Comprehensive National Project Building Group  

Who are we?

We, a group of non-party sons and daughters of Sudan who are concerned about the national public affairs and the future of Sudan, believe that Sudan has been going through a state of a power struggle since its independence on 01 January 1656. The porportion of political, economic, social, and cultural deterioration has continued to increase. We believe that the main reason for this historical political turmoil we are experiencing to this day is the absence of a comprehensive national project agreed upon by the majority of the sons and daughters of Sudan and committed to actually lifting our people. In this paper, we saw a summary in the coming lines of our conviction that a political solution is the only possible solution to the local, regional, and international situations to address the power crisis in Sudan. We will continue to formulate the key features of a comprehensive national project that can be discussed only if there is political stability.

The purpose of this paper

2. The purpose of this paper is to support the path of the political solution to the power crisis in Sudan, which began with the signing of the Framework Agreement on 5 December 2022 by addressing actors within the framework of the political process, whether from the party, civilians or the military with what we see as the challenges to the political solution process.

 

3. The goal of this paper
4. The effort made by our group aims to contribute with others to ensure that the political solution works and does not fail. Failure means entering the country in a dark tunnel. There will be no winner. Everyone will be the loser. Our goal is for all components of Sudanese society and all political forces and actors to realize that we have no choice but to succeed on the path of a political solution. We must cooperate to ensure this success by all means.

 

4. Challenges of reaching the final agreement:

We believe that the framework agreement that was signed between the military and some civilian components on 5 December 2022 is a step in the right direction towards a political solution to The power crisis, but the real challenges lie in the quarterly issues to be negotiated by the final agreement. We, therefore believe that we should make an “intellectual” and “political” effort to address the quarterly issues and ensure that the details of those issues do not undermine the entire process. Politics: Here are the four issues: Justice and Transitional Justice, Pain and Military Reconciliation, Juba Peace Agreement, and Dismantling the June 30 regime. Each of the above-mentioned quarter cases will be reviewed below in some detail.

 

5. Justice and Transitional Justice:

The text on this case reads’ ‘Transitional Justice and Justice: An issue that requires the participation of stakeholders and families of martyrs and includes all those affected by human rights violations since 1989.

From the above text we can understand that the issue of transitional justice has been put in the framework of the concept of “no impunity”.

We should first recognize that the issue of transitional justice is a long-term one that can last for many years and exceed the time limit for transition. But we have to start with the right first step towards achieving transitional justice in the advanced political and legal sense.

We should benefit from the experiences of countries that have gone through similar situations and our current situation. The Sudanese public opinion is charged with misconceptions about the issue of justice and transitional justice that crystallize in “the trial of those who committed crimes against the Sudanese people during and after the December 2018 revolution and even now”.

The leaders of the political work in consolidating this false concept, and this is part of misleading the masses of Sudanese people that those affected by the ousted regime in one form or another for the last three years; or after the revolution in the crime of the sit-in breaking up during the demonstrations that followed and even now are not looking for and punishing the individual criminals.

There is no way to prosecute political criminals in this transitional period.

Crimes and Justice

Monitoring and documenting major crimes against Sudanese human rights since 30 June 1989, the most important of which are: the South Sudan War Crimes Commission, Darfur War Crimes Commission, Murder and Torture Commission of Dissidents to Save Prisons and Detains Commission, Dissipation Crime Commission, Murder and Torture Commission that took place after the 2018 revolution, whether it was during the processions or in prisons.

These committees are required to complete their work before the end of the transitional period specified in the Final Agreement – these files are to be submitted to the parliament and the elected government after the transitional period to enter into a court stage by the principles of justice and transitional justice to be developed by the respective commission, by which time all military and civilian leaders involved in the transition will have lost their legal immunities and everyone will be equal before the law without any restriction, healing, or narrow political retaliation.

Our respect as Sudanese for international justice is the key to ensuring the international community supports us legally and administratively “to complete the process of justice and transitional justice, so the ICC must be dealt with to extradite the leaders of the ousted regime or hold a joint court within Sudan.

The text of the framework agreement reads as follows: Without the building and reform of a unified professional and national army by agreed security arrangements, our country will not be able to achieve democracy, peace, or development.

Military and security reform

The issue of military and security reform is not a process limited by military and security agencies. It is a broad societal process related to the civilizational level of society, the political mindset, and the clarity of political concepts and perspectives that govern the political struggle over power day by day.

Therefore, if we undertake a process of reform of the military and security services independently of the overall reform the reality, including our political, economic, social, cultural, and educational realities, will not do much good.

For example, if the doctrine of the military and security apparatus is to be changed from one to one of citizen protection and elected democratic authority, political leaders and their party entities must be convinced that the only way to gain power is through the ballot box. This concept does not exist in the Sudanese political mind, which is dominated by totalitarianism and an ingrained ideology of democratic free practice.

We therefore believe that the issue of security and military reform must go in three directions during the transition period.

The first trend is the professional and technical development of the security and military services to become modern, lean, non-lax, and active agencies whose members are supervised by them – the second trend is to improve the career conditions of the personnel in these services and develop their technical and administrative capabilities through continuous training – the third trend is the development of the main features of a comprehensive national project. The process of security and military reform will not be carried out by political decisions, but by the effort of professionally qualified civil, security, and military cadres who believe in the comprehensive national project:

Juba Peace Agreement

The text of the Framework Agreement reads The Juba Peace Agreement (JPA): The December Revolution pushed the peace agenda to the fore, leading to the achievement of the Juba Peace Agreement. Accordingly, we see the implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement with its assessment and evaluation between the executive and the partners of the agreement and the parties to the political declaration.

