Realities of Khartoum clashes

Statistical and analytical report covering the period 15 May – 23 June 2023

Reported by ArabExperts Center for Press and Public Opinion Network
Mohamed Hamid Aldaki, Dr. Nuwar Alazraq, Dr. Mohamed Hassan Fadallah, Dr. Ayman Abdujarim, Dr. Wafa Saad, Tayseer Altaweel and Farah Albadri

Preamble:
1. When Khartoum citizens woke up in 15thApril morning on the rumble of shells and the bullets whiz, they never thought that it is signs of a battle that will take long considering thev past experiences of such crises which took last only for few days. As an example the incidents of 30 June 2005 after the killing of Dr. John Garang or the invasion of Omdurman by JEM rebels in 2008.
But this time, unlike the previous experiences the bullets whiz continued and the battles intensified and the bloodshed is continuous recording the longest war in Kartoum’s near and old history

The Arab Experts Center is presenting an analytical report on the incidents on the second month of the war depending on field information provided by its network all over Sudan and the neighboring countries. The report aims at presenting neutral and objective analysis despite the absence of official statistics and the bias of media outlets.

The continuations of the battles and military capabilities
1. After 70 days of clashes, the Rapid Support Forces lost about 73 percent of its combat capabilities as most of its camps in the states are now under the control of the Sudanese army except few camps in Khartoum state on top of which Tayba and Alsalha. The Rapid Support Forces became divergent groups under field commanders in counterattacking any possible attack by the army.
2. Targeting the camps forced the Rapid Support Forces to take refuge in the residential neighborhoods and its recruits preferred to move in civilian dress with motorbikes and the vehicles of the citizens.
3. An unofficial statistics estimated that about 4500 out of 6000 combat vehicles were distroyed or seized or moved away from the battlefield.
4. The number of the Rapid Support Forces militants who were mobilized was reduced from 120 to only 10 -12 thousand
5. Frequent information revealed disputes amid the Rapid Support Forces militants especially between Rizigat and Miseryia recruits a matter that resulted to armed confrontations in Sharq Alnil, Umbadda ànd Waf Al-Bashir areas with the withdrawal of about 4000 militants to their tribal incubators in West Kordofan. It is worth noting that the nature of the clan composition of the Rapid Support Forces leads to the tyranny of clan of Rizigat, Mayiria and Awlad Mansour clans
6. Field monitoring information affirms the pull out of the Rapid Support Forces soldiers to Darfur particularly to East Darfur state via 4WD vehicles loaded with the looted properties.
7. The Rapid Support Forces have high armament power after aquiring drons, rockets and surface-to-air missiles fron the UAE and Wagner a matter that enabled it confront the air superiority of the army and downing two fighter jets.

8. Fuel and food supplies are still flowing to the Rapid Support Forces after it manged to get the looted foodstuffs from the processing factories and buying what they need from the markets and grosseries.
9. The Rapid Support Forces lost the health care after the distruction of public health facilities a matter that constitutes a weak point.
10. The Rapid Support Forces are still enjoying a kind of interconnection due to its advanced communications network which the army failed to control it.
11. The intelligence capabilities of the Rapid Support Forces were considerably declining due to the divergence between it and the risistance committees which were the source of information in the residential areas.
12. The Rapid Support Forces lost the human supply from the states after targeting its military animations by the the army’s air forces
13. The attacking ability of the Rapid Support Forces declined during last month after the failure of its attacks on the armored corps and start defending it’s remaining camps.
14. The Rapid Support Forces motto of restoring the democracy and protecting the civilian transformation was replaced by looting and spoils
15. During last month the Sudanese army managed to preserve its fighting capabilities and strengthened its stances in the battlefield especially after receiving more human supply from several states.
16. The high intillgence capabilities of the Sudanese army enabled it using the artillery weapons accurately against the Rapid Support Forces checkpoints.
17. The air attacks of the Sudanese army declined after the Rapid Support Forces moved to the residential areas using anti-aircraft weapons a matter the weakened the comparative advantage of the army’s air force in last month.
18. The Sudanese army preserveo it’s strategic camps in the general Command and managed during last month to recapture Jeb Aulia airbase, but at the same time it lost the control of strategic battalion and Yarmouk factoifor defence industries.

