes, particularly those involving regionally influential states.
The UAE’s political and economic clout within the Arab League gives it the ability to block any collective move against it—even when there are well-documented allegations of involvement in international crises. The lack of a legal mechanism for accountability within the League, coupled with conflicting regional interests, makes it difficult to issue such condemnations. Added to that is the weakness of Sudan’s own position, which has failed to mobilize sufficient Arab support for its demands amidst internal divisions and varied regional stances.
Today, Sudan is no longer merely an internal crisis, but rather an open arena for intersecting regional and international interests, making the pursuit of a national solution extremely difficult without addressing this fact. Foreign interventions—whether in the form of militia support or competing diplomatic alliances—are perpetuating and complicating the conflict, while the Arab stance remains hesitant, reserved, and unable to offer a proactive and effective model to extinguish the fire.
Accordingly, it can be said that the Baghdad Summit, despite its promises and solidarity speeches, will remain like its predecessors. Sudan does not need more final communiqués, but rather tangible political, economic, and security commitments. Unless the summit is followed by concrete actions—whether through supporting Sudan’s roadmap or developing an effective Arab initiative to impose a ceasefire—it will, regrettably, be remembered by Sudanese as yet another occasion of deepening abandonment rather than one of solidarity.
Wishing you well and good health,
Sunday, May 18, 2025
Shglawi55@gmail.com