Despite the many reservations about the Juba Peace Agreement, it has become a real part of the components of the current political affairs and its partial implementation has had many political implications, so it becomes difficult to talk about its cancellation or review of its texts, because this opens the doors of the details that will enter the transitional period and may even lead to the failure of the next transitional period

We believe that the first and highest priority is to implement everything related to changing the tragic reality of citizens in Darfur, the two regions, and South Kordofan, foremost of which is the return of the displaced to their areas after preparing them in all respects.

– Establishing security in all conflict areas referred to in the JPA and ensuring the security of returnees to their areas and practicing their daily lives in peace.

– Starting the integration of the Rapid Support Forces and the forces of the armed movements into the Sudanese army by the internationally recognized principles (the beginning of the merger processes).

– Considering the situation of individuals belonging to the signatory armed movements and reintegrate them to work in military or civilian institutions according to their qualifications and abilities, and here we must point out that the next executive authority must address the situation of the employees of the signed armed movements and not to leave the matter to the movements, considering that these people are Sudanese citizens must be taken care of in order not to turn into tools in the hands of some stalkers of security, stability, and development of Sudan. The international community must be called upon for financial, administrative, and technical support to accomplish the above-mentioned tasks.

Dismantling Empowerment of the June 30 regime:

The text on this issue in the framework agreement is as follows:

Dismantling the June 30 system:

The June 30 regime hijacked the Sudanese state and its institutions. To build a professional state that serves our society without discrimination or infringement, it is necessary to dismantle the structure of the June 30 regime in a way that adheres to the rule of law and respect for basic rights.

The word “dismantle or removal” is a cheering word that has no specific political-scientific meaning and sends the wrong message to the mind, that the thirty-year of the ousted regime can be dismantled with swift and urgent political measures.

The Constitutional Document signed between the Transitional Military Council and the Forces of the Declaration of Freedom and Change on 17/8/2019 mentioned the word “dismantling” in paragraph 15 of item No. 8 under the title of tasks of the transitional period.

Empowerment removal:

– The constitutional document did not stipulate that a specific body as a committee or commission would be assigned to this process because the intention was that all organs of the transitional period, each in its field, work to dismantle the empowerment structure, but what happened from the development of law and the formation of a committee to remove empowerment has distorted the intended meaning and portrayed to citizens the matter as if it is possible to dismantle the empowerment structure in a mechanical way and with political procedures as if the matter is as simple as procedural.

Dismantling in the sense promoted by the empowerment removal Committee summarized the matter in the files of corruption and the dismissal of employees of state agencies who were somehow affiliated with the National Congress Party, which created the impression “that it was a matter of political liquidation, not a process of rebuilding a state.

Transitional period concept:

The transitional period in the Sudanese political mind was and still is a period thin at everyone accelerates in passing as agreed to reach free elections, so it was always short periods, and this understanding is linked to the authoritarian mentality that believes that the mere change of the ruling authority from a military authority to a civilian authority and the organization of elections. In our assessment, the correct concept of the transitional period is that it is not a period, but rather “a period of completion of tasks. The tasks set out in the Framework Agreement are very great and impossible to accomplish in two or three years. Therefore, we believe that we have two options: either the transitional period extends for at least six years, or if: – It was insisted that it be two years –  there should be two transitional periods – The first transitional period is to consolidate civilian authority to ensure a smooth political transition from military authority to civilian authority The second transitional period, which will begin after the elections and the selection of a parliament and an elected government, to complete the tasks of the first transitional period and lay the correct, sound and strong foundations for building a democratic national state that has a well-established democratic political system and this second transitional period must not be less than 4 years.

Insisting on a transitional period in the traditional Sudanese sense to which we referred earlier guarantees the regime’s failure and the spiral of coups to an end.

Prime minister selection criteria:

 The experiment of the 17 August 2019 has shown that even the selection criteria that were set were not met and that selection came at random. “This has contributed to weakening the transition period so that this time, effective criteria must be established, including the selection of elements capable of achieving and adhering to the criteria that will be agreed upon professionally. As we have stated before, the area for failure is one saving the country’s overall collapse, accordingly, it is not enough “to make the selection process as that of an ordinary employee selection.

Commission for Combating Hate Speech

 Hate speech has continued to exist in Sudanese society, but if we ignore its existence and do not combat it, it has escalated to the point of boldness and boldness.

The spread of hate speech in political discourse is one of the most dangerous phenomena and even more dangerous than all the political, economic, and social crises that the country is going through, and if we do not confront it strongly and firmly, all our national political effort will have no value and the entire country will be burned and we will only find piles of skulls and ashes in front of us.

Therefore, we believe that the transitional executive authority should have a “Commission to Combat Hate Speech” to identify all forms and colors of clear and hidden hate speech and to establish a deterrent law that immediately punishes in a special court anyone who spreads hate speech directly or indirectly. The proposed commission should include political, administrative, and legal elements and representatives of some international and regional institutions with expertise in this field.

6. Importance of Time Factor and the Necessity of Civilian Government Formation

It is observed that taking the process of the political solution which started by the signature of the Framework Agreement is very slow. Time is very important to make the political solution a success for the following reasons:

• The hostile parties to the political solution will take advantage of any time vacuum and continue its attempts to hinder it.
• The slowness causes disappointment amid the citizens who aspire of democratic rule
• The intense interest of the international community will decline

Accordingly we believe that it is wise to expedite the formation of a transitional civilian government based on what is stipulated in the Framework Agreement to include non-partisan officials. This government should be tasked to implement an emergency economic programme to improve the livelihood conditions and communicate with the international financial organizations to support the economic support programmes. This is besides the continuation of the discussions between the political powers and the military component over the five outstanding issues in order to reach the final stage of the agreement.

7. Expanding the base of the Framework Agreement to include the biggest number of the effective political blocs.