Seventy days of war. .. the realities on the ground

1. Last month the situation has not changed in the states except West Darfur and North Kordofan.
2. In North Kordofan the Rapid Support Forces are attempting to besiege El-Obied city from all directions to attack it but the Sudanese army repulsed it through air force.
3.. In North Kordofan, Alrahad City was subject to the Rapid Support Forces attacks a matter that claimed lives and injuries.
4. The Rapid Support Forces attacked Aldibibat and looted the police station and public facilities.
5. Kutum city winessed mass robberies by the Rapid Support Forces resulting to complicated humanitarian situations.
6. The Rapid Support Forces managed to invade Um Dafug and evacuate the military garrison on the bordering zone with Central African Republic, besides Ed Alfirsan garrison a matter that opens new supply lines coinciding with the fierce clashes between the government and the opposition in CAR.
7. In its attacks on Geniena city last month the Rapid Support Forces resulted to genocide which claimed the lives of 3 thousand citizens and 7000 injuries and forceful migration of Masaleet clans in what is considered an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the city.
8. By the end of the second month the Rapid Support Forces adapted side-by-side policy through reattacking some towns in North Darfur as El-Fashir is still witnessing active attempts to control it.

9. In its attempts to escalate the side-by-side policy, the SPLM-N led by Abdul Aziz Al-Hilu launched an attack on Delinj city on 21 June to draw the attention of the Sudanese army in Khartoum and distracts it’s efforts
10. In Khartoum, the situation on the ground the Sudanese army is still controlling armor base up to Jebel Aulia and Omdurman the bridges of White Nile, Fitihab. In the North Wadi Sayida military base and Halfaya bridge besides Medical corp and it’s extensions. In Kartoum North from the Blue Nile bridge till the general Command as the Sudanese army managed to defeat the Rapid Support Forces, but Khartoum airport is still an operational scene while Obied Khatim and Alsiteen streets are scenes of exchanged control between the two sides.
11. The tactics of the Rapid Support Forces deployment in vast areas on the ground included the Khartoum North till Qarri, Sharq Alnil, Faiha, West Omdurman, the entrance of Khartoum from the north, Soba and Manshiya bridges, Al Gaili refinery, the TV and broadcasting, the Republican Palace and several public institutions which are geographically located on the Nile, Gumhoriya and Baladia streets in Khartoum downtown.
12. In the last month the direct confrontations declined considerably after the failure of the Rapid Support Forces attacks on the army’s controlled area on top of which is Jebel Aulia battle which ended by the control of the Sudanese army, while Alyarmouk area of defence industries battle ended by the Rapid Support Forces control.
13. The Rapid Support Forces adapted camouflage tactics through wearing civilian dress, using the looted vehicles of the citizens, besides occupying the residences of the citizens and deployment of snipers on the roofs of the buildings a matter that makes their targeting difficult.
14. The Rapid Support Forces tend to take refuge in the civilian facilities including hospitals, schools, universities, and clubs. Previous reports revealed the stationing of the Rapid Support Forces in more than 24 hospitals, 21 public facilities, 53 schools, 11 medicine colleges, 4 universities 35 private educational institutions.
15. In general we can point out that there are changes in the war course as the Sudanese army launched the qualitative operations, smart weapons, drons and the guided artillery besides concentrating on Khartoum battlefield; while the Rapid Support Forces tactics moved to using the motorbikes, drones and hiding in the civilian facilities.
16. It is difficult to determine who controls Khartoum completely or partially as the Rapid Support Forces claim that Khartoum is under its control through its check points and deployment in the districts, while the Sudanese army denies such allegations through its continuous combing campaigns.
17. On the complete control of Khartoum state the Arab Experts Center tends to determine that the Sudanese army is always keeping superiority on the air and Khartoum skies, while the Rapid Support Forces deployment on the ground is wider considering that the deployment doesn’t mean full control. The issue will remain without confirmation within the non existence of neutral parties or agreed on corridors.

The effect of fighting on the public facilities in last month
1. The health situation remains the most affected by the clashes last month as the working public and private hospitals declined to 58 percent compared to 63 per cent in last month and from 85 to 79 out of 134 hospitals. The bed capacity declined by 8 percent as it is now not more than 1300 beds out of 2860 before the war.
Dialysis centers working now are 18 out of 34 with 7 percent decline.
The referral health centers are now 54 with 9 percent decline from last month as they were 81 in the 7 localities. Working Family medicine centers are 47 out of 101 with a decline of 46.5 percent.
2. Since the launch of the war the Rapid Support Forces attacked more than 24 public and private hospitals the most important of which occupying Khartoum, Tijani Almahi, tuberculosis, Nose and Ear, People, Saha, obstetrics, and Sharq Alnil. The violations against the health facilities included Omdurman, Khartoum North, Albaraha, Doctors’, Ahmed Gasim, Alwalidain, and Alban Jadeed, International, Kuwaiti, Mekka hospitals.
3. The educational aspect is not far from the medical reality as the war resulted to the halt of Sudan School Certificate examinations for the first time in its history which started in 1838, so the fate of about 560 thousand students is at risk, while the study stopped in the schools and the universities in Khartoum state. The ministry of education was burnt and all its official documents were looted. The premises of the universities were looted as the damage included more than 45 University institutions in Khartoum and other states so the educational future became gloomy for the estimated 600 thousand registered students in high education institutions.
4. The sabotage and occupation included all the civil facilities such as the National Archives, land and courts’ registrations. The circulated videos drew a dark image on the on the official public institutions considering that around 215 public units and facilities including the centers of those of special needs were subject to looting and occupation by the Rapid Support Forces.
5. The worst aspect was in the private sector institutions, factories and markets as 6 central markets, more than 15 markets in Khartoum neighborhoods, 118 thousand grosseries and services centers were looted and burnt.
The percentage of the damage of the production and factories in Khartoum state is more than 70 percent.
6. The citizens are witnessing helplessly their forceful migration by the Rapid Support Forces besides looting their properties. Several video films show the Rapid Support Forces while they are breaking, looting and occupying the residences. Specialized centers are documenting such violations as it pointed out to registering more than 90 thousand report on the entrance of the Rapid Support Forces to the residences, while more than 47 thousand report on looted vehicles. Information revealed the crossing of hundreds of vehicles to exports highway heading to Darfur. Eye witnesses said that big number of those looted vehicles are for sale in Chad, Libya and CAR.

Seventy days of clashes.. Humanitarian situations
1. According to various reports, the war resulted to the fleeing of about 1.5 million people from Khartoum to other states. 500 took refuge to neighboring countries Egypt and Ethiopia, while the number of IDPs and refugees from West Darfur to Chad amounted to more than 700 thousand. The IDPs round El-Obied city and South Kordofan areas amounted to about 200 thousand.
2. Up to this moment, the tragic humanitarian situation is witnessing absence of all national and foreign voluntary organizations and no programs or activities targeting the IDPs or the refugees were announced.
3. The Sudanese social fabric provided an excellent incubator to those who flee Khartoum as they were hosted by their relatives or renting house amid high rates of furnished apartments especially in Medani, Port Sudan, Halfa, Dongola and Atbara. It is worth noting that the fragile infrastructure in some states makes it difficult to provide appropriate health care, power and water supplies a matter that complicated the services situations.
4. Most of the refuge cases were to Egypt as it received about 350 thousand refugees since the start of the crisis The Egyptian authorities tightened the migration procedures to reduce the entrance of refugees to it, while Ethiopia announced the entrance of 35 thousand refugees to its territories through Galabat crossing and South Sudan announced the entrance of about 30 thousand refugees to its territories.
5. Despite the fact that the two parties signed Jeddah Humanitarian Declaration and the truce which was renewed three times last month, it was not applied on the ground as only 1percent of the 45 items which was agreed on was implemented.
6. Despite the arrival of relief and shelter materials amounting to 250 thousand tons in Port Sudan, the government and related institutions did not annouce that till now.
7. The most affected areas are the cleansing in West Darfur by the Rapid Support Forces and its supportive Arab militias which targeted Masaleet and African ethnics a matter that represent complete crimes against humanity.
8. Videos showed the permanent violations of the Rapid Support Forces such forceful migration torturing and assassination including the killing West Darfur Governor, while some extracts incriminate the Rapid Support Forces recruits in dealing with detainees.
9. Human rights organizations pointed revealed 23 crimes against humanity included in Geneva agreements including kidnapping forceful detention, attacking the hospitals, torturing the medical cadres, destroying the services institutions, attacking the worshipping places, rape, cleansing, genocide, forceful migration etc. amid calls from world capitals to classify the Rapid Support Forces as terrorist group.
10. After one month of war the daily life became hard due to the stop of production and factories within complete absence in running the activities and preserving security besides closing the airspace except Port Sudan airport which is running exceptional mission along with the closure of the main markets and shortage of the necessary commodities.
11. During the course of conflict several truceswere signed aiming at improving the humanitarian situation, opening the corridors, evacuating the injured and allowing for the access of medical assistance and relief as follows:
– The first truce by USA mediation for 3 days on 21April 2023.
– The second truce by South Sudan President for 3days on 4 May 2023.
– The third truce by USA mediation for 3 days on 4 May 2023.
– The fourth truce of short-term ceasefire and humanitarian arrangements for 7days on 20 May 2023.
– The fifth truce for 5 days on 29 May 2023 as an extension to the previous one.
– The sixth truce for 24 hours on 10June 2023 by USA/Saudi Arabia Initiative.
– The seventh truce for 3 days on 17 June 2023 by the USA/Saudi Arabia Initiative.
12. It is recognized that all the signed truces did not witness 100 percent commitment as the two parties of conflict exchange accusations of breaches.
13. On the ground the periods of truces witnessed redeployment of the Rapid Support Forces and expanding in the residential areas besides the increase of looting.
– At the same time there was no positive humanitarian effect during the truces but in the contrary with each truce the humanitarian situations become more complicated.
– The USA/Saudi Arabia mediation did not succeed in developing its monitoring mechanism or issuing reports on the breaches and the responsibility of each of the conflict parties.
-,The signature of the successive truces with no positive effects on the humanitarian situation gives the indication that the truce periods were only to give time for prolonging the battles, increasing the suffering, and may be to some extent serving the Rapid Support Forces to servive.

Global Reflections
1. The USA/Saudi Arabia Initiative managed to make a breakthrough in settling the conflict through the indirect negotiations which resulted to the signature of the ( Declaration of Protection the Civilians and Humanitarian Situations ) in Jeddah on 21May 2023 The two agreements were on the humanitarian situations according to which 6 humanitarian truces were signed aiming at allowing for safe movements to the civilians, not using the civilians as human shields, commitment to protect the essential services for the civilians and opening humanitarian corridors to allow the access of medical materials. Dispite that the two above mentioned agreements stipulated that there should be temporary ceasefire to pave the way for expanded negotiations to be participated by civilians aiming at reaching a sustainable solution, but the initiative did not make any breakthrough in all aspects including the humanitarian dossier which was the top priority of the initiative.
Through the last statements of the US Administration it seemed that the initiative is it’s way to stop or moving to new forum.
2. On 2 May, The Arab League called for ceasefire and condemned the continues breaches committed by the Rapid Support Forces, besides asking for providing the humanitarian assistance a matter that registered a strong stance in favor of the Sudanese army. The Arab League called for boosting the USA/Saudi Arabia Initiative without proposing new initiative.
3. The UNSC held two sessions on Sudan on 26 April 2023. In the first the council listendv to statement provided by UNITAMS chief Volker Perthes and at the same time Sudan representative in the UNSC said that what is going on is a military coup.
In the second session on 2 June 2023 the UNSC endorsed extending the UNITAMS mandate coinciding with a crisis between Sudan and the UN after Sudan,s demand to change the head of UNITAMS claiming that he contributed in escalating the conflict in Sudan a matter which was unacceptable by the UNSC.As a result Sudan announced that Volker Perthes is persona non grata. The response of the UN is approving the mandate of Volker Perthes to resume his activities from the capital city of Kenya, Nairobi. This crisis might affect the relations between Sudan and the UN.
4. IGAD, under the sponsorship of the African Union, started it’s move later on through its call for solving the Sudanese crisis by the formation of a mechanism led by the Kenyan President a matter which was rejected by Khartoum claiming that the Kenyan President is siding with the Rapid Support Forces, announcing its stuck to the presidency of South Sudan President to the mechanism At the same time Khartoum expressed strong reservation towards the news about IGAD proposal features to solve the crisis represented by demilitarized zones and the intervention of UN forces to separate the two sides.
5. In general the stance of the UNSC permanent members did not give the conflict enough interest due to the busyness of Russia with the Ukrainian dossier and the challenges of China in its balances in Africa make the two countries without considerable contribution in the Sudanese crisis. UK moved to push forward the dossier to the UNSC without presenting any additional proposals. France, which has strong interests in Chad, CAR neighboring countries started coordination with Chad in monitoring the borders by military aviation fearing the consequences of the conflict and the attacks of the Rapid Support Forces.
6.Regionally, it was clear from the first moment the huge support provided by the UAE to the Rapid Support Forces and its bias scandalously along with the full satisfaction of the Sudanese public opinion that the UAE is the party that ignited the conflict through exploiting it’s influence in the area in favor of the Rapid Support Forces.
7. It was obvious the involvement of Wagner in the conflict as it has joint economic and investment interests with the Rapid Support Forces in gold mining. Several reports pointed out that Wagner provided the Rapid Support Forces with the anti-craft and strong tripartite alliance to support General Haftar in Libya.
8. The UN agencies and its humanitarian, monitoring and following up human rights situations organizations did not take clear stances till now, but in the last days there were condemntions by those organizations against the Rapid Support Forces in human rights violations without any preventive measures.
9. What can be said practically is that the global dealing with the conflict was not as big as the issue and the international community’s response was not as required in dealing with similar challenges in other parts of the world.

General Comments:
– At the beginning of the conflict each party was expecting to win the battles in few days to the extent the Rapid Support Forces considered that it could win the war in few hours, but in all wars the victory is difficult and the battles take longer time than expected as it is easy to ignite it but it is slow to put it out
٢. The recent clashes indicate to the slow advancement of the Sudanese army against daily exhortation of the Rapid Support Forces which suffer declination of its fighting capabilities.
3. The continuation of clashes for long period enabled the Rapid Support Forces to restore balance in armament through acquiring anti-craft missiles.
4. The continuation of the clashes for longer time resulted to the resumption of fighting in several areas in Darfur and Kordofan.
5. The continuation of battles for longer time çontributes daily in worthening the humanitarian situation and the increase of displacement and refuge within complete absence of a governmental mechanism,the absence of transparency, corruption rumors which is linked to the leakage of humanitarian assistance to the markets coupled with the reluctance of the international and regional organizations in providing assistance a matter that led to the decline of the humanitarian assistance
6. The media excellence at the beginning of the battles was in favor of the Rapid Support Forces. Several reports pointed out that the UAE arranged for intensive media coverage through thousands of fake digital accounts. The influential TV channels (Al-Jazeera – Alhadath -Alarabiya) represented the strong media weapon which support the Rapid Support Forces against the weak media of the Sudanese army. This was also supported by the Rapid Support Forces occupation to the broadcasting and TV premises and the absence of the Ministry of Information, best the apparent weakness of the Sudanese Army Command website within the absence of enlightenments in such crises, hence the domination of the Rapid Support Forces media in the arena and the spread of rumors and fake news.
7. It was clear the diplomatic isolation of the Sudanese government and.the early absence of the foreign ministry since the start of the crisis except for the determined efforts of Ambassador Dafallah who is the special envoy of the Head of the Sovereignty Council, besides Sudan’s permanent representative in the UN, Alharith Idrees. The recent crisis revealed unfortunates results in Sudan’s foreign relations with the influential countries regionally and internationally as it showed clear hostility towards Sudan in the African and neighboring countries.
8. On the other hand, the absence of the whole governmental Officials in the crisis’ management, except the Ministers of finance and Cabinet affairs raised a question about how to run the country in such circumstances
The crisis showed apparent loopholes in the governmental structure proved by the stances of the Ministers of interior, director of police, Minister of defence, minister of health and other important ministries.
Sudan is paying price resulted from the constitutional vacuum since October 2021 as up to this moment the head of the Sovereignty Council did not assign any government.
9. The puzzling issue is that the government did not declare the state of emergency despite the losses in the main infrastructure and lives a matter that indicates the reluctance of the Head of the Sovereignty Council andthe mystery in his personality and his inability to take desicive stances. This led to the doubt of his ability to withstand against the foreign pressures and his relation with the continuous acceptions to the enormous truces signed which the people did not benefit from
11. The popular support to the army remained since the start of the crisis was accompanied by widening the gap between the citizens and the Rapid Support Forces and that was evedenced by the assistance convoys dispatched to the army.
12. It is expected that the future events will be similar to what is going on through the continuation of the clashes as each party is insisting to win the war in the battlefield amid considerable fall back of the Rapid Support Forces within it’s endeavors to pressure on the Sudanese army in Darfur, North and South Kordofan.
13. As the conflict is prolonging the poor humanitarian situations force the two sides to respond to the international pressures which often tend to maintain a state of balance through the hidden assistance to the Rapid Support Forces
14.Within the current split in the UNSC and the domination of the situation in Ukraine it is most probable the emergence of African initiatives under the sponsorship of the UN pushing towards dialogue which remains the ultimate solution even if one party defeated the other. The dialogue remains important to complete all the arrangements being peace or war. The international pressures will force the two parties to sign permanent ceasefire, opening humanitarian corridors, assigning African troops to separate the two sides as was the case in South Sudan or through the formation of a UN/AU hybrid mission.

15 After that there will be negotiations on the permanent situation in concentration on bringing back the civilians for governance with giving priority to the allies of the international community allies who signed the Framework Agreement and the possibility of engaging the rest of the powers along with considering the armed struggle movements. This will be also the settlement of Eastern Sudan issue.
16. The only option for the future of the Rapid Support Forces in the upcoming negotiations will be its integration in the Sudanese army accompanied by surgery in the army.

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God bless Sudan and its people.

The Arab Experts Center for Press Services and Public Opinion Studies
Neutral Independent Media Center.